Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case 22STCV35702 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV35702, Date: 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35702 Hearing Date: January 26, 2023 Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

TENTATIVE RULING

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	January 26, 2023
CASE NUMBER	22STCV35702
MOTIONS	Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Claim
MOVING PARTIES	Defendant AIDS Healthcare Foundation
OPPOSING PARTY	Plaintiff James Ellis

MOTION

Plaintiff James Ellis (Plaintiff) sued Defendant AIDS Healthcare Foundation (Defendant) based on alleged violent altercation which occurred on Defendant’s property between Plaintiff and fellow tenant (Assailant) with an alleged history of misfeasance in and around the subject property. Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages and related portions of the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Defendant replies.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court denies Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice.

ANALYSIS

MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

Punitive Damages

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.)

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice. To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages. (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice. When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].) In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.” (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].)

In addition, “[t]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].)

Moreover, “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, as well as paragraphs 65 and 71 which are related to the prayer for punitive damages. Defendant argues the Complaint fails to articulate conduct by Defendant demonstrating specific intentional or malicious conduct for which punitive damages can be awarded against a corporate entity. Defendant attests the Complaint is devoid of facts that show Defendant knew of or ratified any punitive conduct by one of their corporate employees.

The Complaint alleges in relevant part the following:

Plaintiff is informed and believes that each of the Defendants, including the fictitiously named Defendants, were the agents, servants, employees, and joint venturers of each of the other Defendants; and, in doing the things hereinafter alleged were acting within the course and scope of such agency, servitude, employment, and/or joint venture.
Plaintiff is informed and believes that each and every wrongful and/or illegal act done by the Defendants complained of was done with the express or implied approval of all Defendants; and each Defendant has had actual or constructive knowledge of, and/or has ratified and/or approved the acts and omissions of all of the other Defendants, both named and fictitiously named.
Plaintiff is informed and believes that each of the Defendants acted in concert and furtherance of each other’s interests; and that each Defendant, both named and fictitiously named, is individually, jointly, and severally liable for the wrongdoing alleged herein.
However, upon information and belief, since Plaintiff ELLIS moved into the subject property, there have been approximately 300 calls to 911 to request police services. According to Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) public records, calls have been for illegal drug use/sales, trespassing, robbery, fights, criminal threats, elder abuse, domestic violence, assault, battery, sexual assault, firearms being discharged, and finally (as in victim Plaintiff ELLIS’S case), attempted murder.
AHF does not maintain a requisite number of competent security guards or employees on staff to address trespassers and crime. Upon information and belief, during the daylight weekday hours, there are no security guards, but only front desk workers or a property manager. Upon information and belief, after approximately 4:00 p.m., a single guard is brought in to staff the subject premises. There are no other front desk workers or managers on staff on weekends, or between 4:00 p.m. to about 7:00 a.m. on weekdays.
Over the course of Plaintiff’s tenancy, Plaintiff verbally and in writing reported to AHF managers that a certain neighbor of Plaintiff’s was engaged in unlawful behavior, including distributing unlawful drugs out of his unit, brandishing deadly weapons, and criminally threatening Plaintiff’s safety. This neighbor will be referred to by his initials, “OD,” as Plaintiff fears retaliation from OD and his friends—some of whom still live at the subject property. OD lived right across the hallway from Plaintiff ELLIS.
Upon information and belief, other tenants had complained to AHF about OD’s violence, drug sales at the subject premises, criminal threats, and discharge of firearms. OD regularly bragged about his criminal record. Upon information and belief, AHF either a) ran a background check on OD and disregarded OD’s lengthy criminal history; or, b) failed to run a background check on OD, despite having OD sign an authorization allowing AHF to conduct a background check, enabling a repeat offender to reside at the subject property.
While at the subject premises, and even in front of AHF employees, OD openly went by the alias, “Killa.”
Upon information and belief, on or around October 31, 2021, OD pulled a butcher’s knife out on a female tenant in the subject property’s community or common area lobby.
Upon information and belief, on or around Thanksgiving 2021, OD fired his gun outside of the subject premises, and then ran into the subject property, through the common area lobby with his gun. Upon information and belief, the LAPD took OD to jail.
Upon information and belief, in or around December 2021, OD waved a gun around at an AHF employee at the front desk.
Upon information and belief, OD broke the door to a bathroom at the subject property.
Upon information and belief, around May 2022, OD sexually assaulted a female tenant. Around the same time, OD got into a violent verbal argument with an AHF employee.
Plaintiff ELLIS spoke with AHF’s property manager, Angela, about the repetitive domestic violence. Plaintiff ELLIS asked Angela, something to the effect of, “Why don’t you do anything to OD?” Referring to the victim of domestic violence, Angela responded, “If she loves it, I love it.”
On July 15, 2022, at about 11:05 p.m., OD had a lot of company over in his small unit, and was blasting loud music. At about midnight, Plaintiff ELLIS heard OD have a very loud argument over money. Plaintiff ELLIS went downstairs to talk with AHF’s security worker, Adrian. The worker said other tenants had come and complained about the noise too. At or around 1:20 a.m., OD got into another loud argument with someone over money. Plaintiff ELLIS turned in a complaint form to AHF, recording all of the above. The complaint was signed received by “Adrian Management.” Plaintiff ELLIS also wrote in his complaint form that he did not want to confront OD directly because “we might get into [an] argument and then might fight. I don’t want that.”
On July 16, 2022 at about 10:45 p.m., OD had his door propped open, blasting loud music, and having a lot of guests in his small unit. He started walking up and down the hallway, clearly under the influence of narcotics, screaming words to the effect of “I paid my rent, they can’t do nothin’!” OD then got into a loud argument with one of his female guests. Plaintiff ELLIS turned in a complaint form to AHF that same night, and it was again received and signed by “Adrian Management.”
Upon information and belief, someone in the employ of AHF informed OD that Plaintiff ELLIS had made a complaint about OD.
At all times relevant herein, even during the COVID eviction moratorium, AHF had the lawful right to evict violent tenants or tenants engaging in unlawful activities, including illegal drug sales. At all times relevant herein, upon information and belief, AHF took no steps to evict OD, obtain a criminal restraining order against OD, threaten to evict OD, or even investigate reported incidents to determine whether to evict a violent tenant.
AHF’s failure to protect its tenants, including Plaintiff ELLIS, from known violent behavior, finally led to OD shooting Plaintiff ELLIS.
The criminal act(s) associated with the shooting of Plaintiff ELLIS were foreseeable. Noting the following list is not exhaustive, Defendants had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the following: (1) the unlawful and/or illegal activities OD engaged in on or around the subject premises, (2) the violent nature and dangerous propensities of OD in or around the subject premises, (3) prior similar acts on or around the subject premises, and (4) the frequency of crimes that occurred on or around the subject premises.
Defendants acted with “wanton and reckless misconduct” in their actions and/or omissions. See Donnelly v. S. Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 869, 118 P.2d 465, 468 (1941). Defendants, even if they had no intent to cause harm, “intentionally perform[ed or failed to perform] an act,” which was “so unreasonable and dangerous that Defendants kn[e]w, or should [have] know[n], it [was] highly probable that harm [would] result.” Id. Indeed, Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) provides for punitive damages where Defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” “Malice,” under § 3294(c)(1), includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Therefore, Plaintiff shall be entitled to punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter Defendants, and to make an example of them. See Donnelly, 118 P.2d at 469; Cal. Civ. Code § 3294.
Defendants’ conduct was willful and wanton and done with a conscious contempt and disdain for the disastrous consequences that Defendants knew could occur as a result of their dangerous conduct. Accordingly, Defendants acted with malice towards Plaintiff, and therefore, Plaintiff seeks the recovery of punitive and exemplary damages against Defendants, as set forth herein.

(Complaint, ¶¶ 10-12, 22, 27, 29-36, 38-41, 55, 57, 60, 65, 71.)

Defendant argues that allegations of Defendant’s employees such as property managers and security guards failing to take preventative safety measures after Plaintiff reported suspicious behavior to them, while perhaps demonstrating negligence or recklessness, does not rise to the level of malicious behavior because the alleged employee behavior does not indicate a positive intent to harm or absolute disregard of consequences. Defendant further argues that the Complaint fails to allege that Defendant knew of or ratified the conduct of its security guards and property managers.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s employees’ knowledge of Assailant’s history of violent and criminal behavior and failure to take reasonable security measures in light of said behavior evinces a conscious disregard of the safety of others amounting to malice. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant even exacerbated the likelihood of injury to Plaintiff when a property manager informed Assailant that Plaintiff had made a complaint about Assailant. (See Complaint, ¶ 41.) Plaintiff additionally attests that the Complaint sufficiently states a claim for punitive damages against Defendant as a corporation based on Plaintiff’s allegations of managerial misconduct. Plaintiff concludes that his failure at the pleading stage to identify specific corporate officers, directors, or managing agents responsible for the malicious managerial misconduct which Plaintiff alleges is a proximate cause of the subject violent altercation does not defeat a punitive damages claim at the pleading stage.

Reading the Complaint in context and assuming the truth of the allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to support his claim for punitive damages. Based upon Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant did not simply engage in ordinarily, routine negligence. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations show that Defendant acted with conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of Plaintiff and fellow tenants residing at the subject property by failing to take any meaningful preventative safety measures despite knowledge of Assailant’s history of volatile and violent behavior in and around the subject premises. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct at a managerial level are sufficient to plead a punitive damages cause of action against Defendant as a corporation.

Irrelevant and Immaterial Matter

Defendant further seeks to strike portions of the Complaint which Defendant deems as irrelevant and immaterial to the underlying causes of action. Preliminarily, the Court notes that Plaintiff has conceded to strike paragraphs 23-26, 28, and 52. The remaining paragraphs which Defendant seeks to strike are as follows:

While at the subject premises, and even in front of AHF employees, OD openly went by the alias, “Killa.”
On July 30, 2022, Plaintiff ELLIS submitted a complaint form to AHF saying Plaintiff heard someone with keys going into OD’s unit and shutting the door, but because Plaintiff did not have a peephole on his door, Plaintiff would not open his door to see who it was as he was scared for his safety. Another tenant went past OD’s unit at that time, and heard someone inside the unit. Upon information and belief, the other tenant called the police. Plaintiff ELLIS told AHF that Plaintiff was “scared and frightened for my life.”
Several times after OD shot Plaintiff ELLIS, AHF employees kept telephoning Plaintiff ELLIS. Plaintiff ELLIS believes the individual is named “Mason” with “Healthy Housing Foundation,” which is, upon information and belief, a fictitious business name of AHF. Mason kept asking Plaintiff ELLIS out to a “nice dinner, my treat.” Mason asked if he could record the conversation at dinner. Plaintiff ELLIS asked if he could also record the dinner, but Mason said “no.” So Plaintiff ELLIS declined the invitation to dinner.

(Complaint, ¶¶ 31, 50, 54.)

The Court finds that paragraphs 31 and 50 are pertinent to Plaintiff’s claims of negligence premises liability, as well as their prayer for punitive damages. However, the Court finds paragraph 54 is immaterial and irrelevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and thus grants in part Defendant’s motion to strike paragraph 54 of the Complaint.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court grants in part Defendant’s motion to strike paragraphs 23-26, 28, 52, and 54 of Plaintiff’s Complaint without leave to amend. The Court denies in part Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, as well as paragraphs 31, 50, 65, and 71.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.