Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV03457, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV03457    Hearing Date: January 24, 2024    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

Defendant 11649 Mayfield, LLC (“Defendant”) demurs to both causes of action alleged in Plaintiff Christine Medrick’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).  Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and Defendant replies.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice of the original Complaint filed in this action.

Judicial notice may be taken of records of any court in this state.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)  Because the Complaint is part of the Court’s record for this case, the Court may take judicial notice of it.  (Ibid.)   However, “while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files.  Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof.”  (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [cleaned up].) 

Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the initial complaint filed in this matter as a court record, and the date of the filing thereof, but not the truth of the allegations contained therein.

ANALYSIS

1.      DEMURRER

Defendant demurs to both causes of action in Plaintiff’s FAC on the basis that they failed to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.”  (290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe” the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)  

In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if one consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

A.    FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendant contends that both of Plaintiff’s causes of action -- for premises liability and negligence -- fail because they are time barred.  Specifically, the FAC alleges the incident occurred on June 16, 2021 (FAC at ¶¶ GN-1, Prem.L-1), yet the original Complaint was not filed until July 27, 2023. 

The statute of limitations for negligence and premises liability actions is two years.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)  Therefore, because the original Complaint was filed more than two years after the alleged incident, the claims appear, on their face, to be time barred.

“Equitable tolling and equitable estoppel are distinct doctrines.  Tolling, strictly speaking, is concerned with the point at which the limitations period begins to run and with the circumstances in which the running of the limitations period may be suspended. Equitable estoppel, however, comes into play only after the limitations period has run and addresses the circumstances in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period. Equitable estoppel is wholly independent of the limitations period itself and takes its life from the equitable principle that no man may profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice.”  (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 383 [cleaned up]) (hereafter Lantzy.)

“Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.”  (Evid. Code, § 623.)

“But an estoppel may arise although there was no designed fraud on the part of the person sought to be estopped.  To create an equitable estoppel, it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.  Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense.”  (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 384 [cleaned up].)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense, because attached to the FAC are communications from Defendant to Plaintiff indicating that Defendant was willing to work with Plaintiff informally to accommodate Plaintiff’s concerns only if Plaintiff would “stop any legal actions” so Defendant could “open things up for discussion and accommodations.”  (Ex. A to FAC.)

Defendant argues that the email exchange does not establish that Defendant made any promise to Plaintiff with the intent to deceive Plaintiff or that Plaintiff actually induced Plaintiff to delay bringing this lawsuit.  (Demurrer at p. 5.) 

In Reply, Defendant argues various factual reasons why Plaintiff fails to satisfy the requirements of equitable estoppel as a matter of law.  In support, Defendant cites to CACI No. 456, which requires:

1.      That Defendant said or did something that caused Plaintiff to believe that it would not be necessary to file a lawsuit;

2.      That Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s conduct and therefore did not file the lawsuit within the time otherwise required;

3.      That a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would have relied on Defendant’s conduct;

4.      That after the limitation period had expired, Defendant’s representations by words or conduct proved to not be true; and

5.      That Plaintiff proceeded diligently to file suit once Plaintiff discovered the need to proceed. 

However, “the existence of equitable estoppel generally is a factual question for the trier of fact to decide, unless the facts are undisputed and can support only one reasonable conclusion as a matter of law.”  (Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1263.)  Defendant cites to Hopkins v. Kedzierski (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 736, 745 as standing for a contrary proposition.  (See Demurrer at p. 5.)  Hopkins v. Kedzierski is distinguishable. 

There, the trial court bifurcated the statute of limitations issues from liability issues, and denied the plaintiff’s request for a jury trial on the equitable tolling/estoppel issues, trying those issues via bench trial instead.  The appellate court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial on the issues of equitable tolling/estoppel, because those were equitable doctrines, and “[t]he right to a jury trial is limited to those causes of action (and their analogues) that were historically triable in a court of law.”  (Hopkins v. Kedzierski, supra, 225 Cal.App.4^th at p. 744.)

Because Defendant’s reply arguments rely on applying evidentiary facts (email correspondences), susceptible to differing interpretations, to jury instructions, it is clear that whether Defendant is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense in this case is a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact at later stages of the litigation.  As such, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff’s causes of action are time-barred at this stage of the action as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, the Court overrules Defendant’s Demurrers to the FAC. 

Further, the Court orders Defendant to file an Answer to the FAC on or before February 7, 2024. 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service regarding the same. 

DATED:  January 24, 2024                                                    ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court