Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV26858, Date: 2023-03-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV26858 Hearing Date: March 27, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is
highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative
ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the
subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
DEPARTMENT |
32 |
HEARING DATE |
March
27, 2023 |
CASE NUMBER |
22STCV26858 |
MOTIONS |
Demurrer
to Complaint |
MOVING PARTY |
Defendant
Ecolab Inc. |
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff
Grace Iverson |
MOTIONS
Plaintiff Grace Iverson (Plaintiff) sued Defendant Ecolab Inc.
(Defendant) based on third degree burns Plaintiff allegedly suffered while
utilizing dishwashing solution supplied by Defendant. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges general negligence
and premises liability causes of action against Defendant.
Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for premises
liability. Plaintiff opposes the
motion. Defendant replies.
ANALYSIS
1. DEMURRER
“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of
the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In ruling on a demurrer, the court must
“liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 452.) “This rule of liberal
construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the
plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist.
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)
A.
FAILURE TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant demurs to the second cause
of action for premises liability. Defendant
attests Plaintiff has only advanced conclusory statements and has failed to
state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for premises liability
against it. Defendant specifically
argues that Plaintiff has failed to state facts to support her allegation that
Defendant is an owner or controller of the subject premises where the incident
occurred.
The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same
as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v.
The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Therefore, to state a claim for premises
liability, Plaintiff must allege: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject
property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property;
(3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial
factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69
Cal.2d 108.)
The second cause of action for premises liability alleges in pertinent
part the following regarding Defendant’s alleged ownership and control over the
subject premises:
Defendants, and each of them, failed to act
reasonably in the installation, maintenance, repair and upkeep of dish washer
chemicals located at 8225 W. Sunset Boulevard, Mount Olympus, California 90046.
Defendants, and each of them, further failed
to adequately warn users of a dangerous condition on the premises, specifically
a, a dishwasher that was dangerously stocked with chemical cleaning solutions
which were toxic to human skin if the chemical fluid came into contact with a
person . . . Defendants and each of them, in failing to act reasonably with
regard to the installation and maintenance of this chemical, proximately caused
injuries and damages to the Plaintiff which will be proven at the time of trial.
Defendants, and each of them, monitored this
"set up" monthly, and were fully aware of the condition which led to
the severe injuries of Ms. Grace Iverson.
(Complaint,
p. 5.)
By checking off the applicable boxes in the Judicial Council Pleading
Form, Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant negligently owned, maintained,
managed and operated the described premises, and willfully or maliciously
failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or
activity. (Complaint, p. 5.)
The Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the ultimate facts
necessary to state a cause of action for premises liability against Defendant. Ultimate facts are those “constituting the
cause of action” or those upon which liability depends, e.g., duty of care,
breach of the duty and causation (damages).
(See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) [1] “[T]he complaint need only allege facts
sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might
eventually form a part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872
[at pleading stage, plaintiff need not specify which of defendant’s employees
committed negligent acts or omissions].) [2]
Therefore, for pleading purposes, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for premises liability.
B. UNCERTAINTY
A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained
only where the pleading is so bad that the
responding
party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine
what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him
or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must
distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such
uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v.
Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)
Here, Defendant also demurs
to the second cause of action on the basis of uncertainty. Here, as is discussed
above, Plaintiff relies on a Judicial Council Form Complaint designed to lay
out the ultimate facts of a cause of action in a clear and concise
fashion. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s second cause of
action for premises liability does not fail for uncertainty.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the second
cause of action for premises liability in the Complaint.
Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof
of service of such.
[1] “[T]he term ultimate fact generally refers to a core
fact, such as an essential element of a claim. Ultimate facts are distinguished
from evidentiary facts and from legal conclusions.” (Central Valley General Hosp. v. Smith
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 501, 513 [cleaned up]; see also Rodriguez v. Parivar,
Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 739, 750–751 [“The elements of a cause of action
constitute the essential or ultimate facts in a civil case”].)
[2] “[J]udicial Council pleading forms are not
demurrer-proof, while relevant, does not address directly to the adequacy of
the allegations made in this case. We agree with the general principle that
Judicial Council form complaints are not invulnerable to a demurrer.
Conversely, Judicial Council form complaints do not always fail to state a
cause of action and, thus, they are not necessarily susceptible to demurrer.
The logical implication from these polar opposite principles is that use of a
Judicial Council form complaint is not a determinative factor in deciding
whether or not to sustain a demurrer. Instead, a reviewing court must examine
the particular allegations in the form pleading and determine whether those
allegations satisfy the pleading requirements established by California
law.” (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist.
Hosp. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 555 [cleaned up].)