Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV24386, Date: 2023-01-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV24386    Hearing Date: January 27, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Maria Najera-Polanco (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Lawrence Gonzalez (Defendant) based on a vehicle versus pedestrian collision after which Defendant allegedly fled the scene of the incident.  Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) related to punitive damages as well as her claim for intentional inflection of emotional distress (IIED).  Plaintiff opposes the motion.  Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

1. Punitive Damages

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

In Taylor v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held:  “We consider whether punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver.  As will appear, we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”  (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892 [cleaned up].)  The California high court further held that “[o]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.”  (Id. at p. 899.)  But the California high court also stated, “Although the circumstances in a particular case may disclose similar wilful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.”  (Id. at pp. 899-900.) 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support the recovery of punitive damages based on a theory of malice or oppression.  Specifically, Defendant attests that Plaintiff’s allegation of Defendant leaving the scene of the accident after seeing that Plaintiff was injured is insufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages without further allegations of intoxication, erratic driving, speeding, etc.  Finally, Defendant notes that the FAC does not allege that Defendant was prosecuted nor cited for a hit and run violation. 

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges the following in regard to the punitive damages claim:

• Defendant GONZALEZ exited his vehicle and observed the serious nature of NAJERA POLANCO’s injuries.
• Defendant GONZALEZ proceeded to flee the scene, leaving Plaintiff NAJERA POLANCO alone and clearly injured.
• Defendant GONZALEZ personally heard and observed that Plaintiff NAJERA POLANCO was severely injured but proceeded to drive away with full knowledge that he was leaving Plaintiff NAJERA-POLANCO alone, distressed, and injured. Defendant cannot dispute that he knew Plaintiff was injured he exited his car and observed her injuries. Upon seeing her severely injured, he volitionally and knowing it was illegal to do so fled the scene with the hopes he would escape without taking any accountability for the damages sustained by Plaintiff. Defendant knew that would cause significant emotional distress to Plaintiff as she could not care for herself nor know how her damages would be paid for.
• Defendant GONZALEZ proceeded to flee the scene without giving Plaintiff his information and new that such actions were criminal.
• Defendant GONZALEZ knew or should have known that serious injury would result to Plaintiff NAJERA-POLANCO after impacting Plaintiff’s body on the date of the accident.
• Defendant GONZALEZ, despite having full knowledge that Plaintiff NAJERA POLANCO was injured, fled the scene, disregarding the common law objective of preventing further harm to an injured Plaintiff and in blatant disregard of California law necessitating individuals such as Defendant GONZALEZ to remain at the scene.
• Defendant GONZALEZ’s actions as described herein and above are a conscious disregard of safety which may justify an award of exemplary damages. Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 24 Cal.3d 890, 895 (1979).
• Defendant GONZALEZ’s failure to remain at the scene and subsequent fleeing was willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, and in conscious disregard and callous indifference to Plaintiff NAJERA-POLANCO’s safety and rights and with awareness of the risk of injury thereby caused. Furthermore, his actions are criminal as they are in violation of the Penal Code.

(FAC, ¶¶ 11-12, 22-23, 25, 27-29.)

For pleading purposes, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to show malice on the part of Defendant  In particular, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant knew Plaintiff was injured and then left the scene of the incident supports Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant acted with malice by willfully and consciously disregarding the rights or safety of Plaintiff.   

2.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant next argues the FAC fails state facts sufficient to support a claim of IIED.  However, an argument involving the sufficiency of how a cause of action is pled is grounds for a demurrer, and is thus improper grounds for a motion to strike.  (See Warren v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 41; see also Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20.)

Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s IIED claim from the FAC.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, IIED claim, and related portions of the FAC.   

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.