Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV10002, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV10002    Hearing Date: June 22, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

Plaintiff Janik Galstian (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Ryan Thanaratnam (Defendant) based on a motor vehicle collision between Defendant and Plaintiff’s vehicles, and Defendant’s subsequent and immediate flight from the scene of the collision.  Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).  Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim and prayer for punitive damages.  Plaintiff opposes the motion and demurrer.  Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS

1.     DEMURRER

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In ruling on a demurrer, the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) 

a.     Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant first demurs to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  To prevail on the IIED cause of action, Plaintiffs must prove : “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)   A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when “it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.”  (Ibid. [cleaned up].)  Further, the defendant’s conduct must be “intended to inflict injury or engages in with the realization that injury will result.”  (Id. at p. 1051 [cleaned up].)  

Defendant contends Plaintiff fails to allege facts which establish Plaintiff’s severe or extreme emotional distress or physical injury resulting from Defendant’s immediate flee from the scene.  Defendant further contends that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that establish extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of causing emotional distress on the part of Defendant.   

In opposition Plaintiff argues he has sufficiently plead the elements for IIED by proffering allegations that Defendant immediately fled the scene of the incident after rear ending Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Here Plaintiff alleges in pertinent part against Defendant:

• On April 14, 2020, Plaintiff Janik Galstian was stopped (with his motor vehicle) under red light at the intersection of San Fernando Boulevard and Providencia Avenue in the city of Burbank, California.  As Mr. Galstian was waiting for the red light to turn green, the vehicle driven by Defendant Rajiv Thanaratnam suddenly and unexpectedly rammed into the rear-end of Mr. Galstian’s vehicle.  Upon impact, Mr. Galstian was violently jolted back and forth multiple times.  Immediately thereafter, Defendant fled the scene of the collision leaving Plaintiff injured, shocked, and helpless.  A witness managed to take a photo of Defendant’s Honda Civic including the license plate. 
• By virtue of Defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle in the State of California, Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to act in a lawful and safe manner while driving on public streets.  Defendant also owed Plaintiff a duty to immediately stop and identify himself to Plaintiff after an accident and to render aid to Plaintiff who sustained injuries because of the incident described above. 
• Notwithstanding, Defendant’s duty to Plaintiff, Defendant acted with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, including that of Plaintiff, while operating his vehicle, as described above.
• At the time and place described above Defendant so operated his vehicle so as to proximately cause injuries and damages to Plaintiff as described above.
• As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s intentional conduct of fleeing from the accident scene, Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress, anxiety, pain and suffering, nervousness, medical expenses, future medical expenses, financial burdens, and attorneys’ fees, such that an ordinary, reasonable person would be unable to cope with the serious emotional distress.
• Defendant had a duty to not cause emotional harm to Plaintiff by his conduct.  The wrongful acts and omissions of Defendant caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress.

(See Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 34-39.)

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff alleges facts to establish Defendant engaged in the outrageous conduct of fleeing the scene of the collision with intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress to Plaintiff.  For pleading purposes, this is sufficient to support Plaintiff’s claim for IIED.

2.     MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

In Taylor v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held:  “We consider whether punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver.  As will appear, we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”  (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892 [cleaned up].)  The California high court further held that “[o]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.”  (Id. at p. 899.)  But the California high court also stated, “Although the circumstances in a particular case may disclose similar wilful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.”  (Id. at pp. 899-900, emphasis added.) 

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim and prayer for punitive damages.  Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant fled the scene of a low impact accident, without more, does not rise to the level of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of Defendant to support a claim for punitive damages.  In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the allegations of Defendant immediately fleeing the scene after ramming into the rear end of Plaintiff’s vehicle with his vehicle, sufficiently pleads Defendant’s conscious disregard of the safety of Plaintiff.  (See Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 34-39.)

In reply, Defendant cites Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679 (hereafter Brooks), in further support of his argument that Plaintiff’s hit-and-run allegations are insufficient on their own to support a prayer for punitive damages.  Brooks states leaving the scene of an accident is independently actionable only if the defendant’s leaving the scene was “a proximate cause of further injury or death” beyond the accident itself.  While the court in Brooks did not consider whether punitive damages can be imposed based on a hit and run incident, it did hold that fleeing an accident scene only constitutes a tort if the act itself causes the plaintiff additional injury above and beyond the damages caused by the collision that preceded the flight. (Ibid.)

Defendant concludes Plaintiff’s failure to allege additional injuries caused specifically by Defendant fleeing the scene rather than immediately providing aid to Plaintiff after the incident, defeats Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages based on said hit-and-run allegations.  The Court agrees, finding that Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendant fleeing the scene after the vehicle collision, without alleging additional physical injuries caused by the Defendant’s act of fleeing the scene, are not sufficient, on their own, to support a claim for punitive damages.  Accordingly, the Court shall grant Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages from Plaintiff’s complaint.

The Court shall disregard Defendant’s arguments in relation to Vehicle Code section 20001, as the complaint is devoid of specific references to that Vehicle Code section.

3.     LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) The plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

            Here in opposition Plaintiff states his request for leave to amend without any further explanation as to how the complaint could be amended to address potential pleading deficiencies.  (See Opposition, p. 7.)  Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to fourth cause of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Further, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim and prayer for punitive damages, without leave to amend.

Further, the Court orders Defendant to file and serve an Answer to the complaint on or before July 7, 2023. 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.