Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 22STCV39060, Date: 2023-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39060    Hearing Date: March 29, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Raymond Velasquez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Benjamin Lopez Maldonado (“Defendant Maldonado”) and Bloomington Premier Concrete Construction, Inc. (“Defendant Bloomington”) (collectively, “Defendants”) based on injuries and damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s claim and prayer for punitive damages in the Complaint.  Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Defendants reply.

ANALYSIS

1.     MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault.  It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.”  (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.)  “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive.  An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.  But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation.  Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders:  the officers, directors, or managing agents.”  (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

In Taylor v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held: “We consider whether punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver. As will appear, we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”  (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892 [cleaned up].)  The California high court further held that “[o]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.” (Id. at p. 899.)  But the California high court also stated, “Although the circumstances in a particular case may disclose similar willful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.”  (Id. at pp. 899-900, emphasis added.)

Here, Defendants argue Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages.  In opposition, Plaintiff contends the Complaint sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating malicious and despicable conduct on the part of Defendant Maldonado because he operated Defendants heavy commercial vehicle in excessive speed, and knowingly refused to obey traffic signals on the roadway.  The Complaint specifically alleges the following:

·       Immediately prior to the accident on or about December 17, 2020, Plaintiff was driving the above-referenced Lexus RX330 vehicle Eastbound on I-10 Freeway in or near the City of Los Angeles, California.

·       Concurrently, on Eastbound I-10 Freeway in or near the City of Los Angeles, California, Defendant MALDONADO was operating defendants’ vehicle at an excessive speed and in a reckless manner, and negligently/recklessly caused defendants’ vehicle to strike the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

·       Furthermore, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at the time and place of said accident, Defendants MALDONADO, BLOOMINGTON and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, and each of them, were recklessly operating their vehicle at excessive and unsafe speeds, and without requisite care, so as to lose control of their vehicle and subsequently cause their vehicle to collide with Plaintiff’s vehicle, and proximately causing and/or contributing to the hereinafter described injuries and damages to Plaintiff.

·       In their operation of their vehicle Defendants, and each of them, violated statutes, laws and regulations including, but not limited to, statutes, laws and regulations relating to maintaining control of operation of a motor vehicle, making of safe lane changes, making of safe turns, obeying traffic signs and signals, traveling at a safe speed for the conditions, keeping a proper look-out, and of operating a motor vehicle at an unsafe speed and in a reckless manner.

(See Complaint, ¶¶ 15-16, 18-19.) 

            The Court finds Taylor is instructive.  While the facts of this case do not involve driving while intoxicated, Taylor sets forth the type of conduct that may warrant punitive damages.

As the Taylor court stated, “routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages,” and, here, Plaintiff simply alleged that Defendant Maldonado drove in excess speeds and generally that he violated traffic laws.  (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 899-900.)  In addition, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing conduct that would warrant punitive damages.  (See Busbom¿v. Superior Court¿(1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 550 [plaintiff alleged that defendant drove his pickup southbound in the northbound lane of the highway];¿Peterson v. Superior Court¿(1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 162 [defendant was alleged to be driving at speeds of greater than 100 miles per hour after consuming alcoholic beverages];¿Sumpter v. Matteson¿(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th¿928, 936 [defendant ran red light after ingesting drugs].) 

Furthermore, Plaintiff asserted conclusory allegations without factual specificity to show that Defendants engaged in conduct that was malicious and/or despicable.  Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Maldonado drove his vehicle at an “excessive speed” and “violated [traffic] statutes, laws, and regulations,” but fails to state any specific facts regarding Defendant Maldonado’s conduct that would support a claim for punitive damages.  Equally important, Plaintiff fails to allege malice among the corporate leaders of Defendant Bloomington, including  its officers, directors, or managing agents. 

2.     LEAVE TO AMEND

A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state claim for negligence against the Demurring Defendant. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

Here, the burden is on Plaintiff to establish that the operative complaint can be amended successfully.  The Court finds Plaintiff has not met his burden by generally requesting leave to amend if the motion is granted.  Although Plaintiff sets forth the law for granting leave to amend, he fails to articulate how he can amend the Complaint to assert a proper claim for punitive damages. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Thus, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Punitive Damages) without leave to amend, and orders Defendants to file and serve an answer to the Complaint on or before April 12, 2023. 

Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.