Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV02791, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV02791 Hearing Date: December 13, 2023 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
HEARING DATE |
December 13, 2023 |
CASE NUMBER |
23SMCV02791 |
MOTION |
Demurrer |
MOVING PARTY |
Defendant City National Bank, N.A. |
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff Kimberly Tucker |
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kimberly Tucker’s (“Plaintiff”) business entity previously
filed suit against Defendant City National Bank, N.A., alleging (1) race and
color discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) failure to prevent discrimination
and retaliation; (4) unfair business practices; (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and (6) fraud and deceit for allegedly discriminating against
it three times in five years for exercising its “freedom of speech” by “making
a complaint about being mistreated.” (See
LAX Snak Trak Vending v. City National Bank, Los Angeles Superior Court
Case No. 23STCV00130.) The Court
sustained Defendant’s unopposed demurrer to that complaint with leave to amend,
on the basis that it was uncertain, and noted that Plaintiff cannot appear or
file pleadings in pro per on behalf of the business, which can only be
represented by a licensed attorney.
(Case No. 23STCV00130, May 11, 2023 Minute Order.) Upon the entity’s failure to timely amend,
the Court granted Defendant’s ex parte application to dismiss for
failure to prosecute.
Plaintiff now brings this suit, again in pro per, but in an individual
capacity, alleging three causes of action for (1) discrimination; (2)
retaliation re a complaint; and (3) unlawful business practices, stemming from
Defendant’s alleged racial discrimination in denying Plaintiff a business and
CD account and retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior complaints of unfair treatment.
Defendant has demurred to all three causes of action on the basis that
they fail to state a cause of action and are uncertain pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f). Plaintiff opposes the demurrer[1] and
Defendant replies.
MEET
AND CONFER REQUIREMENT
Code of Civil Procedure section
430.41, subdivision (a) requires that “before filing a demurrer pursuant to
this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by
telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for
the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would
resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.”
The statute further requires “As part of the meet and confer process,
the demurring party shall identify all of the specific causes of action that it
believes are subject to demurrer and identify with legal support the basis of
the deficiencies.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.41, subd. (a)(1).) “The party who
filed the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer shall provide legal support for
its position that the pleading is legally sufficient or, in the alternative,
how the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer could be amended to cure any
legal insufficiency.” (Ibid.)
“The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date
the responsive pleading is due. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)
“The demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a
declaration stating either” the means by which the parties met and conferred,
or that the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond
to the meet and confer request. (Id.,
subd. (a)(3).)
Here, Defendant provided an attorney declaration indicating that on October
5, 2023, Defendant’s counsel sent Plaintiff an email, requesting a meet and
confer call, but Plaintiff responded: “I
will not meet and confer as you have already stated your stance!” (Ovsepian Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. 1.)
Accordingly, the Court determines that Defendant has satisfied the
meet and confer requirement.
ANALYSIS
1. DEMURRER
“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of
the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In testing the sufficiency of a cause of
action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters
which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law. [A court
also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole
and its parts in their context.” (290
Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc.
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer,
however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however
improbable they may be”].)
Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe”
the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between
the parties.” (See Code Civ. Proc., §
452.) “This rule of liberal construction
means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not
the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)
In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as
against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if one consideration of all the
facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of
the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the
facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of
other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff
may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)
A.
UNCERTAINTY
A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading
is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond - i.e., he or she
cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what
claims are directed against him or her.
(Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612,
616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the
ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why
the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to
page and line numbers. (See Fenton
v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)
“[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if
the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.”
(Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) Demurrers for
uncertainty are strictly construed, “because ambiguities can reasonably be
clarified under modern rules of discovery.”
(Ibid.)
Moreover, “the Code of Judicial Ethics requires judges to treat all litigants
fairly.” (Nuño v. California State
University, Bakersfield (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 799, 810.) “A judge shall dispose of all judicial
matters fairly, promptly, and efficiently. A judge shall manage the courtroom
in a manner that provides all litigants the opportunity to have their matters
fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.”
(Ibid.) Notwithstanding, “[t]he
obligation of a judge to dispose of matters promptly and efficiently must not
take precedence over the judge's obligation to dispose of the matters fairly
and with patience.” (Ibid.) “For example, when a litigant is
self-represented, a judge has the discretion to take reasonable steps,
appropriate under the circumstances and consistent with the law and the canons,
to enable the litigant to be heard.” (Ibid.) “Providing access to justice for
self-represented litigants is a priority for California courts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.960(b).)
While the Court agrees that the Complaint could be clearer in terms of
the causes of action and allegations, it declines to sustain the demurrer on
the basis of uncertainty. Construing the
allegations of the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
especially in consideration of the fact that Plaintiff is self-represented, the
Court does not find the Complaint so ambiguous that Defendant cannot reasonably
determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed
against it.
Specifically, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s first cause of
action appears to state a claim for racial discrimination in violation of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Demurrer at p.
8.) Similarly, as to the second cause of
action for retaliation, the Unruh Civil Rights Act bars retaliation for filing
discrimination complaints. (See, e.g.,
Vaughn v. Hugo Neu Proler Int’l (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1612.) And a cause of action for “unlawful business
practices” appears to state a claim under California’s Unfair Business
Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200, et seq.) pursuant
to the unlawful prong.
The Court thus declines to sustain Defendant’s demurrer on the basis
of uncertainty.
B.
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
i.
First Cause
of Action – Discrimination
In order to state a cause of
action for discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must
allege (1) defendant denied, aided or incited a denial of, discriminated, or
made a distinction that denied full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, and/or services to plaintiff; (2) a substantial
motivating reason for defendant’s conduct was plaintiff’s sex, race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, medical condition, genetic information,
marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, and/or
immigration status or defendant’s perception thereof; (3) that plaintiff was
harmed; and (4) that defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing
plaintiff’s harm. (See CACI No. 3060.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges
Defendant “racially and retalitoratly” [sic] discriminated against Plaintiff by
denying “opening a Business and CD account at City National Bank on 3 separate
visit [sic] at 3 different location [sic] in a 5 year time span.” (Complaint at p. 2:1-4.) Thus, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
with respect to the first two elements.
However, the Complaint does
not allege any harm Plaintiff has suffered, or how Defendant’s allegedly
discriminatory conduct caused Plaintiff’s harm.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to plead the third and fourth elements
to establish a discrimination claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
ii.
Second Cause
of Action – Retaliation Re a Complaint
As discussed above, the
Unruh Civil Rights Act also bars retaliation for filing discrimination
complaints. (See, e.g., Vaughn v.
Hugo Neu Proler Int’l (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1612.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s
corporate office sent Plaintiff “a letter confirming I was flagged to not open
account [sic] because I made a complaint years ago.” (Complaint at p. 2:22-27.)
However, because the Complaint does not contain allegations of any
harm Plaintiff suffered, or a causal connection between Defendant’s alleged
retaliatory conduct and any harm, Plaintiff has similarly failed to satisfy the
third and fourth elements of a retaliation claim under the Unruh Civil Rights
Act.
iii.
Third Cause
of Action – Unlawful Business Practices
Business & Professions Code section 17200, known as the Unfair
Competition Law, or “UCL,” bars unfair competition, defined as “any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with
Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions
Code. “An unlawful business practice or
act within the meaning of the UCL is an act or practice, committed pursuant to
business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.” (Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation
of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 351.) “By proscribing any unlawful business
practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as
unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently
actionable.” (Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20
Cal.4th 163, 180.) Moreover, “a practice
may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law.” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges
unlawful discrimination and retaliation.
However, in order to have standing to bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff
must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to
qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that
economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business
practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322.)
Because Plaintiff has not
alleged any economic injury, or that Plaintiff’s harm was caused by Defendant’s
alleged unlawful business practices, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
under the Unfair Competition Law for unlawful business practices.
2.
LEAVE TO AMEND
A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what
manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the
legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The
Inland Oversight Committee v City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for
the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of
action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc.,
supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his
or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to
strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff
respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v Bank of America (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the
burden].)
In opposition to Defendant’s demurrer, Plaintiff provides
additional details regarding Defendant’s alleged discrimination and retaliation:
·
“I have tried in the past and present to resolve
this hatred I I [sic] endured by the location staffers and managers.” (Opp. at p. i, lines 17-19.)
·
“I later received a letter from the headquarters
branch Manager stating I was flagged for making a complaint almost 4 years
ago.” (Opp at p. i, lines 21-25.)
·
“I never knew Iwas [sic] flagged for reporting
the way I was racially harassed at the Santa Monica Branch by Jennifer Rudea.” (Opp. at p. i, lines 24-28.)
·
“Plaintiff has unfairly treated as a black small
business owner and single mom.” (Opp. at p. ii, lines 6-8.)
·
“I was talked down to, dismissed, dragged with
verbal language, laughed upon, embarrassed in front of others inside of bank
[sic], asked 100 questions not pertained [sic] to banking, my business,
documents needed for account [sic], my deposit, money, etc.” (Opp. at p. ii, lines 11-17.)
·
“I was literally asked to leave 2 branches
because I asked questions and was protecting the conversation.” (Opp. at p. ii, lines 17-19.)
·
“The last branch in Palisades, left me with “We
prefer not to do business with you”. [sic] after they took everything needed to
open my 2 accounts and never returned any of my private documents.” (Opp at p. ii, lines 18-23.)
·
“I was also threaten [sic] with law enforcement
due to my cashier check being deposited for 70,000.” (Opp. at p. iii, lines
11-13.)
·
“I was wrongfully ‘flagged’ for making a report
and protecting myself and future people of color.” (Opp. at p. iii, lines 15-19.)
·
“Bob Martinez was the branch manager that said
‘we prefer not to do business with people like you’ as this was relayed by
teller [sic] over the phone when I called to ask about status [sic] of my new
account 3 weeks later.” (Opp at p. iii,
lines 21-26.)
·
“City National Bank Flagging [sic] my name is
proof that I was racially targeted.”
(Opp. at p. iv, lines 4-6.)
·
“City National did this others [sic] and had to
pay 31 million.” (Opp. at p. iv, lines
14-16.)
With regard to damages, the opposition provides
the following additional facts:
·
“I am again asking for 3 million in
damages.” (Opp. at p. ii, line 28.)
·
“The discuss [sic] I have felt with this Bank
had left me discouraged, defeated, in therapy, my reexamining myself [sic]
worth, feeling like a failed business owner, a set back [sic] when I was
questioned about friends family strangers [sic] in order to get a bank account
possibly opened.” (Opp. at p. iii, lines
6-12.)
·
“I was also threaten [sic] with law enforcement
due to my cashier check being deposited for 70,000.” (Opp. at p. iii, lines 11-13.)
·
“City National Bank not only emotionally,
racially, pain and distress, tormented, sabotaged, accusatory re my 70,000
cashier check for deposit, without any proof of explanation or proof.” [sic] (Opp. at p. iv, lines 5-10.)
·
“My business has taken a harsh financial hit due
to the prior case.” (Opp. at p. iv,
lines 17-19.)
Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently identified additional facts
that could be added to the Complaint to further clarify the allegations of
discrimination and retaliation and to address the deficiencies identified by
the Court with respect to causation and damages.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to all
three causes of action with leave to amend.
Further, the Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended
complaint in conformance with the Court’s ruling on or before January 17,
2024.
Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof
of service regarding the same.
DATED: December 13, 2023 ___________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition filed on
October 25, 2023 was titled “Amended Complaint to Defendant Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Thus, the Clerk
of the Court deemed the opposition as Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and filed it as such which
was erroneous. To correct the error, the
Court orders that the Clerk of the Court change the description of Plaintiff’s
filing to “Opposition to Demurrer” and delete any reference in the Court’s
docket that Plaintiff has filed a first amended complaint as of October 25,
2023.