Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 23SMCV05458, Date: 2025-05-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV05458    Hearing Date: May 1, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 1

MOTION

This case arises from a motor vehicle collision. 

On November 20, 2023, Plaintiff Stephanie Madrigal (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendant Jonathan Warr (“Defendant”) alleging a single cause of action for Motor Vehicle negligence.

Defendant now moves for leave to amend the answer.  Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendant replies.          

LEGAL STANDARD

Amendments to Pleadings: General Provisions

            Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”

            To wit, without notice to the other party the Court has wide discretion to allow either party (i) to add or strike the name of a party or (ii) to correct a mistake in the name of a party or a mistake in any other respect “in furtherance of justice” and “on any terms as may be proper.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); see also Marriage of Liss (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1429.) Alternatively, after notice to the other party, the Court has wide discretion to allow either party to amend pleadings “upon any terms as may be just.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1). Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 576 states “Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”

            Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties and, therefore, leave to amend is liberally granted. (Berman vs. Bromberg (1986) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945; Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489 [this has been an established policy in California since 1901] (citing Frost v. Whitter (1901) 132 Cal. 421, 424; Thomas v. Bruza (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 150, 155).) The Court of Appeal in Morgan v. Superior Court held “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.) Moreover, “it is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [opposing party did not establish harm by the delay in moving to amend the complaint].)

            “The court may grant leave to amend the pleadings at any stage of the action.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 6:636 (hereafter Weil & Brown).) Denial of a motion to amend is rarely justified if the motion is timely made and granting the motion will not prejudice the opposing party. (Id. at ¶ 6:639, citations omitted.) However, if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Id. at ¶ 6:655, citations omitted. Absent prejudice, any claimed delay alone is not grounds for denial. “If the delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced the other side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case even if sought as late as the time of trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:653 (citing Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565).) “Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. . . . But the fact that the amendment involves a change in legal theory which would make admissible evidence damaging to the opposing party is not the kind of prejudice the court will consider.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:656, citations omitted.)

            “Even if some prejudice is shown, the judge may still permit the amendment but impose conditions, as the Court is authorized to grant leave ‘on such terms as may be proper.’” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:663, citation omitted.) For example, the court may cause the party seeking the amendment to pay the costs and fees incurred in preparing for trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:664 (citing Fuller v. Vista Del Arroyo Hotel, 42 Cal.App.2d 400, 404).)

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324: Procedural Requirements

            Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

“(1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleadings, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.”

            In addition, under Rule 3.1324(b), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies the following:

“(1) the effect of the amendment;

(2) why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

DISCUSSION

            Defendant seeks to amend the answer to add a sixth affirmative defense that the complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.  Defendant has provided the text of the proposed amendment.

            In support of the motion, Defendant has provided the Declaration of Thema Chapple, which provides:

3. Plaintiff Stephanie Madrigal filed her Complaint in the instant action against Defendant Jonathan Warr on November 20, 2023. She alleges a cause of action for motor vehicle arising out of a November 17, 2021, motor vehicle accident.

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint inexplicably alleges that the incident occurred on November 27, 2023, a date that is seven days after the filing of the Complaint. In reality, the subject accident occurred on November 17, 2021.

5. At that time of the incident, the applicable statute of limitations for personal injury claims was governed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, which provides a two-year statutory period.

6. On December 11, 2024, defense counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel of the discrepancy between the filing date and the accident date.

7. On January 22, 2025, defense counsel reiterated these concerns in a telephone call and follow-up email, highlighting inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s discovery responses. Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged the issue and indicated they would confer with their firm’s partners.

8. On January 10, 2024, Defendant Jonathan Warr filed his Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

9. At the time Defendant filed his initial Answer on January 10, 2024, he did not have access to critical records from the County of Los Angeles Fire Department.      

10. On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff provided verified responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One). In response to Form Interrogatory 20.1, which asked Plaintiff to state the date, time, and place of the incident, Plaintiff stated that the accident occurred on November 11, 2021.

11. On March 6, 2025, Defendant received a subpoena response from Los Angeles County Fire Department in which a Public Incident Report was produced.

12. Public Incident Report records from the Los Angeles County Fire Department state that on November 17, 2021, Unit E99 and S71 were dispatched at 2:12 a.m. to Decker Canyon Road in Malibu for an overturned vehicle.

13. On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff provided verified responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set One), in which she produced her medical records.

14. Plaintiff’s medical records further confirm that she previously and repeatedly reported the correct date of the incident as November 17, 2021. On September 29, 2023, Plaintiff reported to University Imaging CTR – Sherman Oaks / ProHealth Advanced Imaging that the incident occurred on November 17, 2021. On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff reported to Greater LA Pain Specialist that the incident occurred on November 17, 2021. On June 13, 2023, Plaintiff reported to Alpha Omega Acupuncture that the incident occurred on November 17, 2021.

15. On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Alen A. Nourian reported the incident date as November 27, 2021

16. Discovery is ongoing between the parties as depositions remain outstanding.

17. Defendant seeks to amend his answer to include the affirmative defense of Statute of Limitations. Specifically, the proposed affirmative defense states as follows: “Plaintiff’s claims for relief, and each of them, may be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, including but not limited to Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1.”

18. Allowing Defendant to amend his Answer to include the affirmative defense is in the interest of justice because if it was not permitted to do so, Defendant would severely and irreparably prejudiced in his ability to assert a critical defense.

19. Following discovery of the Plaintiff’s admission that the incident took place prior to November 20, 2023, Defendant partook in informal discussions with counsel regarding the issues with the date of the incident and statute of limitations.

20. Trial is currently scheduled for May 27, 2025.

21. Prior to filing the instant motion, on January 30, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgement on the ground that Plaintiff filed her Complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations.

22. Defendant’s proposed First Amended Answer is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

(Chapple Decl. ¶¶ 3-22.)

            Thus, Defendant has demonstrated that the complaint contains a typo about the date of the incident, and Defendant did not discover the true date of the incident until March 6, 2025, when it received the incident report from the LA County Fire Department in response to a subpoena. 

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that as a driver in the collision, Defendant had firsthand knowledge of the actual date of the incident, and therefore should have known about the statute of limitations defense at the time he filed his answer. 

            Plaintiff also argues that she will be prejudiced if Defendant is permitted to amend his answer at this late juncture, with trial less than a month away, as Plaintiff has already incurred “significant costs” retaining experts and preparing for trial.  But delay alone, even to the eve of trial, is not enough to constitute prejudice.  Rather, Defendant would be prejudiced if not permitted to raise the statute of limitations defense. 

Further, as the parties have already briefed the statute of limitations issue in connection with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, no additional discovery appears needed on the issue.  Rather, permitting the amendment will simply make Defendant’s already-pending motion for summary judgment procedurally proper.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Therefore, finding the motion both procedurally and substantively proper, and finding no prejudice to Plaintiff, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for leave to amend the answer.  Defendant shall file and serve the proposed amended answer forthwith, and no later than close of business, May 2, 2025.

Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s order and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  May 1, 2025                                   ___________________________

                                                                  Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                  Judge of the Superior Court

TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 2

MOTION

This case arises from a motor vehicle collision. 

On November 20, 2023, Plaintiff Stephanie Madrigal (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendant Jonathan Warr (“Defendant”) alleging a single cause of action for Motor Vehicle. 

Defendant now moves to continue the trial.  Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS

            California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c), provides:

Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits.  The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.  Circumstances that may indicate good cause include:

(1)  The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;

(2)  The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;

(3)  The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;

(4)  The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice;

(5)  The addition of a new party if:

(A)  The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or

(B)  The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case;

(6)  A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or

(7)  A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial.

Factors a court considers in ruling on a motion for continuance include:

(1)  The proximity of the trial date;

(2)  Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party;

(3)  The length of the continuance requested;

(4)  The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance;

(5)  The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance;

(6)  If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay;

(7)  The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials;

(8)  Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial;

(9)  Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance;

(10)  Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and

(11)  Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).)

            Defendant argues there is good cause for the motion to continue because on January 30, 2025, when Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment, the earliest available hearing date was May 6, 2025, which is only 21 days prior to the May 27, 2025 trial date, instead of 30 days prior, as required by statute.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(3).)

            Specifically, Defendant argues, “if trial is not continued, Defendant will be forced to incur costs of expert witness discovery and preparing for trial, which may be rendered unnecessary if summary judgment motion is granted.”

            The Court does not find a trial continuance necessary or warranted because there are alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion.  Namely, the Court can simply allow Defendant’s motion for summary judgment to be heard on May 6 as scheduled, good cause being that the delay is only 1 week, and it will enable Defendant to potentially dispose of the case on the merits, obviating the need for a trial.  That the parties may have to simultaneously finalize their expert discovery and prepare for a trial that may ultimately not go forward while the Court hears the motion for summary judgment is not good cause to continue the trial, especially in light of the Court’s extremely impacted trial calendar.           

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to continue trial, because the problem of Defendant’s belatedly scheduled motion for summary judgment can be resolved by simply allowing the motion for summary judgment to be heard on May 6 as currently scheduled. 

 Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.

DATED:  May 1, 2025                                                           ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court