Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV00589, Date: 2023-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV00589 Hearing Date: March 27, 2024 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
|
HEARING DATE |
March
27, 2024 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
23SMCV00589 |
|
MOTIONS |
Motions
to Compel Responses to: 1.
Form Interrogatories (Set One) 2.
Special Interrogatories (Set One) 3.
Demands for Production of Documents (Set One) Requests for Monetary Sanctions |
|
MOVING PARTY |
Defendant
NAI Capital Commercial Inc. |
|
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff
Alexander Rivkin |
MOTIONS
Defendant NAI Capital Commercial
Inc. (“Defendant”) moves to compel verified responses from Plaintiff Alexander
Rivkin (“Plaintiff”) to Form Interrogatories (Set One) (“FROG”); Special
Interrogatories (Set One) (“SROG”) and Demands for Production of Documents (Set
One) (“RPD”). Defendant also seeks
monetary sanctions in connection with the motions.
Plaintiff opposes the motions and Defendant replies.
LEGAL
STANDARDS
1. Interrogatories
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
2030.290, “[i]f a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a
timely response . . . [t]he party to whom the interrogatories are directed
waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Section
2030.230, as well as any objection to the interrogatories, including one based
on privilege or the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing
with Section 2018.010. . . . [and] The party propounding the
interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the
interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subds. (a)-(b).)
2. Requests
for Production
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (a),
“[i]f a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is
directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he party to whom the demand
for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection
to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work
product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010. . . . [and] The party making the demand may
move for an order compelling response to the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300, subds. (a)-(b).)
ANALYSIS
1.
Discovery Requests
Defendant electronically served Plaintiff the
FROG, SROG, and RPD on November 6, 2023.
(See Kenney Decl. ¶¶ 2-4 and Exhibits A-C thereto.) Plaintiff did not
timely respond to the subject discovery requests. (Kenney Decl. ¶ 5.)
In opposition, Plaintiff indicates it has
since served verified responses to FROG, SROG, and RPD, and that it has
produced documents in response to the RPD, thus mooting the instant motions.
In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
responses are inadequate, as Plaintiff improperly relies on objections that
were waived by virtue of Plaintiff’s untimely response, and the responses also
make clear that some documents are being improperly withheld.
Because Plaintiff has served responses to
the FROG, SROG, and RPD, the Court denies the motion to compel initial
responses is moot, except as to the issue of sanctions.[1] Any deficiencies in the FROG, SROG, or RPD
responses are properly the subject of a motion to compel further responses
and/or a motion to compel further production, as appropriate.
2.
Monetary Sanctions
Defendant
requests monetary sanctions for legal fees spent in connection with the
motions. However, Defendant did not
properly notice the request for sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
counsel. As such, the request for
sanctions is procedurally defective, especially as to Plaintiff’s counsel.[2] Nonetheless, Plaintiff forfeited the issue by
failing to raise the procedural defect in the oppositions to the motion.[3]
The Court
finds Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond to the FROG, SROG, and RPD to be an
abuse of the discovery process, warranting monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010, subd. (d),
2030.290, subd. (c), 2031.310, subd. (h).)
Accordingly, the Court imposes monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and
counsel for Plaintiff, Gary D. Fidler & Associates, APLC, in the amount of
$2222.66, which represents five hours of attorney time to prepare the moving
and reply papers, and attend the hearing, at $400 per hour, plus $222.66 in
filing fees at $74.22 per motion.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court denies, in part, Defendant’s motions to compel
responses to the FROG, SROG and RPD per Code of Civil Procedure sections
2030.290 and 2031.300 as moot.
Further, the Court grants, in part, Defendant’s motions regarding the
requests for monetary sanctions and orders Plaintiff and counsel for Plaintiff,
Gary D. Fidler & Associates, APLC, jointly and severally, to pay monetary
sanctions in the amount of $2,222.66 to Defendant, by and through counsel for Defendant,
within 20 days of notice of the Court’s orders.
Defendant is ordered to
provide notice of the Court’s orders and file a proof of service of such.
DATED: March 27, 2024 ________________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] “[P]roviding untimely responses does not
divest the trial court of its authority [to hear a motion to compel responses].” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v.
Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 407.) Even if the untimely response “does not
contain objections [and] substantially resolve[s] the issues raised by a motion
to compel responses…the trial court retains the authority to hear the
motion.” (Id. at pp.
408-409.) This rule gives “an important
incentive for parties to respond to discovery in a timely fashion.” (Id. at p. 408.) If “the propounding party [does not] take the
motion off calendar or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions,” the trial
court may “deny the motion to compel responses as essentially unnecessary, in
whole or in part, and just impose sanctions.”
(Id. at p. 409; see also Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a) [“The court may award sanctions under the
Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even
though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was
withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after
the motion was filed”].)
[2] “Where sanctions are sought against the opposing
party's counsel, the notice of motion must expressly so state. It is not enough
simply to attach declarations or a transcript showing that the deponent refused
to appear or answer questions on counsel's advice.” (Weil & Brown, Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 8:1985
(citing Blumenthal v. Superior Court (1980) 103 CA3d 317; Marriage of Fuller
(1985) 163 CA3d 1070); see also id. at ¶ 8:1986 [“Where an award is sought
against the attorney for advising the opposing party not to answer or respond,
the notice of motion must identify the opposing counsel and state that
sanctions are being sought against such counsel personally”].)
[3] “The terms “waiver” and “forfeiture” long have been
used interchangeably. As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
however, waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure
to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.
Thus, it is most accurate to characterize the issue as whether a
defendant forfeits the right to object to venue by failing to timely raise such
an objection prior to trial.” (People
v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097 [cleaned up]; see also Osman v.
Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.)