Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV33486, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV33486 Hearing Date: March 8, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is
highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative
ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the
subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
32 |
|
HEARING DATE |
March
8, 2023 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
22STCV33486 |
|
MOTIONS |
Demurrer
to Complaint |
|
MOVING PARTIES |
Defendant
Bird Rides, Inc. |
|
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff
Regina Lynn Patton |
MOTION
Plaintiff Regina Lynn Patton (Plaintiff) sued Defendants City of Los
Angeles, County of Los Angeles, California Department of Transportation, C M C
Medical Plaza Partners, and Bird Rides, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) based
on injuries Plaintiff alleges she sustained in a trip and fall incident over an
electric scooter parked on a sidewalk.
Defendant Bird Rides, Inc. (Bird) demurs to the third cause of action in
Plaintiff’s complaint for products liability.
Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.
ANALYSIS
“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of
the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In ruling on a demurrer, the court must
“liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 452.) “This rule of liberal
construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the
plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist.
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)
Bird demurs to the third cause of
action for products liability for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
A defendant “may be held strictly
liable for its product if the plaintiff was injured while using the product in
a reasonably foreseeable way. In order for there to be strict liability, the
product does not have to be unreasonably dangerous—just defective. Products
liability may be premised upon a theory of design defect, manufacturing defect,
or failure to warn.” (Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 990, 1000, internal quotations & citations omitted.) “Whether or not a produce was defectively
designed or manufactured is a factual issues to be determined by the trier off
fact. However, whether or not the
subject object or instrumentality is a ‘product’ is a question of law for the
trial court[.]” (Brooks v. Eugene
Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611.)
Bird highlights the following
portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint in support of its contention that Plaintiff
has failed to state a cause of action for products liability against Bird:
(Complaint, pp. 6.)
Bird
argues that the third cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not alleged
any facts indicating that the scooter, she allegedly tripped on contained a
manufacturing defect, was defectively designed, or did not include sufficient
instructions or warning of potential safety hazards. Further Bird notes that according to the
pleadings, Plaintiff was not a user or rider of the subject electric scooter,
nor was the scooter in use at the time of the incident. The scooter was rather a stationary
instrument located on a sidewalk.
Accordingly, Bird concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause
of action for products liability, whether based in strict liability,
negligence, or failure to warn, based on said defects in the pleadings.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues she stated sufficient facts to state a cause of
action for products liability by checking the appropriate boxes on the judicial
form complaint. By checking these boxes
Plaintiff alleges the following:
(See Complaint, p. 9.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds
that based on her checking off the appropriate boxes in the form pleading, she
has sufficiently plead ultimate facts required to allege a products liability
cause of action, including the existence of a defect, a duty owed by Bird
Rides, Inc. to Plaintiff, and that said defect was the legal and proximate
cause of Plaintiff’s damages. Ultimate facts are those “constituting the cause of action” or
those upon which liability depends, e.g., duty of care, breach of the duty and
causation (damages). (See Doe v. City
of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “[T]he complaint need only
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that
might eventually form a part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872
[at pleading stage, plaintiff need not specify which of defendant’s employees
committed negligent acts or omissions].) [1]
Bird
additionally attests that the third cause of action is fatally uncertain. A demurrer for uncertainty
will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party
cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what
issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or
her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a
demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly
specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such
uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v.
Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) Here, as is discussed above, Plaintiff relies
on a Judicial Council Form Complaint designed to lay out the ultimate facts of
a cause of action in a clear and concise fashion. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
third cause of action for products liability does not fail for uncertainty.
However, as
Plaintiff concedes in her opposition, she mistakenly failed to fill out the
section of the form complaint labeled: “Prod. L-3”, and did not mark the box
explaining her relationship to the product; whether she was a purchaser, user,
or bystander of the product. Thus, the
Court, on its own motion, sustains a demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint for her
failure to complete section Prod, L-3 in the form complaint and grants
Plaintiff leave to amend the defect.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court sustains a demurrer to the third cause of action
in the complaint with leave to amend.
The Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint in
conformance with the Court’s ruling on or before March 22, 2023.
Bird shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file a proof of
service of such.
[1] “[J]udicial Council pleading forms are not
demurrer-proof, while relevant, does not address directly to the adequacy of
the allegations made in this case. We agree with the general principle that Judicial
Council form complaints are not invulnerable to a demurrer. Conversely,
Judicial Council form complaints do not always fail to state a cause of action
and, thus, they are not necessarily susceptible to demurrer. The logical
implication from these polar opposite principles is that use of a Judicial
Council form complaint is not a determinative factor in deciding whether or not
to sustain a demurrer. Instead, a reviewing court must examine the particular
allegations in the form pleading and determine whether those allegations
satisfy the pleading requirements established by California law.” (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hosp.
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 555 [cleaned up].)