Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV19328, Date: 2023-04-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV19328 Hearing Date: April 7, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is
highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative
ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the
subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING
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DEPARTMENT |
32 |
|
HEARING DATE |
November 8, 2023 |
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CASE NUMBER |
22STCV19328 |
|
MOVING PARTY |
Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Tobby Rolf
Alvestad |
|
OPPOSING PARTIES |
Defendants/Cross-Complainants/Cross-Defendants Kevin
Mauricio Gutierrez Munoz, Postmates, LLC, and Defendant/Cross-Defendant Mario
Santiago Vasquez Linares |
MOTION
Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Tobby Rolf Alvestad (Alvestad) moves the court for an order
granting his trial preference due to Alvestad’s age and poor, failing health pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a). Plaintiff Hector Carbajal (Plaintiff) initiated
the action based on a motor vehicle collision.
Defendant/Cross-Complaint/Cross-Defendant Kevin Mauricio Gutierrez Munoz
(Munoz) opposes the motion. Additionally,
Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Postmates, LLC (Postmates) opposes
the motion. Defendant/Cross-Defendant
Mario Santiago Vasquez Linares (Linares) joins in Postmates’ opposition. Alvestad replies to the oppositions.
ANALYSIS
Code of Civil Procedure section 36 provides in part: “A party to a
civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a
preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following
findings: (1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a
whole. (2) The health of the party is
such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party's interest
in the litigation.”. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (a).)
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 36.5, “An affidavit submitted in
support of a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 may be
signed by the attorney for the party seeking preference based upon information
and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party.” (See also Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 529, 534 [“a motion under subdivision (a) may be
supported by nothing more than an attorney's declaration “based upon
information and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any
party’”].) However, “Admissible evidence
is still required as to the party's age (e.g., declarations by party or
admissible records showing he or she is over 70). The attorney's declaration is
not sufficient for this purpose.” (Weil
& Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 2022) ¶ 12:247.3 (hereafter Weil & Brown).)
The Court of Appeal in Koch-Ash v. Superior Court, held that
“The determinative question presented is whether section 36, subdivision (a),
leaves trial courts with discretion to deny preferential trial rights to
litigants who qualify under that statute. Here, the trial court claims such
discretion to serve judicial economy and to protect defendants from serial
trials that might occur if consolidated cases are severed to comply with
section 36 preference requirements. We conclude that section 36, subdivision
(a), as construed by this court in Rice
v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 185 Cal.Rptr. 853, is mandatory
and absolute in its application and does not allow a trial court to exercise
the inherent or statutory general administrative authority it would otherwise
have.” (Koch-Ash v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 692.) Further the appellate court stated that “We
are mindful of and appreciate that respondent's ruling was based upon its view
that it was striking a fair balance between these plaintiffs' rights to a
section 36 preferential trial and the ‘interest of the court to avoid
potentially wasteful serial trials.’ However, [the trial court] had no
discretion to so balance interests. [The trial court’s] authority and
jurisdiction was limited by section 36, subdivisions (a) and (e), to setting
trial for a date within 120 days of granting the preference motion. For [the
trial court] to have ignored the unquestionably controlling authority of the
statute, as construed by Rice, was an
abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 698.)[1]
Further, it is irrelevant that a motion for statutory preference may
result in inconvenience to the court or other litigants or may prevent the
completion of discovery or other pretrial matters. (Swaithes v Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082,
1085-1086.) Cases entitled to this
preference must be set for trial ahead of other cases. (See Miller
v Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1200, 1206-1212.) A court has no discretion to delay a trial
setting after a motion for trial preference is granted. (Miller, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1204; Sprowl v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 777, 781; Vinokur v. Superior Court (1988) 198
Cal.App.3d 500, 502.)
Here, Alvestad first advances the
declaration of counsel for Alvestad, James J. Perkins (Counsel). Counsel avers that Alvestad is 82 years old,
and has a substantial interest in the underlying case because he is disputing
liability as to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
(Declaration of James J. Perkins, ¶ 4.)
Alvestad also advances his own
declaration. Alvestad avers his
birthdate is August 5, 1940, and he is currently 82 years of age. (Declaration of Tobby Rolf Alvestad,
¶ 2.) Alvestad further states that
he received heart stents in 2022.
(Declaration of Tobby Rolf Alvestad, ¶ 3.)
In opposition, Opposing Defendants do
not take issue with Alvestad’s age, but do dispute that Alvestad’s health is
such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudice. Opposing Defendants assert that the
declarations of both Alvestad and Counsel do not lay proper foundation for
Alvestad’s medical condition nor sufficiently explain how said medical
condition will affect Alvestad’s ability to participate in his case or
trial. Further, Opposing Defendants
contend that moving the trial date further forward will prejudice Opposing
Defendants by unnecessarily compressing the time to complete basic discovery
such as Plaintiff’s deposition and written discovery regarding Plaintiff’s past
medical history which have not yet been completed.
The Court finds Alvestad has not demonstrated that his health is such
that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing his interest in the
litigation. Absent anything more than a
general declaration that he has recently “received heart stents,” Alvestad has
not demonstrated a temporal risk associated with his present condition such
that trial preference is necessary.
CONCLUSION
The
Court therefore denies Alvestad’s motion
for trial setting preference. Alvestad
shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.
[1] Notwithstanding, cases indicate that there may be a
due-process violation by setting trial so early that defendants are deprived of
a reasonable opportunity for discovery or pretrial preparation. (Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 12:248.2 (citing
in part Roe v. Superior Court (1990)
224 Cal.App.3d 642, 643).)