Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV07480, Date: 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV07480 Hearing Date: July 27, 2022 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT |
32 |
HEARING DATE |
July 27, 2022 |
CASE NUMBER |
22STCV07480 |
MOTION |
Motion to Strike Punitive Damages |
MOVING PARTIES |
Defendants NFL Ventures, Inc. and NFL Ventures, LP |
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff Lita Abella |
MOTION
Plaintiff Lita Abella sued defendants NFL Ventures, Inc. and NFL Ventures, LP (collectively, “Defendants”) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained while seated in the stands of the stadium owned, leased, rented, occupied, inspected, managed, controlled, maintained, or supervised by Defendants when other Superbowl attendees fell over their seats and onto Plaintiff. Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against Defendants in the first amended complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
ANALYSIS
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)
In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As set forth in the Civil Code,
(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.)
Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice. To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages. (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice. When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].) In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.” (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].)
Finally, “the imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].)
Here, Defendants argue the first amended complaint fails to allege facts to establish malice on the part of Defendants. Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show despicable conduct on the part of Defendants, fail to allege malice among Defendants’ corporate leaders, and are conclusory. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that paragraphs 32, 41, and 42 of the first amended complaint allege sufficient facts to support the claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff also asserts paragraphs 33 and 34 sufficiently allege Defendants corporate leaders knowingly acted with disregard toward stadium guests and spectators. The Court disagrees.
For pleading purposes, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient and lack the required specificity to assert a proper claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory regarding the existence of a dangerous condition which Defendants consciously failed to remedy. Plaintiffs have not asserted facts which show that “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.” Further, Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish malice among Defendants’ officers, directors, or managing agents.
Plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the first amended complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) The plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See The Inland Oversight Committee, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)
Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden. Plaintiff’s opposition to the demurrer requests leave to amend on the basis that Plaintiff filed this first amended compliant prior to having conducted any discovery. Without more, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate in what manner the first amended complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change its legal effect. Should facts arise in discovery leading Plaintiff to believe she has a good-faith basis to assert a claim for punitive damages, she may request leave to amend upon noticed motion.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against Defendants, without leave to amend. The Court orders Defendants to file and serve an answer to the first amended complaint within 20 days of the hearing.
Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file a proof of service of such.