Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV04534, Date: 2025-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV04534    Hearing Date: March 12, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

On September 25, 2023, Plaintiffs Anton N. Natsis and Demetra Natsis, Trustees of the Anton and Demetra Natsis Family Trust (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Defendant Haroun Hanasab (“Defendant”) alleging three causes of action for (1) trespass and trespass to timber; (2) negligence; and (3) declaratory relief. 

Defendant demurs to all three causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), respectively.  Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and treble damages.

Plaintiffs oppose both motions and Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS

1.     DEMURRER

Defendant argues that the entire complaint is uncertain and fails to state a cause of action because Plaintiffs fail to allege the date on which Defendant allegedly trespassed on Plaintiffs’ land and cut down trees. 

Defendant also argues the first cause of action is uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because it conflates two distinct legal theories of trespass (to land) and trespass to chattels (timber). 

Finally, Defendant argues the third cause of action is uncertain and fails to state a cause of action because the caption of the complaint indicates the third cause of action is for “aiding and abetting trespass and trespass to timber” whereas the body of the complaint seeks “declaratory relief.” 

a.     STANDARDS

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.”  (290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe” the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)  

In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored.”  (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)  A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond - i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers.  (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) 

b.     NO DATE ALLEGED

Defendant does not cite to any authority in the demurrer, and on reply cites to Corum v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 891 (hereafter Corum), which cites to Baird v. Olsheski (1930) 105 Cal.App. 293 (hereafter Baird), and Johnson v. Nolan (1929) 102 Cal.App. 452 (hereafter Johnson).

In Corum, the appellate court actually reversed the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer for failure to allege the date upon which the automobile accident occurred.  Corum articulated the rule as follows, “the failure to allege a date, which appears to be material, such as the date of an accident, known to plaintiff, and as to which it may be assumed plaintiff’s knowledge is superior to that of defendant, is subject to special demurrer.”  (Corum, supra, 67 Cal.App.2d at p. 894.)  In Corum, because the date of the accident was also “well known to defendant,” it was error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer for failure to allege the accident date.

In Johnson, the plaintiff, in its original complaint, alleged a date such that it appeared on the face of the complaint that the applicable statute of limitations had run.  In filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff simply omitted the incident date in question.  The appellate court held the amended pleading was subject to demurrer for failure to allege a date demonstrating that the statute of limitations had not run, in light of the prior version of the complaint that implicated the issue.

In Baird, the appellate court held, in the context of a loan that was secured by stock, that the alleged loan repayment date and the date demand was made for the return of the stock were material, and the complaint was subject to demurrer for failure to allege those dates.

Here, Plaintiffs allege:

7. Mr. Hanasab owns property adjacent to, and to the north and west of, the Property, with an address of 1073 Linda Flora Drive, Bel Air, California (“Hanasab Property”). Until the events complained of herein, the Owners and Mr. Hanasab acted as good neighbors to each other (though they did not socialize) and respected each other’s rights, including their respective rights to the Property and the Hanasab Property.

8. That all ended when Mr. Hanasab and/or his agents willfully, maliciously, and intentionally entered onto the Property without permission – that is, trespassed – and proceeded to cut down three fully-mature (over 75’ in height) pine trees for his own, personal reasons without getting permission from the Owners. The pictures embedded below show the stumps left after Mr. Hanasab removed the beautiful, mature trees.

[…]

10. Mr. Hanasab knew perfectly well that his cutting of the trees was both illegal and tortious. But he did it anyway. And Mr. Hanasab has admitted that he “removed some of the tall trees” without permission to do so! See Exhibit 1 hereto. The cost to replace the vandalized trees will exceed $200,000 (the Owners have obtained an estimate from a well-recognized, reputable landscape architect who is familiar with the Property). And, as alleged below, these selfish and malicious actions justify treble damages under California’s laws protecting trees and justify punitive damages against Mr. Hanasab as well.

(Complaint ¶¶ 7-8, 10, emphasis original.)  Thus, the Complaint alleges that the date Defendant admittedly “removed some of the tall trees” should be well within Defendant’s knowledge, making it unnecessary to plead.

            Defendant argues that Defendant’s admission should not factor into the Court’s analysis because Plaintiffs did not actually attach Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.  But even without a copy of Exhibit 1, the Complaint has alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that the date Defendant removed trees, which Defendant allegedly admitted to doing, is sufficiently within Defendant’s knowledge to withstand a demurrer.

As such, Defendant does not demonstrate that any portions of the Complaint are so bad that Defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against Defendant.  Nor does the missing date fail to allege a material element of any of Plaintiffs’ causes of action.

The Court thus declines to sustain Defendant’s demurrer for failure to allege the date Defendant removed the trees.   

c.      TRESPASS/TRESPASS TO TIMBER

Defendant next argues that the first cause of action for “trespass/trespass to timber” conflates two distinct causes of action, and is therefore uncertain.  Specifically, Defendant contends that trespass to chattels involves personal property, whereas trespass involves real property, and by styling the cause of action as “trespass to timber” it implies a trespass to chattels cause of action, which is nonsensical because trees are part of the land/real property.

In opposition, Plaintiffs point out that they do not allege a cause of action for trespass to chattels because the claim “does not mention chattels of any sort.”  Defendant does not address Plaintiffs’ argument on reply.

Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action. 

d.     ERRONEOUS CAPTION

Finally, Defendant argues that the caption erroneously lists “aiding and abetting trespass/trespass to timber” when the third cause of action alleged is for declaratory relief.  But as Plaintiffs point out in opposition, there is no demurrer to a caption page.

Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the caption page.

2.     MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and treble damages.

a.     Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.9.  (Complaint ¶ 16.)  That section provides:

In any action to recover damages to personal or real property resulting from trespassing on lands either under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock, the prevailing plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs, and in addition to any liability for damages imposed by law.

            Defendant moves to strike the prayer for attorneys’ fees because Plaintiff fails to allege with particularity that the land in question is “under cultivation” to invoke Section 1021.9.  In support, Defendant cites to Quarterman v. Kefauver (1977) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366 (hereafter Quarterman).   Quarterman clarifies that the legislature intended Section 1021.9 to apply to “agricultural land used for farming and growing crops, […] not urban backyards.”  (Id. at p. 1373.)   Further, the court of appeal stated: 

Taken in isolation and read literally, the term “lands under cultivation” may be broad enough to encompass a backyard garden in a metropolitan area. But that term does not stand alone in section 1021.9; instead, it must be read as part of the entire descriptive phrase, “lands under cultivation or used or intended for the raising of livestock,” a phrase denoting two alternative uses of rural land. Moreover, reading the term “lands under cultivation” literally and in isolation is unreasonable and absurd when it is clear from the statute's legislative history that the Legislature was concerned with the unique problems caused by trespassers on rural land owned by farmers and ranchers. Nothing in that history suggests that the Legislature intended also to provide attorney fees to city dwellers who happen to have gardens in their backyards.

(Id. at p. 1375, emphasis added.)   Here, Plaintiffs allege:

9. To be clear, the Owners had nurtured and maintained their trees for the entire period of their ownership, continuing the care that had begun with the prior owners. Not only did the trees provide shade and privacy to the Owners’ property, but they also provided benefits to the Property’s neighbors and the neighborhood including: cooling of the ground and surrounding roads; and prevention of storm water runoff and thus the prevention of erosion, benefits that became particularly important during the storms of last Winter. Despite the intense rains from these weather events, the neighborhood surrounding the Property did not experience any major flooding events due in part to the neighborhood trees and especially the trees and landscaping at the Property.

(Complaint ¶ 9.)   In opposition, Plaintiffs seek to distinguish Quarterman, but the Court is unpersuaded.  Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ reliance on Haworth v. Lira (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1362 to be misplaced. 

            Accordingly, the Court will strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees without leave to amend as Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to establish how the complaint can be amended to overcome the deficiency.             [1]

b.     Punitive Damages

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

Here, Plaintiffs allege:

8. That all ended when Mr. Hanasab and/or his agents willfully, maliciously, and intentionally entered onto the Property without permission – that is, trespassed – and proceeded to cut down three fully-mature (over 75’ in height) pine trees for his own, personal reasons without getting permission from the Owners. The pictures embedded below show the stumps left after Mr. Hanasab removed the beautiful, mature trees.

[…]

10. Mr. Hanasab knew perfectly well that his cutting of the trees was both illegal and tortious. But he did it anyway. And Mr. Hanasab has admitted that he “removed some of the tall trees” without permission to do so!

            Thus, the Complaint alleges that Defendant intentionally entered Plaintiffs’ property without permission to cut down three fully mature pine trees.  Thus, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant acted intentionally and with willful or reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.

c.            Treble Damages

Plaintiffs seek treble damages, pursuant to Civil Code section 3346.  (Complaint ¶ 15.)  That section provides:

For wrongful injuries to timber, trees, or underwood upon the land of another, or removal thereof, the measure of damages is three times such sum as would compensate for the actual detriment, except that where the trespass was casual or involuntary, or that the defendant in any action brought under this section had probable cause to believe that the land on which the trespass was committed was his own or the land of the person in whose service or by whose direction the act was done, the measure of damages shall be twice the sum as would compensate for the actual detriment, and excepting further that where the wood was taken by the authority of highway officers for the purpose of repairing a public highway or bridge upon the land or adjoining it, in which case judgment shall only be given in a sum equal to the actual detriment.

(Civ. Code, § 3346, subd. (a).)

            As discussed above, Plaintiffs adequately allege that Defendant intentionally trespassed and cut down three of Plaintiffs’ mature pine trees without permission sufficient to support a claim for treble damages. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, the Court overrules Defendant’s Demurrer.  Further, the Court grants in part Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees without leave to amend, and denies in part Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive and treble damages. 

Further, the Court orders Defendant to file and serve an Answer to the Complaint on or before March 28, 2025. 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  March 12, 2025                                                      ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court