Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case Number: 23SMCV05205, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV05205, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Monique Guisa (erroneously sued as Monique Guish) (“Defendant”) demurs to Plaintiff Lillian Smith, Sr.’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint on the bases that Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and for uncertainty, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), respectively. Defendant also moves to strike the entire complaint, or in the alternative, the request for punitive damages.

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe” the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if one consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond - i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)

Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges, “Monique Guisa made defamatory statements about Floor Leaking and gave the order for Forced Entry and Broke into my self- storage unit Right after I paid the bill Employee Lied Said Food ITEMS and stole & Removed family heirlooms[.]” (FAC ¶ 1.) The First Amended Complaint further alleges “The following causes of action are attached and the statements above apply to each (each complaint must have one or more causes of action attached):” the boxes are checked next to General Negligence; Intentional Tort; Premises Liability, and Other (specify). (FAC ¶ 10.) Plaintiff does not specify what “Other” is, nor did Plaintiff include any attachments to the First Amended Complaint.[1]

Defendant has interpreted this as alleging causes of action for property damage, personal injury, slander, and forceful entry. (Demurrer at p. 3.) However, this ignores that Plaintiff checked the box for General Negligence. And although Plaintiff uses the word “Defamatory” Plaintiff alleges “defamatory statements about Floor Leaking” which does not appear to state a cause of action for slander.

Ultimately, the fact that reasonable minds can differ demonstrates that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is too uncertain to determine what causes of action are being alleged.

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice. To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages. (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice. When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].) In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.” (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].)

Because the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer, the motion to strike is denied as moot.

A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden as Plaintiff has not responded to the demurrer or motion to strike, and therefore does not address whether leave should be granted if either the demurrer is sustained or the motion to strike is granted.

And although Plaintiff attached additional allegations to the original complaint, these additional allegations do not assist the Court in determining what causes of action Plaintiff is attempting to allege against Defendant. Therefore, the addition of the allegations alleged in connection with the original complaint would also not cure the deficiencies identified by the Court.

For the reasons stated, the Court sustains Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint without leave to amend.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service regarding the same.

[1] Plaintiff did attach a General Negligence attachment to the original complaint, but the First Amended Complaint supersedes the original complaint. (See Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 884 [“It is well established that an amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading”].)

DEPARTMENT	207
HEARING DATE	March 28, 2024
CASE NUMBER	23SMCV05205
MOTIONS	Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
MOVING PARTY	Defendant Monique Guisa (erroneously sued as Monique Guish)
OPPOSING PARTY	none