Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV04944, Date: 2024-02-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV04944    Hearing Date: February 22, 2024    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

207

HEARING DATE

February 22, 2024

CASE NUMBER

23SMCV04944

MOTION

Demurrer

MOVING PARTY

Defendant Rockwell Collins Optronics, Inc.

OPPOSING PARTY

Plaintiff Ivan Robledo

 

MOTIONS

 

Defendant Rockwell Collins Optronics, Inc. (“Defendant”) demurs to Plaintiff Ivan Robledo’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c), requesting that this action be stayed pending the resolution of an earlier lawsuit filed in the Superior Court in and for the County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”), Dvorak v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., No. 37-2019-00064397-CU-OE-CTL (hereafter Dvorak). 

 

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and Defendant replies. 

 

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

            Defendant’s Request

 

            Defendant requests judicial notice of the following:

 

·         Exhibit A: the Dvorak complaint.

 

·         Exhibit B: Exhibit 21 to a 10-K Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filing evidencing that Defendant is a subsidiary of Rockwell Collins, Inc.

 

With respect to Exhibit A, judicial notice may be taken of records of any court in this state.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)  However, “while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files.  Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof.”  (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [cleaned up].)  Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the Dvorak complaint, but not the truth of the allegations contained therein.

 

With respect to Exhibit B, Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of the “facts and propositions” contained therein as “not reasonably subject to dispute” and “capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy[.]”  However, Defendant has not provided the Court sufficient information regarding Exhibit B for such determination.  Defendant does not indicate whose 10-K filing it is, nor does Defendant indicate the date it was filed.  Therefore, the Court declines to take judicial notice of Exhibit B or the facts and propositions contained therein.

 

            Plaintiff’s Request

 

            Plaintiff requests the Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiffs’ “Status Report in Advance Of the Status Conference” scheduled for December 8, 2023” filed in Dvorak on or about November 22, 2023.  As discussed above, the Court takes judicial notice of this document as a court record, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d)(1), but not the truth of the assertions contained therein.

 

            Defendant’s Supplemental Request

 

            In connection with the Reply, Defendant supplementally requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following:

 

·         Exhibit A: the Joint Statement Re: Stay of Action Pending Completion of Related Actions filed on May 31, 2023, in Israel Alvarado v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., et. Al. (C.D. Cal, No. 2:23-cv-00400-JFW-JC) (hereafter Alvarado.)

 

·         Exhibit B: the June 7, 2023 Order Staying Alvarado.

 

·         Exhibit C: the Minute Order granting the defendants’ Motion to Stay in Quintana v. Wheel Pros, Inc., Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, No. 21CMCV00160 (March 1, 2022.)

 

            As discussed above, the Court takes judicial notice of these documents as court records, but not of the truth of the allegations contained therein.

 

ANALYSIS

 

            Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c)

 

The party against whom a complaint has been filed may object by demurrer to the pleading on the grounds that there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c).)

 

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.”  (290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

 

Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe” the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)  

 

In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if one consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

 

On October 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) action, individually and “on behalf of all other aggrieved employees,” against Defendant “Rockwell Collins Optronics, Inc.” alleging violations of California’s Labor Code. 

 

Dvorak, which is a PAGA action, filed by plaintiffs Stephanie Dvorak and Israel Alvarado, “on behalf of the State of California, as private attorneys general” against defendant Rockwell Collins, Inc. on December 4, 2019 similarly alleges violations of California’s Labor Code.  (Curley Decl. ¶ 2 and RJN Ex. B.)

 

            Counsel for Defendant also represents defendant, Rockwell Collins, Inc., in Dvorak.  (Curley Decl. ¶ 2.) 

 

            “A PAGA claim is a dispute between an employer and the state, which alleges directly or through its agents—either the Agency or aggrieved employees—that the employer has violated the Labor Code.”  (Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255 (hereafter Shaw).)  It “is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties[.]”  (Ibid.)  In a PAGA suit, “the employee plaintiff represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies” and “an aggrieved employee's action under PAGA functions as a substitute for an action brought by the government itself.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, “[t]he state is always the real party in interest in a PAGA representative suit.”  (Ibid.)

 

            Therefore, it does not matter that both actions are brought by different representative plaintiffs; the real plaintiff in interest to both lawsuits is the State of California.

 

            However, the defendant employers are different.  This action is brought against Rockwell Collins Optronics, Inc., whereas in Dvorak, the action is brought against Rockwell Collins, Inc.  Therefore, because the parties are not the same, the Court cannot sustain the demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c).

 

            Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction

 

“The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction provides that when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of the others.”  (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1062.)  It does not matter if the parties or remedies sought are not exactly the same; it is sufficient “that the issue in both actions is the same and arises out of the same transaction or events.”  (County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 83, 89.)

 

Exclusive concurrent jurisdiction “should be raised by demurrer where the issue appears on the face of the complaint and by answer where factual issues must be resolved.”  (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 771.)  If raised by answer, “the party asserting the application of the rule may obtain a trial court ruling on the issue by a motion to dismiss or abate or a motion for summary judgment.”  (Ibid.)

           

PAGA actions are subject to the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.  (Shaw, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 245.)

 

Although exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require the parties or remedies be identical, here it is not clear from the face of the pleadings and the documents of which the Court has taken judicial notice that the two actions arise from the same transaction or events.  Because Rockwell Collins Optronics, Inc. and Rockwell Collins, Inc. are separate entities, it is not clear from the face of the complaints that Dvorak encompasses similar claims in the Robledo action. The Court notes that in the opinions attached to the supplemental request for judicial notice, the defendants were the same in both actions.

 

            Defendant contends that Rockwell Collins Optronics, Inc. is a subsidiary of Rockwell Collins, Inc.  However, Defendant has not provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to support that contention because the Court denied Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit B, and even if the Court had taken judicial notice of that document, it does not establish that Rockwell Collins Optronics, Inc. is still a subsidiary of Rockwell Collins, Inc.  Moreover, even if Defendant had established that Defendant is currently a subsidiary of Rockwell Collins, Inc., it is not clear from the face of the Complaint and judicially-noticed documents that Defendant’s alleged labor code violations are encompassed in Dvorak. 

 

In reply, Defendant submits the supplemental Declaration of Justin T. Curley, indicating that “Plaintiff Robledo was included in the list of allegedly aggrieved employees that received the opt out notice in the Dvorak Action.”  (Supp. Curley Decl. ¶ 4.)  However, the Court may not consider extrinsic evidence in connection with a demurrer.  (Executive Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente Country Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 496, 499 [“The demurrer tests the pleading alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters which do not appear on the face of the pleading or cannot be properly inferred from the factual allegations of the complaint”].) 

 

Moreover, the Court will not generally consider evidence offered on reply, as it deprives the opposing party of an opportunity to address or rebut it, as due process requires.  (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316 [“due process requires a party be fully advised of the issues to be addressed and be given adequate notice of what facts it must rebut in order to prevail”]; see also Wall Street Network Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171.) 

 

To the extent Defendant believes it can provide an evidentiary basis for its claim of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, Defendant may raise the issue by an appropriate motion following the answer.  (See People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc.. supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 771.)

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s Demurrer in its entirety.  Because the defendants in this action and Dvorak are different entities, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c).  Because it unclear from the face of the pleadings and judicially noticed documents that the claims at issue in this action are encompassed by Dvorak, the Court overrules Defendant’s Demurrer premised on exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. 

 

The Court orders Defendant to file an Answer to the Complaint on or before March 8, 2024.

 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service regarding the same. 

 

 

DATED:  February 22, 2024                                                  ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court