Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV07480, Date: 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV07480 Hearing Date: January 24, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING
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DEPARTMENT |
32 |
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HEARING DATE |
January 24, 2023 |
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CASE NUMBER |
22STCV07480 |
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MOTION |
Motion to Quash Subpoena for Employment Records |
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MOVING PARTY |
Plaintiff Lita Abella |
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OPPOSING PARTIES |
Defendants Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC, STADCO LLC, and STADCO LA Manager, LLC |
MOTION
Plaintiff Lita Abella (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC, STADCO LA LLC, and STADCO LA Manager, LLC (collectively, Defendants) based on injuries Plaintiff sustained while she attended the Super Bowl, and an attendee allegedly fell on top of her from several rows of seats above where Plaintiff was seated.
Plaintiff moves to quash the deposition subpoena Defendant Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC, served on the State Bar of California. The subpoena seeks all of Plaintiff’s employment records, including but not limited to employment applications, personnel files, job descriptions and assignments, performance evaluations, attendance records, correspondence, W2s, Wage and Salary Information, Medical Records and Medical Bills, Accident Reports, Compensation and disability claims, Insurance Coverage Information, Pension Records, and all Records Relating to Employee Benefits. (Declaration of Anna Okhovat, Exhibit A.) Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions. Defendants oppose the motion.
ANALYSIS
If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).) “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.” (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].) However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .” (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.)
“The
state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right to privacy. Protection of informational privacy is the
provision's central concern. . .
. The party asserting a privacy
right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened
intrusion that is serious.[1] The party seeking information may raise in
response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure
serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives
that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the
loss of privacy. A court must then
balance these competing considerations.”
(Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned
up].)
“Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) . . . .” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff has a right of privacy in her employment records. (See Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.) “The public interest in preserving confidential, personnel information generally outweighs a private litigant’s interest in obtaining that information. A showing of relevancy may be enough to cause the court to balance the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy.” (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652) “[O]bvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.) “Even when the balance does weigh in favor of disclosure, the scope of disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed.” (Life Technologies, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 652-653, emphasis in original.)
In opposition, Defendants argue in part that Plaintiff’s motion must be denied for failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, which requires “[a]ny motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request…be accompanied by a separate statement,” which includes a motion “[t]o compel or to quash the production of documents or tangible things at a deposition[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, subd. (a)(5).” The Court finds that Plaintiff has not filed a separate statement in compliance with Rule 3.1345.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice as procedurally defective. The Court orders Plaintiff to give notice of the Court’s order, and file proof of service of such.
[1] “This initial inquiry is necessary to permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on constitutionally protected privacy interests as not even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.” (Lewis v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 571 [cleaned up].)