Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV09599, Date: 2023-05-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV09599 Hearing Date: May 22, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is
highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative
ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the
subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT |
32 |
HEARING DATE |
May 4, 2023 |
CASE NUMBER |
22STCV09599 |
MOVING PARTY |
Plaintiff Mary Sue Komulaine |
OPPOSING PARTY |
Defendant Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. |
MOTION
Plaintiff Mary Sue Komulaine moves the court for an order granting them
trial preference due to the age and poor, failing health of Plaintiff pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivisions (a). Defendant Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. opposes
the motion.
ANALYSIS
Code of Civil Procedure section 36 provides in part: “A party to a
civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a
preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the
following findings: (1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a
whole. (2) The health of the party is such
that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party's interest in
the litigation.”. (Code Civ. Proc., §
36, subd. (a).)
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 36.5, “An affidavit submitted in
support of a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 may be
signed by the attorney for the party seeking preference based upon information
and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party.” (See also Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 529, 534 [“a motion under subdivision (a) may be supported by
nothing more than an attorney's declaration “based upon information and belief
as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party’”].) However, “Admissible evidence is still
required as to the party's age (e.g., declarations by party or admissible
records showing he or she is over 70). The attorney's declaration is not
sufficient for this purpose.” (Weil
& Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 2022) ¶ 12:247.3 (hereafter Weil & Brown).)
The Court of Appeal in Koch-Ash v. Superior Court, held: “The determinative question presented is
whether section 36, subdivision (a), leaves trial courts with discretion to
deny preferential trial rights to litigants who qualify under that statute.
Here, the trial court claims such discretion to serve judicial economy and to
protect defendants from serial trials that might occur if consolidated cases
are severed to comply with section 36 preference requirements. We conclude that
section 36, subdivision (a), as construed by this court in Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 185 Cal.Rptr. 853,
is mandatory and absolute in its application and does not allow a trial court
to exercise the inherent or statutory general administrative authority it would
otherwise have.” (Koch-Ash v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 692.) Further the appellate court stated: “We are mindful of and appreciate that
respondent's ruling was based upon its view that it was striking a fair balance
between these plaintiffs' rights to a section 36 preferential trial and the
‘interest of the court to avoid potentially wasteful serial trials.’ However,
[the trial court] had no discretion to so balance interests. [The trial
court’s] authority and jurisdiction was limited by section 36, subdivisions (a)
and (e), to setting trial for a date within 120 days of granting the preference
motion. For [the trial court] to have ignored the unquestionably controlling
authority of the statute, as construed by Rice,
was an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 698.)[1]
Further, it is irrelevant that a motion for statutory preference may
result in inconvenience to the court or other litigants or may prevent the
completion of discovery or other pretrial matters. (Swaithes v Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082,
1085-1086.) Cases entitled to this
preference must be set for trial ahead of other cases. (See Miller
v Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1200, 1206-1212.) A court has no discretion to delay a trial
setting after a motion for trial preference is granted. (Miller, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1204; Sprowl v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 777, 781; Vinokur v. Superior Court (1988) 198
Cal.App.3d 500, 502.)
Here, Plaintiff relies on the declaration
of counsel for Plaintiff, Sean P. Garrety (Counsel), who avers to the
following:
·
Plaintiff is 84 years old, (DOB January 06,
1939) and currently suffers from Cervical spondylosis with severe cord
compression, Neurogenic bladder, Quadriplegia, and Central cord syndrome at C3.
·
As a result of a trip and fall, the subject of
this lawsuit, Plaintiff suffered catastrophic injury and after an emergency
C3-4 Anterior Cervical Decompression and Fusion she suffers from permanent
quadraperesis. She also now has a neurogenic bladder and requires full time
catheterization. Plaintiff requires full time 24 hour care which she has paying
out of pocket for and she is confined to a hospital bed in her living room.
(Declaration
of Sean P. Garrety, ¶¶ 6,7.)
Notwithstanding, apart from Counsel’s declaration, Plaintiff presents no
other admissible evidence in support of the motion establishing Plaintiff’s age. The lack of such evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
birthdate is fatal to the motion.
Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met the requirements
set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 36, subdivision (a).
Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for trial setting preference
as procedurally defective. Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling
and file a proof of service of such.
[1] Notwithstanding, cases indicate that there may be a
due-process violation by setting trial so early that defendants are deprived of
a reasonable opportunity for discovery or pretrial preparation. (Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 12:248.2 (citing
in part Roe v. Superior Court (1990)
224 Cal.App.3d 642, 643).)