Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV00552, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV00552    Hearing Date: January 28, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 1

MOTION

            This case stems from a dispute over the installation of artificial turf at Plaintiff Buddy Chan’s (“Plaintiff”) home.  On February 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Michael Navi (“Navi”) and Millbrook Kitchens, Inc. (“Millbrook”) (together, “Defendants”) alleging six causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) intentional misrepresentation; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) professional negligence; and (6) violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

            On July 7, 2023, Millbrook filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff, alleging three causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; and (3) common counts—services rendered.

            Plaintiff now moves to compel Navi’s deposition and for sanctions.  The motion is unopposed.

ANALYSIS

1.     Deposition

“If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).)

Here, on July 18, 2024, Plaintiff served the operative amended notice of taking Navi’s deposition by Zoom, which was scheduled for July 30, 2024.  (Sallus Decl. ¶ 9 and Ex. 8.)  At 7:58 a.m. the morning of July 30, 2024, Defendants wrote an email indicating, “Unfortunately I’m not able to do deposition today, we need to reschedule.”  (Sallus Decl. ¶ 12 and Ex. 11.)  Plaintiff’s counsel notified Defendants that they were taking a notice of nonappearance and moving for sanctions based on the nonappearance.  (Sallus Decl. ¶ 13 and Ex. 12.)  The parties continued to meet and confer to reschedule the deposition to avoid motion practice. Yet after two Informal Discovery Conferences, on October 31 and November 18, neither Defendants’ counsel has provided deposition dates for Navi nor has Navi appeared for his deposition.

2.     Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivisions (g) and (h) provide:

(g) (1) If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(g) (2) On motion of any other party who, in person or by attorney, attended at the time and place specified in the deposition notice in the expectation that the deponent’s testimony would be taken, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of that party and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(h) If that party or party-affiliated deponent then fails to obey an order compelling attendance, testimony, and production, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that party deponent or against the party with whom the deponent is affiliated. In lieu of, or in addition to, this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that deponent or against the party with whom that party deponent is affiliated, and in favor of any party who, in person or by attorney, attended in the expectation that the deponent’s testimony would be taken pursuant to that order.

Plaintiff also requests terminating and monetary sanctions against Navi in connection with the motion to compel deposition. 

Terminating sanctions are only appropriate if the deponent “fails to obey an order compelling attendance, testimony, and production[.]”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (h).)  Here, Navi has not failed to obey any such order of the Court.  As such, terminating sanctions are not appropriate.

However, monetary sanctions are appropriate (and compulsory) against a party who fails to attend a deposition, unless they acted with substantial justification.  Here, Navi did not attend or object to the noticed deposition, and did not oppose the motion to provide any other such substantial justification.  As such, the Court finds that the imposition of monetary sanctions to be  warranted.

Therefore, the Court awards monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,810.35, representing 3 hours of counsel’s time to prepare the instant motion and attend the hearing at the hourly rate of $620, plus $950.35 in costs incurred in connection with the deposition nonappearance and filing of the instant motion.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel Navi’s deposition and for sanctions.  The Court compels Navi to appear for deposition within 30 days of notice of this order. 

Further, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions and orders Navi to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,810.35 to Plaintiff, by and through counsel for Plaintiff, within 30 days of notice of this order.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for terminating sanctions.

Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.

DATED:  January 28, 2025                                                    ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court 

TENTATIVE
RULING - NO. 2

MOTIONS

            This case stems from a dispute over
the installation of artificial turf at Plaintiff Buddy Chan’s (“Plaintiff”)
home.  On February 3, 2023, Plaintiff
filed suit against Defendants Michael Navi (“Navi”) and Millbrook Kitchens,
Inc. (“Millbrook”) (together, “Defendants”) alleging six causes of action for
(1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (3) intentional misrepresentation; (4) negligent misrepresentation;
(5) professional negligence; and (6) violation of Business & Professions
Code section 17200 et seq.

            On July 7, 2023, Millbrook filed a
cross-complaint against Plaintiff, alleging three causes of action for (1)
breach of contract; (2) fraud; and (3) common counts—services rendered.

            Plaintiff now moves the Court for
orders compelling Defendants Navi and Millbrook to serve further responses to
the following discovery requests:

1.         Requests for Production of Documents
[“RPD”], Set 1, propounded to Defendants Navi and Millbrook Kitchens

·      
Propounded:                     April
18, 2024

·      
Responses served:            June 11, 2024

·      
Motion filed:                    July
26, 2024

2.         Requests for Production of Documents
[“RPD”], Set 2, propounded to Defendants Navi and Millbrook Kitchens

·      
Propounded:                     Undetermined

·      
Responses served:            June 11, 2024

·      
Motion filed:                    July
26, 2024

3.         Form Interrogatories [“FROG”], Set 1,
propounded to Defendants Navi and Millbrook Kitchens

·      
Propounded:                     April
18, 2024

·      
Responses served:            June 11, 2024

·      
Motion filed:                    July
26, 2024

4.         Special Interrogatories [“SROG”], Set
1, propounded to Defendants Navi and Millbrook Kitchens

·      
Propounded:                     April
18, 2024

·      
Responses served:            June 11, 2024

·      
Motion filed:                    July
26, 2024

5.         Requests for Admission [“RFA”], Set 1,
propounded to Defendants Navi and Millbrook Kitchens

·      
Propounded:                     April
18, 2024

·      
Responses served:            June 11, 2024

·      
Motion filed:                    July
26, 2024

Procedural
Requirements

1.    
Timeliness
of Motions

            A notice of motion to compel further
responses must be “given within 45 days of the service of the verified response,
or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date
to which” the parties have agreed in writing.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).)  Failure to file such a motion within this time
period constitutes a waiver of any right to compel further responses to demands
for production of documents.  (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff filed the motions on the dates set forth above.  Defendants have not objected to the timeliness
of the motions. 

2.    
Meet and
Confer

            A motion to compel must be
accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure
section 2016.040.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310,
subd. (b)(2).)  A meet and confer declaration
must state facts showing a reasonable and good-faith attempt at an informal
resolution of each issue presented in the motion.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) 

            “The Discovery Act requires that,
prior to the initiation of a motion to compel, the moving party declare that he
or she has made a serious attempt to obtain an informal resolution of each
issue. This rule is designed ‘to encourage the parties to work out their
differences informally so as to avoid the necessity of a formal order.  . . . 
This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the
unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of
informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.”  (Townsend
v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1434-1435, citations omitted
[cleaned  up].)  To comply, “A reasonable and good-faith
attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with
[opposing counsel].  Rather, the law
requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views,
consult, and deliberate.”  (Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p.
1439; see also Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294 [to
satisfy the attempt at informal resolution required in section 2016.040
opposing parties must do more than try to persuade each other of their
errors].)  In short, the Discovery Act
“requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal
resolution.”  (Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.)

            To that end, trial courts are
entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort
required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Obregon v.
Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 433.)  In determining if parties have satisfied Section
2016.040, judges may consider “the history of the litigation, the nature of the
interaction between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of
discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar factors can be
relevant.” (Id. at pp. 431-432 [holding that the trial court was correct
in determining that sending a letter with oppositions was an insufficient
attempt at an informal resolution].)  In
sum, meet and confer efforts should go beyond merely sending letters to each
other stating each party’s respective positions.

            Here, as set forth in the
Declarations of Darryl A. Meigs, counsel for Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has engaged in a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of
the issues presented in the motions, and Defendant has not disputed any of the
representations concerning meet and confer efforts.

3.    
Separate
Statement

            California Rules of Court, rule
3.1345 requires that any motion involving the content of discovery contain a
separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a statement
of factual and legal reasons for why an order compelling further responses is
warranted. 

            Here, Plaintiff has filed separate statements
related to each motion which complies with Rule 3.1345.

LEGAL
STANDARD – DISCOVERY – GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Where
a party objects, or responds inadequately, to discovery requests, a motion lies
to compel further responses, and that party has the burden to justify the
objections or inadequate responses. (Fairmont
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Code Civ. Proc., §§
2030.300, subd. (a) [motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a
response to interrogatories”], 2031.310, subd. (a) [motion to compel further
responses lies “[o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection”], 2033.290,
subd. (a) [motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a response
to requests for admissions”].)  Further, “a
trial court's determination of a motion to compel discovery is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.  However, when the
facts asserted in support of and in opposition to the motion are in conflict,
the trial court's factual findings will be upheld if they are supported by
substantial evidence.” (Costco Wholesale
Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 [cleaned up].)

            With
respect to interrogatories, the Discovery Act requires as follows: 

Each answer in a response to interrogatories
shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably
available to the responding party permits. 
If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered
to the extent possible.  If the
responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully
to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and
good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons
or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the
propounding party. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subds. (a)-(c).)  Similarly, regarding requests for production
of documents or other items, the Discovery Act provides as follows:

The party to whom a demand for inspection,
copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to
each item or category of item by any of the following:  (1) A statement that the party will comply
with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the
date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to
paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related
activities.  (2) A representation that
the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying,
testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.  (3) An objection to the particular demand for
inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.

(Code
Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).)  “A
representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for
inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search
and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand.
This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because
the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been
lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the
possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall
set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or
believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or
category of item.”  (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.230.)

            Further,
regarding requests for admission, the Discovery Act provides as follows:

(a) Each answer in a response to requests for
admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information
reasonably available to the responding party permits.

(b) Each answer shall: (1) Admit so much of the
matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request
itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party. (2) Deny
so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.  (3) Specify so much of the matter involved in
the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient
information or knowledge.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subds.
(a)-(b).)  And “[i]f a responding party
gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all
or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a
reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been
made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to
enable that party to admit the matter.” 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (c).) 

1.    
BOILERPLATE OBJECTIONS

            On June 11, 2024, Defendants served
Plaintiff with a series of objections to all discovery without any substantive responses.  Upon review of the discovery, subject to the
exceptions below, the Court finds that most of the requests appear limited to
the project, relevant time period, specific claims and defenses raised, and/or
parties at issue and are therefore not, on their face, vague and ambiguous, overbroad,
or unduly burdensome.  Nor do most of the
requests on their face generally appear to refer to any documents that would be
privileged or otherwise implicate privacy interests.  The Court has identified the following
exceptions:

Request for Production No. 19, which seeks “Any and all documents
related to any policy of insurance for you that was in effect during the
relevant time period” appears on its face to be overbroad in scope and to
violate Defendants’ privacy.  Furthermore,
RPD No. 27 propounded on Milbrook and RPD No. 29 propounded on Navi seek a highly
relevant subset of these documents: “Any and all documents related to insurance
which was in effect during the relevant time period which may have covered
services you performed at the property.” 
As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to compel further
responses to RFP No. 19.

Special Interrogatory Nos. 8-9 request Defendants to identify all
documents demonstrating monies paid to persons for services performed at the
property and for materials related to services performed at the property, and RPD
Nos. 20-21 to Millbrook and Nos. 22-23 to Navi request production of any and
all documents so identified.  All
documents demonstrating monies paid would necessarily encompass bank statements
and financial records that include other transactions in which Defendants
and/or third parties would have privacy interests.  Notwithstanding, Defendants should be able to
identify all such documents and substantiate any documents withheld on the
basis of privilege or privacy.  Therefore,
notwithstanding the potential privacy interests, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
motion to compel further responses to SROG Nos. 8-9 and RPD Nos. 20-21
propounded to Millbrook and SROG Nos. 9-10 and RPD Nos. 22-23 propounded to
Navi.

SROG No. 19 to Millbrook and to Navi requests Defendants to “identify
all documents related to the property that you have knowledge of during the
relevant time period” and SROG No. 20 requests “identify all documents related
to plaintiff that you have knowledge of during the relevant time period.”  Similarly, RPD Nos. 23-24 to Millbrook and
RPD Nos. 25-26 to Navi seeks any and all documents identified in response to
SROG Nos. 19-20. 

As worded, SROG Nos. 19 and 20 are vague and ambiguous, as it is
unclear whether Plaintiff seeks knowledge Defendants had during the relevant
time period, documents that existed during the relevant time period, or
documents about Plaintiff and the property concerning the relevant time period
but that may have been created later.  Moreover,
it is unclear whether the request seeks documents of which Defendants had
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge. 

Further, as drafted, the identification of all documents related to
the property seems overly broad on its face, as it would appear to encompass
unrelated property documents of which Defendants would have general knowledge,
such as prior public real estate listing documents, property tax statements,
etc.  As such, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to SROG Nos. 19-20 propounded
to both Milbrook and Navi, RPD Nos. 23-24 propounded to Milbrook, and RPD Nos.
25-26 propounded to Navi.

2.     RULINGS

RPD
Set 1 to Milbrook

·      
RPD No. 1: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 2: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 3: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 4: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 5: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 6: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 7: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 8: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 9: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 10: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 11: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 12: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 13: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 14: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 15: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 16: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 17: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 18: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 19: DENIED

·      
RPD No. 20: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 21: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 22: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 23: DENIED

·      
RPD No. 24: DENIED

·      
RPD No. 25: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 26: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 27: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 28: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 29: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 30: GRANTED

RPD
Set 1 to Navi

·      
RPD No.1: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 2: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 3: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 4: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 5: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 6: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 7: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 8: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 9: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 10: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 11: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 12: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 13: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 14: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 15: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 16: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 17: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 18: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 19: DENIED

·      
RPD No. 20: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 21: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 22: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 23: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 24: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 25: DENIED

·      
RPD No. 26: DENIED

·      
RPD No. 27: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 28: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 29: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 30: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 31: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 32: GRANTED

RPD
Set 2 to Milbrook

·      
RPD No. 31: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 32: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 33: GRANTED

RPD
Set 2 to Navi

·      
RPD No. 33: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 34: GRANTED

·      
RPD No. 35: GRANTED

SROG
Set 1 to Navi

·      
SROG No. 1: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 2: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 3: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 4: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 5: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 6: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 7: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 8: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 9: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 10: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 11: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 12: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 13: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 14: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 15: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 16: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 17: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 18: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 19: DENIED

·      
SROG No. 20: DENIED

SROG
Set 1 to Milbrook

·      
SROG No. 1: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 2: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 3: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 4: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 5: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 6: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 7: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 8: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 9: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 10: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 11: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 12: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 13: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 14: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 15: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 16: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 17: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 18: GRANTED

·      
SROG No. 19: DENIED

·      
SROG No. 20: DENIED

RFA
to Navi

·      
RFA No. 5: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 6: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 7: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 11: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 13: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 14: GRANTED

RFA
to Milbrook

·      
RFA No. 5: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 6: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 7: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 11: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 13: GRANTED

·      
RFA No. 14: GRANTED

FROG
to Navi

·      
FROG No. 2.2: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 2.3: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 2.4: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 2.5: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 2.6: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 2.7: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 2.11: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 4.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 8.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 8.4: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 8.7: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 8.8: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 9.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 9.2: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.2: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.3: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.4: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.5: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.7: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 15.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 16.7: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 16.8: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 17.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.2: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.3: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.4: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.5: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.6: GRANTED

FROG
to Milbrook

·      
FROG No. 2.11: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 4.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 8.4: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 8.7: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 8.8: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 9.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 9.2: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.2: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.3: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.4: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 12.5: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 15.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 16.7: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 16.8: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 17.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.1: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.2: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.3: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.4: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.5: GRANTED

·      
FROG No. 50.6: GRANTED

CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

Therefore, the Court grants in
part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motions to compel further responses per Code
of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, 2031.310 and 2033.290.    Likewise, the Court orders Defendants to
serve further verified, code compliant responses to the Requests for Production
of Documents, Sets 1-2, Special Interrogatories, Set 1, Requests for Admission,
Set 1, and Form Interrogatories, Set 1,
as noted above, within 30 days of notice of the Court’s orders.

Plaintiff shall provide notice
of the Court’s orders and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.

DATED:
January 28, 2025                                         ___________________________

                                                                                    Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                              Judge
of the Superior Court