Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV13148, Date: 2023-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV13148    Hearing Date: February 7, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

              Plaintiff Jaime Gonzalez (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Maria Rivas (Defendant) based on a motor vehicle vs. bicycle collision.  Defendant moves to quash the subpoena for production of records Plaintiff served on Defendant’s insurance carrier, Mid-Century Insurance.  Defendant requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motion.  Plaintiff opposes the motion.  Defendant replies.  

ANALYSIS

If a subpoena requires the production of documents, the court may quash the subpoena entirely or modify it.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

Current discovery standards hold that, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 (hereafter Board of Nursing).)  “To meet this [test], a party seeking to compel [the] production of records . . . must articulate specific facts justifying the discovery sought; it may not rely on mere generalities.”  (Ibid.; see Johnson v. Superior Court (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 829, 837 [finding that a subpoena was “insufficient” to compel production because it was “based wholly on the [party’s] alleged information and belief without any statement of supporting facts”].)  However, “[e]ven if information is otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege[,] [including] the right to privacy . . . .”  (Board of Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) 

            “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy.  Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern.  .  .  .  The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.^[1]  The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.  A court must then balance these competing considerations.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [cleaned up].)

            “Legally recognized privacy interests [include] interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’) .  .  .  .”  (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  “A particular class of information is [sensitive or confidential] when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.”  (Ibid.) 

            Here, the subject subpoena served on Mid-Century Insurance, on September 16 , 2022, seeks the following:

            REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Any and all DOCUMENTS compromising INSURANCE POLICIES, issued by YOU, that may provide coverage for the damages alleged in this lawsuit.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Any and all DOCUMENTS compromising INSURANCE POLICIES, issued by YOU, that may provide coverage for the INCIDENT.

            REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Any and all DOCUMENTS RELATING TO any INSURANCE POLICIES which provided coverage to any of DEFENDANT’S vehicles at the time of the INCIDENT.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

A copy of the complete POLICY (Policy Number 0178831476 issued by Mid-Century Insurance Company and/or Farmers Insurance Exchange) including endorsements and exceptions.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Any and all DOCUMENTS RELATING TO claim 7003690548-1, including DEFENDANT’s full file.

(Declaration of Josephine N. Baurac, Exhibit A.)

Defendant argues the requests for production of insurance records are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and seek to invade the privacy rights of Defendant and third parties.  Defendant first argues Plaintiff’s requests are irrelevant because they are not merely limited to Plaintiff’s claims, but seek documents as to potential claims of others.  Defendant further argues her insurance file is irrelevant because Plaintiff admits that Defendant was not even at the scene of the accident.  (Declaration of Josephine N. Baurac, Exhibit D, RFA Nos. 1-10.)  Moreover, the subject subpoena is directed to an insurance carrier that had advised Plaintiff that there was no coverage under Defendant’s policy as to Plaintiff’s claims.  (Declaration of Josephine N. Baurac, Exhibit B.)  Defendant concludes that because she was not involved in the car accident at issue, there is no compelling need that outweighs Defendant’s right to privacy as to Plaintiff’s claims for negligence against Defendant. 

In opposition, Plaintiff attests that Defendant has failed to establish cause for granting a motion to quash the subject subpoena as Plaintiff’s request to produce an insurance policy, already drafted and readily available to Defendants’ counsel, is neither burdensome nor oppressive.  Plaintiff further argues that the nature and extent of Defendant’s insurance coverage is at issue, and the best evidence of the extent of coverage is the insurance policy itself.

In reply, Defendant notes that Plaintiff has failed to contest the following: (1) Defendant Maria Rivas was not the owner of the vehicle involved in plaintiff’s alleged auto vs. bicycle incident, (2) Maria Rivas was not driving the subject auto involved in the incident at issue, (3) Maria Rivas did not witness the incident at issue, and (4) Maria Rivas’s carrier officially advised plaintiff’s counsel that there was no coverage through Maria Rivas’s insurance policy.  Accordingly, Defendant concludes that Plaintiff cannot meet his significant burden of justifying his overbroad subpoena, because Defendant demands the production of records unrelated to the injuries that Plaintiff is claiming in this lawsuit or to liability on Defendant’s part.

The Court agrees, finding that Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence in his opposition to show good cause for compelling the production of Defendant’s insurance records.  Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks disclosure of records that are unrelated to Plaintiff’s claims at issue and are thus private and not discoverable.

Based upon the subpoena as currently crafted, Defendant has carried her threshold burden of establishing a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.  Plaintiff has failed to identify a legitimate interest, in light of Defendant’s discovery responses, that outweighs Defendant’s right to privacy in her insurance records.

Defendant requests monetary sanctions in connection with the motion.  In ruling on a motion to quash, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)  The Court declines to award such sanctions.  The Court concludes that the parties had a good faith dispute as to the proper scope of the subpoenas, and neither party has acted in bad faith.  

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Consequently, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to quash the subject subpoena, and orders such subpoena quashed. 

Defendant shall give notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.