Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case Number: 23SMCV03707, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV03707, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

This case arises over a dispute concerning an increase in membership fees Plaintiff Joseph Robert Giannini (“Plaintiff”) was charged to access the Gold’s Gym in Venice, California.

The operative Second Amended Complaint alleges three causes of action against Defendants Golds Gym California, LLC (“Gold’s”); RSG Group USA, Inc. (“RSG”); and Jeff Suender (“Suender”) (together, “Defendants”) for (1) breach of Business & Professions Code section 17200; (2) breach of the Unruh Act; and (3) breach of Corporate Code section 1507.

Defendants now move for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, as to the following issues:

Issue No. One – Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Breach of Business & Professions Code Section 17200 against all Defendants fails as a matter of law as the undisputed material facts establish that Plaintiff was not subjected to unfair competition.

Issue No. Two – Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Beach of the Unruh Act, Civil Code Section 51 et al. against all Defendants fails as a matter of law as the undisputed material facts establish that Plaintiff was not subjected to discrimination.

Issue No. Three– Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Beach of Corporations Code Section 1507 against all Defendants fails as a matter of law as the undisputed material facts establish that Plaintiff did not rely upon any alleged fraudulent documents.

Issue No. Four – Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Beach of Corporations Code Section 1507 against Defendant RSG GROUP USA, INC. and fails as a matter of law as a claim for breach of Corporations Code Section 1507 cannot be stated against a corporation.

Issue No. Five – Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Beach of Corporations Code Section 1507 against Defendant GOLD’S GYM CALIFORNIA, LLC fails as a matter of law as a claim for breach of Corporations Code Section 1507 cannot be stated against a limited liability company.

On February 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Notice Plaintiff Is Dismissing His Claim Under Corp. Code Under § 1507,” apparently abandoning the third cause of action. Otherwise, Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendants reply.

The Court rules as follows with respect to Defendants’ objections to the Declaration of Chris McConnell:

The Court rules as follows with respect to Defendants’ objections to the Declaration of Joseph Robert Giannini:

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” ¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (hereafter Aguilar).) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” ¿(Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)

Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.) A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.) Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2); Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.) Additionally, in line with Aguilar, “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

In order to prevail on a cause of action for discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must prove (1) defendant denied, aided or incited a denial of, discriminated, or made a distinction that denied full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, and/or services to plaintiff; (2) a substantial motivating reason for defendant’s conduct was plaintiff’s sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, and/or immigration status or defendant’s perception thereof; (3) that plaintiff was harmed; and (4) that defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See CACI No. 3060.)

Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot prove Defendants violated the Unruh Act because their decision to stop participating in the Silver & Fit program was made for legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons.

· In 1997, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement that provided him with a lifetime membership to use the Venice Gold’s Gym at a fixed rate of $29 per month. (UMF ¶ 5.)

· Effective November 1, 2015, Plaintiff obtained a Medicare supplement health insurance plan through Blue Shield, that made Plaintiff eligible to participate in a program called “Silver Sneakers” administered through Tivity Health, Inc., which is a health and fitness program for adults over 65. (UMF ¶¶ 6-9.)

· Plaintiff authorized Venice Gold’s Gym to receive payment for his gym membership through the Silver Sneakers program. (UMF ¶ 10.)

· Around 2016, Plaintiff stopped paying for his gym membership and Tivity started paying for the gym membership through the Silver Sneakers program. (UMF ¶ 11.)

· Beginning January 2023, Plaintiff no longer had the Blue Shield Medicare supplement health insurance plan, and obtained a Medicare supplement health insurance plan through Kaiser. (UMF ¶¶ 12-13.)

· Kaiser does not offer the Silver Sneakers program; instead it offers a similar program called “Silver & Fit” through a company called American Specialty Health Fitness, Inc. (UMF ¶¶ 14-17.)

· American Specialty also offers a companion program called “Active & Fit” which is a health and fitness program available to people over the age of 13. (UMF ¶ 18.)

· In January 2023, Plaintiff notified Defendant Suender, the General Manager of Venice Gold’s Gym that Plaintiff had switched from the Blue Shield Medicare Supplement plan to a Kaiser Medicare Supplement plan. (UMF ¶ 19.)

· The Venice Gold’s Gym had stopped participating in the Silver & Fit program effective October 1, 2021, because it was losing revenue from participating in the Active & Fit program, and its understanding was it could not participate in the Siler & Fit program without also participating in the Active & Fit program. (UMF ¶¶ 21-24.)

· As such, Defendants’ decision to stop participating in Silver & Fit was based on its decision to stop participating in Active & Fit, not based on any individual’s age, veteran status, or disability. (UMF ¶¶ 25-26.)

· the Venice Gold’s Gym location informed Plaintiff he could either go to another gym location that accepted his Silver & Fit plan, or he could apply for a new membership at the Venice Gold’s Gym location by paying the regular monthly membership dues. (UMF ¶ 27.)

· Defendant Suender did not reinstate Plaintiff’s membership at the previous rate of $29 per month because he believed that in connection with Plaintiff’s enrollment in the Silver Sneakers program, Plaintiff had voluntarily cancelled his prior lifetime membership agreement. (UMF ¶¶ 28-29.)

· senior citizens can be members of the Venice Gold’s Gym by either paying the regular monthly gym membership rate or having their dues paid through the Silver Sneakers program. (UMF ¶ 38.)

· Defendants do not own or exercise control over any other Gold’s Gym location other than the Venice location. (UMF ¶¶ 1-4.)

· Each franchisee owner of the other locations decides whether or not they will participate in the Silver & Fit program. (Alfonso Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.)

Thus, Defendants have met their prima facie initial burdens of persuasion and production of evidence that they did not discriminate against Plaintiff because (1) their decision to not honor Plaintiff’s prior $29 monthly rate was based on an understanding that Plaintiff had voluntarily cancelled that agreement in 2016 by authorizing Tivity to pay for his gym membership through the Silver Sneakers program; (2) their decision to stop participating in the Silver & Fit program in 2021was based on a business decision unrelated to its customers’ age, veteran status, or disability; and (3) Defendants did not deny Plaintiff access to the Venice Gold’s Gym, instead they offered Plaintiff the choice to either enroll in some other Gym they do not own or operate that accepts his Silver & Fit program or apply for a new membership at Venice Gold’s Gym and pay the standard monthly membership fee.

· “Plaintiff orally authorized defendants to bill his insurance carrier $29 per month in December 2016.” (Giannini Decl. ¶ 16.)

· Giannini Decl. ¶ 21:

Plaintiff disputes undisputed fact 29. Same answer. What Mr. Suender believed in regard to the log transaction is his opinion. Plaintiff disputes Mr. Suender’s belief. Plaintiff believes Mr. Suender is biased and his beliefs are self-serving conclusions and not subject to summary adjudication. Plaintiff’s asserts the “account record” [Ex. p. 14] Suender describes as true and correct contains mammoth mistakes, including:

(i) plaintiff’s gym membership number varies between the alleged account records and the alleged July 13, 2015 documents;

(ii) In April 2015, the account record claims plaintiff submitted a cancellation form. Defendants have admitted they do not have a copy of this form;

(iii) Om [sic] July 13, 2105 [sic] the account record does not state plaintiff signed a contract;

(iii) [sic] On July 21, 2015, the account record states plaintiff did not have a Silver Sneakers number or insurance. Thus, the alleged July 13, 2015 contract that plaintiff allegedly signed that says plaintiff is a woman, born 11/11/1911, and has no next of kins was rejected by plaintiff’s insurance carrier on July 21, 2015. It never went into effect because of mistakes. There was no meeting of the minds There is no offer and acceptance, no consent, no consideration, and no reliance. See Civil Code § 1580 “Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense.” The contract is void ab initio. It is crystal clear it is void because the Tivity Records prove plaintiff’s gym membership visits did not start until December 3, 2016. See Civil Code § 1587. “A proposal is revoked by any of the following: (c) By the failure of the acceptor to fulfill a condition precedent to acceptance.” See Tivity records of plaintiff’s visits beginning December 3, 2016.

(iv) On May 10, 2017, the account record states “Member no longer qualifies for LockedFor-Life (Dues Rate Lock, signed new GG contract. In discovery, defendants have admitted plaintiff never signed a new GG contract on May 10, 2017 or any other date. The account record Suender alleges under oath is true and correct per se proves the July 13, 2015 is, was, and always has been null and void.

(v) The second July 13, 2015 document fares no better. [Ex. 4-9] It is unsigned. It is unenforceable and void according to its terms because it is not signed; it is backdated from December 5, 2017 to July 13, 2015 and the contracting party is Gold’s Gym California LLC, when that entity was not formed until July 2020; the document further mistakenly claims plaintiff (although now a male) was born 11/11/1911 (making him 114 years old); his email is joe@aol.com (making him the only Joe in America); his person to be notified in case of emergency is “KNOWONE” (sic) (when plaintiff’s son became a member on June 17, 2017 and Jeff Suender orchestrated Alex’s membership). See also attached exhibit Alex Giannini gym membership. This unsigned document that Suender created and backdated as a pretext to cancel plaintiff’s lifetime membership also does not show the name of the Gold’s Gym employee who created it. Suender testified this document was in his possession. Suender admits he has been the Venice gym general manager since 2016.

· Approximately 475 members who were relying on the Active & Fit or Silver & Fit programs to pay their membership dues, approximately 30-50 of whom were relying on Silver & Fit to pay their membership dues, were not informed of the cancellation beforehand; and were told when they showed up that if they wanted to re-apply their annual membership fees would be $800. (Exhibit K – Jeff Suender Deposition testimony.)

Plaintiff has not met his burden of production to create any triable issues of material fact that there was discriminatory intent or a discriminatory impact of Defendants’ decision to cancel their participation in the Active & Fit and Silver & Fit programs in October 2021 or their policy and practice of offering members of those cancelled programs the option to reapply for membership at the current membership rate on the basis of age, veteran status, or disability.

Instead, Plaintiff challenges whether he actually cancelled his prior membership agreement by orally authorizing Defendants to bill his insurance the $29 fee or by subsequently signing a new contract. Plaintiff also challenges, through his declaration, regarding UMF No. 29, as being irrelevant on the grounds that Mr. Suender’s belief that Plaintiff cancelled his prior membership agreement has no bearing on whether Plaintiff actually cancelled his prior membership agreement, and that the signed agreement Defendants proffer has several indicia of unreliability.

But the central issues to Plaintiff’s Unruh Civil Rights Act claim are not whether Plaintiff actually cancelled his prior membership agreement orally or in writing, but whether Defendants had discriminatory intent and/or whether their contract cancellations had a discriminatory impact. In this regard, Defendants have proffered evidence that (1) there was no discriminatory intent or impact because of the 475 members were affected by Defendants’ decision to cancel participation in the Active & Fit and Silver & Fit programs, only 30-50 were senior citizens; (2) Defendants treated Plaintiff the same as all the other customers who were surprised by Defendants’ decision to no longer participate in the Silver & Fit or Active & Fit programs; and (3) Defendants had no discriminatory intent behind discontinuing their participation in the Silver & Fit and Active & Fit programs or cancelling Plaintiff’s prior membership agreement when he either in writing or orally instructed them to start billing his insurance plan for his membership at Gold’s Gym.

Defendants also withdrew from the Active & Fit and Silver & Fit programs before Plaintiff switched health insurance plans (from Blue Shield to Kaiser) which resulted in a change to what fitness program he was qualified to participate in from the Silver Sneakers to the Silver & Fit. In other words, Defendants had no role in Plaintiff switching health insurance plans and ultimately his eligibility in the plans’ respective fitness programs.

In sum, Plaintiff does not advance sufficient, competent evidence that raises a triable issue of material fact regarding any discriminatory intent or impact on the part of Defendants.

Further, Plaintiff’s Declaration also indicates, “The RSG PMK deposition was set for two months ago. The deposition date and other concessions are being negotiate. [sic]” (Giannini Decl. ¶ 30.) And the “Standard of Review” section of Plaintiff’s opposition brief vaguely indicates, “The moving party must set forth all material evidence on point, not just the evidence favorable to it. A moving part omitting deposition answers that raise triable issues of fact might be treated as an attempt to mislead the court as to the state of the discovery record.” (Opposition [“Opp.”] at p. 2:11-15 [citing Rio Linda Unified School Dist. v. Sup. Ct. (Diaz) (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 732, 740.])

But in order for the Court to grant additional discovery under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, it must appear from the affidavits submitted “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).) Here, Plaintiff has not made a clear request or any such showing that additional discovery cure the issues raised to withstand summary adjudication of the claim.

Therefore, because Plaintiff challenges only the underlying validity of the cancelation, which is not an element of his Unruh Civil Rights Act claim, and does not present evidence demonstrating Defendants’ discriminatory intent or a discriminatory impact of the cancellations, or any showing that additional discovery could save Plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff has not met his burden of production to create any triable issues of material fact. [1]

Because it is not entirely clear, based on Plaintiff’s filings, whether the third cause of action has yet been properly dismissed, in an abundance of caution, the Court analyzes Defendants’ motion with respect to the third cause of action.

Any officers, directors, employees or agents of a corporation who do any of the following are liable jointly and severally for all the damages resulting therefrom to the corporation or any person injured thereby who relied thereon or to both:

(a) Make, issue, deliver or publish any prospectus, report, circular, certificate, financial statement, balance sheet, public notice or document respecting the corporation or its shares, assets, liabilities, capital, dividends, business, earnings or accounts which is false in any material respect, knowing it to be false, or participate in the making, issuance, delivery or publication thereof with knowledge that the same is false in a material respect.

(b) Make or cause to be made in the books, minutes, records or accounts of a corporation any entry which is false in any material particular knowing such entry is false.

Plaintiff contends Defendant Suender injured Plaintiff by providing “forged, fake, and false corporate documents” including: (1) a fake unsigned contract dated July 13, 2015 and December 5, 2017; (2) a corporate account record that falsely states Plaintiff signed a new GC contract in May 2017; (3) Suender’s declaration indicating Gold’s Gym began billing Plaintiff’s Silver Sneakers program in 2015, when it began billing Silver Sneakers on December 3, 2016 and misstating who his employer is. (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 73.)[2]

Defendant argues it did not have the requisite intent to deceive and that Plaintiff did not rely upon the allegedly fake documents to his detriment.

· In early 2023, Plaintiff requested that Mr. Suender provide him with a copy of the Agreement by which Plaintiff’s membership dues were paid through the Silver Sneakers program. (UMF ¶ 30.)

· In response, Mr. Suender obtained from the Venice Gold’s Gym’s computer system an unsigned document that Mr. Suender believed at the time to be the document Plaintiff requested. (UMF ¶ 31.)

· Mr. Suender sent this unsigned document to Plaintiff by email on March 7, 2023. (UMF ¶ 32.)

· Plaintiff did not rely on this unsigned document for any purpose other than to file this lawsuit. (UMF ¶ 33.)

· After sending the unsigned document Plaintiff, Mr. Suender obtained from the Customer Care Department a document titled “Gold’s Gym Membership Agreement” dated July 13, 2015, that Mr. Suender believed was the contract signed by Plaintiff. (UMF ¶ 34.)

· Mr. Suender sent Plaintiff the document titled “Gold’s Gym Membership Agreement” dated July 13, 2015. (UMF ¶ 35.)

· Plaintiff did not rely on the document titled “Gold’s Gym Membership Agreement” dated July 13, 2015 for any purpose other than to file this lawsuit. (UMF ¶ 36.)

· Mr. Suender did not knowingly create any false document with the intent to deceive the Plaintiff. (UMF ¶ 37.)

· Neither Gold’s Gym California, LLC nor RSG Group USA Inc. have had their qualification to do intrastate business in California forfeited. (UMF ¶ 39.)

Thus, Defendants have met their initial prima facie burdens of persuasion and production of evidence that Defendants did not send Plaintiff the allegedly fake documents with the intent to deceive Plaintiff, nor did Plaintiff rely on the documents to his detriment.

As discussed above, Plaintiff has filed a Notice indicating an intent to dismiss the third cause of action, and Plaintiff’s opposition does not directly address Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of the third cause of action.

Moreover, for the same reasons discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s Unruh Civil Rights Act cause of action, Plaintiff has only provided evidence that the underlying documents may have been altered, not that Defendants had a subjective knowledge of their falsity or intent to disseminate false documents. Nor has Plaintiff proffered any evidence demonstrating that he relied on the purportedly altered document to his detriment.

As such, Plaintiff has not met his burden of production to create any triable issues of material fact that Suender had the requisite knowledge that the documents he produced were false or that Plaintiff relied on those documents to his detriment.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff has not yet dismissed the third cause of action, summary adjudication is appropriate as to Issue 3.[3]

3. Issue 1: First Cause of Action – Breach of Business & Professions Code, § 17200

Business and Professions Code section 17200, known as the Unfair Competition Law, or “UCL,” bars unfair competition, defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code. “An ‘unlawful’ business practice or act within the meaning of the UCL is an act or practice, committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.” (Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of Am. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 351.) “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) Moreover, “a practice may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law.” (Ibid.)

In order to have standing to bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322.)

Defendants argue that because summary adjudication is warranted as to the second and third causes of action, Plaintiff has not established any predicate unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices upon which to base a UCL violation. The Court agrees. As such, summary adjudication is similarly warranted as to Issue 1.

The Court finds no triable issues of material fact that Defendants did not act with discriminatory intent or impact in ending their participation in the Silver & Fit program in October 2021 or in requiring Plaintiff and other members to apply for a new membership and pay a higher membership rate to continue working out at the gym. As such, summary adjudication is appropriate as to Issue 2.

The Court also finds no triable issue of material fact that Defendants did not have the requisite knowledge of the falsity of the documents they produced to Plaintiff and Plaintiff did not rely on those documents to his detriment. As such, summary adjudication is appropriate as to Issue 3.

The Court further finds no triable issue of material fact, that having found summary adjudication appropriate as to Issues 2 and 3, Plaintiff cannot prove any predicate unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct to support his first cause of action for violations of the Unfair Competition Law. As such, summary adjudication is appropriate as to Issue 1.

Finding summary adjudication appropriate as to all three causes of action alleged in the operative Complaint, the Court grants summary judgment.

Further, Defendants shall lodge a proposed Order and Judgment in conformance with the Court’s ruling on or before March 27, 2025. Defendants shall also provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with proof of service forthwith.

[1] Prior versions of the Complaint alleged an additional cause of action for “Bad Faith Denial of the Existence of a Contract.” (See Complaint; First Amended Complaint.) Moreover, the version of the second amended complaint Plaintiff improperly filed on January 16, 2024 without a stipulation or leave of court (see Code Civ. Proc., § 472, subd. (a)) alleged additional causes of action for (1) breach of contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) bad faith denial of insurance contract benefits; (3) declaratory relief; and (4) breach of Civil Code section 3345, but the Court struck that version of the complaint as being improperly filed. (See Minute Order, Apr. 17, 2024.) But the current, operative version of the Second Amended Complaint alleges only three causes of action for (1) breach of Unruh Civil Rights Act; (2) breach of the Unfair Competition Law; and (3) breach of Corporations Code section 1507. (See JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 477 [“[A]n amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading.”]) The underlying validity of the cancellation is not an element of any of these three causes of action.

[2] “The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding. As our Supreme Court has explained it: The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings, which set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment. Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 [cleaned up]; see also Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258 [“The complaint limits the issues to be addressed at the motion for summary judgment. The rationale is clear: It is the allegations in the complaint to which the summary judgment motion must respond”].)

[3] Because the Court grants summary adjudication as to Issue 3, it does not analyze Issues 4 or 5.

DEPARTMENT	207
HEARING DATE	March 13, 2025
CASE NUMBER	23SMCV03707
MOTION	Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication
MOVING PARTIES	Defendants Gold’s Gym California, LLC; RSG Group USA, Inc.; and Jeff Suender
OPPOSING PARTY	Plaintiff Joseph Robert Giannini