Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV00792, Date: 2024-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV00792    Hearing Date: March 21, 2024    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

207

HEARING DATE

March 21, 2024

CASE NUMBER

23SMCV00792

MOTION

Motion for Summary Judgment

MOVING PARTY

Plaintiff Forwardline Financial, LLC

OPPOSING PARTY

none

 

MOVING PAPERS:

 

  1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
  2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
  3. Declaration of Rodney Adams
  4. Declaration of Jon O. Blanda, Esq.

 

BACKGROUND

 

On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff Forwardline Financial, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendants Vent Tech, Inc. (“Vent Tech”) and Christopher Taulbee (“Taulbee”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging causes of action for (1) account stated against Vent Tech; (2) money lent against Vent Tech; (3) open book account against Taulbee; (4) breach of contract against Vent Tech; and (5) breach of contract against Taulbee, seeking to recover $66,697.45 in connection with Defendants’ alleged default on a commercial loan.

 

Both Defendants have filed an Answer, but Defendants have not responded to any of Plaintiff’s discovery requests.  Plaintiff now seeks summary judgment.  Defendants have not filed an opposition.

 

LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  

 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

 

DISCUSSION

 

1.      COMMON COUNTS

 

The elements of an “Account Stated” cause of action are (1) at the time of the statement, an indebtedness from one party to the other existed (2) a balance was then struck and agreed to be the correct sum owing from the debtor to the creditor; and (3) the debtor expressly or impliedly promised to pay to the creditor the amount thus determined to be owing.  (Truestone, Inc. v. Simi West Industrial Park II (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 715, 725.)  The second and third elements can be established where an account is sent to the debtor, and the debtor does not object within a reasonable time.  (Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d 17, 25; Atkinson v. Golden Gate Tile Co. (1913) 21 Cal.App. 168, 171.) 

 

            “A book account is ‘open’ where a balance remains due on the account.”  (Eloquence Corporation v. Home Consignment Center (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 655, 664–665.)  However, “[t]he mere recording in a book of transactions or the incidental keeping of accounts under an express contract does not of itself create a book account.”  (Id. at p. 666.)  

 

To establish a cause of action to recover on an Open Book Account, the plaintiff must establish that it has an “open book account,” defined as (1) a detailed statement constituting the principal record of transactions between a debtor and creditor (2) arising out of a contract; (3) that shows the debits and credits for the transaction(s); (4) and against whom and in favor of whom the entries are made; (5) kept in a reasonably permanent form and manner.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.) 

 

            A plaintiff may similarly recover for money lent at the request defendant that remains unpaid.  (See, e.g., Moya v. Northrup (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 276, 278.)

 

            Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Plaintiff lent Vent Tech $58,000, with $85,260 to be repaid, and Taulbee guaranteed the loan (UF 2-3); Plaintiff kept an account of all debits and credits for the transaction and sent Defendants a statement of their account (UF 4); Defendants never disputed the accuracy of the account (UF 5); and Defendants owe Plaintiff $66,697.45 on the account (UF 5).

 

            Therefore, Plaintiff has met its burden of establishing a prima facie case that it will prevail on the common counts.

 

2.      BREACH OF CONTRACT

 

“To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.”  (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) 

 

            Here, as to Vent Tech, Plaintiff has demonstrated (1) Plaintiff and Vent Tech entered into a commercial loan agreement (UF 9); (2) Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises under the agreement (UF 15); (3) Vent Tech breached the agreement by defaulting on the loan payments (UF 14, 16); and (4) as a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $66,697.45.

 

            As to Taulbee, Plaintiff has demonstrated (1) Plaintiff and Taulbee entered into an agreement whereby Taulbee agreed to guarantee the loan to Vent Tech (UF 24); (2) Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises under the loan agreement with Vent Tech and the guaranty agreement with Taulbee (UF 27); (3) Taulbee breached the guaranty by failing to pay the loan payments as they became due (UF 26); and (4) as a result of Defendants’ breaches, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $66,697.45.

 

            Therefore, Plaintiff has similarly met its burden of establishing a prima facie case that Defendants breached their agreements with Plaintiff.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Having found that Plaintiff met its burden of production and persuasion in establishing its prima facie case, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for summary judgment in its entirety.  Plaintiff is entitled to recover $66,697.45 from Defendants, jointly and severally, on Plaintiff’s claims for common counts and breach of contract. 

 

Defendants shall file a proposed order and judgment in conformity with the Court’s ruling forthwith and shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service regarding the same.   

 

 

 

DATED:  March 21, 2024                                                      ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court