Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV05423, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV05423 Hearing Date: June 10, 2025 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
|
HEARING DATE |
June
10, 2025 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
23SMCV05423 |
|
MOTION |
Motion
for Summary Judgment |
|
Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC |
|
|
OPPOSING PARTY |
none
|
MOVING PAPERS:
MOTION
This case arises from allegations of Song-Beverly Act violations. On November 16, 2023, Plaintiff Deborah Lynne
Mitchell (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against Defendants Mercedes Benz USA, LLC
and Mercedes Benz of Beverly Hills (“Defendants”) alleging six causes of action
for (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subd. (d); (2) violation of
Civil Code section 1793.2, subd. (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section
1793.2, subd. (a); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5)
negligent repair; and (6) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The fifth cause of action is alleged only
against Defendant Mercedes Benz of Beverly Hills.
Defendant Mercedes Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”) now moves for summary
judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims are all barred by the
applicable four-year statute of limitations.
The motion is unopposed.
LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
“[T]he party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue
of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]
There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable
issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a
shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden
of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a
triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.)
“On a summary judgment
motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing
party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the
evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function
is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may
the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict,
the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”
(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839
[cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court
may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose
version is more likely true. Nor may the
trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of
credibility.” (Id. at p. 840
[cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the
light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party”].)
DISCUSSION
1. DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE
Defendant proffers the
following evidence in support of the motion:
·
Plaintiff
entered into a warranty contract for the subject vehicle on May 29, 2015. (UMF No. 1)
·
The
express warranty provided coverage for (3) years from May 19, 2015 to October
25, 2018 (UMF No. 2.)
·
Plaintiff
filed the complaint in the instant matter on November 16, 2023 (UMF No. 5.)
An action for a breach of
warranty must commence within four years after the cause of action
accrues. (See Com. Code, § 2725.) Song-Beverly Act claims regarding the implied
warranty of merchantability are subject to the same four-year statute of
limitations as implied warranties (see Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1304-1306), but implied warranties do not have a duration
of more than 1 year (see Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (c).
Further, in general, such
actions accrue on tender of delivery, unless the warranty explicitly extends
for future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance. (Krieger v.
Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 215.) A promise to repair defects that occur during
a future time period is express warranty of future performance. As such, the four-year period begins when the
breach is discovered, should have been discovered, or when the explicit time
period expires, whichever occurs first. Similarly, Magnuson-Moss Act claims
“stand or fall with the express and implied warranty claims under state
law.” (Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp. (9th Cir. 2006) 534 F.3d 1017, 1022.)
Here, Defendant has
demonstrated that all of Plaintiff’s causes of action alleged against Defendant
accrued on or before October 25, 2018, when the express warranty expired, yet
Plaintiff did not file the instant complaint until more than four years later,
on November 16, 2023.
As such, Defendant has met its
initial burdens of production and persuasion to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s
claims against it are time barred, and Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to meet
her burden of production to establish triable issues of material fact.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, finding Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC has met its
initial burdens of production and persuasion to demonstrate that all of
Plaintiff’s claims alleged against it are barred by the applicable four-year
statute of limitations, the Court grants Defendant’s unopposed motion for
summary judgment.
The Court will enter the proposed Judgment in favor of Defendant. Further, Defendant shall provide notice of
the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.
DATED: June 10, 2025 ___________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court