Judge Michael E. Whitaker, Case Number: 24SMCV00306, Date: 2024-11-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV00306, Date: 2024-11-20 Tentative Ruling

On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff David Schlosberg (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendants Alliance Property Management, Inc. (“Alliance”) and Great for Six LLC (“Great for Six”) (together, “Defendants”) alleging four causes of action for (1) wrongful eviction; (2) vacate void judgment; (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment of the premises; and (4) negligence.

On June 5, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action without leave to amend, leaving only the fourth cause of action for negligence at issue. (Minute Order, Jun. 5, 2024.)

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff’s action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in connection with a prior unlawful detainer action.

1. Exhibit A: Unlawful Detainer Complaint (the “UD Complaint”) filed on February 9, 2023, as case number 23SMUD00248.

4. Exhibit D: An action filed by Plaintiff against Alliance and others seeking damages related to his tenancy, as case number 23SMCV02310.

5. Exhibit E: A Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict (“JNOV”) relating to the Judgment and Special Verdict in the UD action.

6. Exhibit F: The decision rendered on the JNOV against Mr. Schlosberg and in favor of Alliance.

Judicial notice may be taken of records of any court in this state. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) Because the requested exhibits are all court records within this state, the Court may take judicial notice of them. (Ibid.) However, “while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files. Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof.” (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [cleaned up].)

Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the court records, including the truth of results reached and legal implications of the records, the Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay allegations in the requested pleadings.

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Defendants argue that this action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, because the issues were already adjudicated in connection with a prior unlawful detainer action.

“Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be relitigated between the same parties in a future lawsuit.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 249.)

“Collateral estoppel has five threshold requirements: 1) the issue to be precluded must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; 2) the issue must have been actually litigated at that time; 3) the issue must have been necessarily decided; 4) the decision in the prior proceeding must be final and on the merits; and 5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be in privity with the party to the former proceeding.” (Cruz v. City of Merced (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 453, 471.)

“Privity for collateral estoppel and res judicata purposes refers to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation sufficiently close to justify application of the doctrine of res judicata. The determination of privity depends on the fairness of binding one party with the result from an earlier proceeding in which it did not participate. Such a determination requires a close examination of the circumstances. The nonparty must have had an identity or community of interest with, and adequate representation by, the party in the first action, so that the nonparty should have expected to be bound by the prior adjudication.” (Central Delta Water Agency v. Department of Water Resources (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 170, 209.)

On or about February 7, 2023, Defendant Alliance filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Plaintiff, pertaining to Plaintiff’s rental of Defendants’ apartment unit 103 in Santa Monica. (RJN Ex. A.) Plaintiff answered that complaint, asserting, among other things, the affirmative defense that the three-day eviction notice was defective. (RJN Ex. B.) Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Alliance and against Plaintiff. (RJN Ex. C.) Specifically, Alliance was granted possession of the premises and a money judgment in the amount of the jurisdictional limit of $25,000. (RJN Ex. C.) The jury specifically found that Alliance had properly given Plaintiff a Three (3) Day Notice to Perform or Quit. (See RJN Ex. C at Ex. 1 ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, including on the grounds that the Three-Day Notice was illusory because Defendants prevented Plaintiff from complying by refusing to accept Plaintiff’s proposed new roommates. (RJN Ex. E.) On November 16, 2023, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety (RJN Ex. F.) In so holding, the court found that Plaintiff had not established any such frustration or impossibility defense warranting a judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict. (RJN Ex. F at p. 13.)

On or about October 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit, styled as case number 23SMCV02310 against Alliance, Tim Leinen and Tim Dietenhofer, alleging that the defendants colluded to evict Plaintiff by refusing to allow him to rent out the unit to others so they could rent out the unit to another tenant at a higher rent.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants breached their duty of care owed to Plaintiff in their negligent management of the subject property, to the extent that they pursued unlawful detainer based on defective notice, which caused Plaintiff harm when he was evicted.” (Complaint ¶ 27.)

Thus, Defendants have produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the same issue regarding the validity of the Three-Day Notice was previously litigated between Plaintiff and Alliance in connection with the Unlawful Detainer action. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Alliance is an authorized agent for Great for Six (Complaint ¶ 7) and that both Defendants to this action were responsible for serving Plaintiff with the Three Day Notice at issue (Complaint ¶ 8.) As such, Great for Six is in privity with Alliance regarding the prior unlawful detainer action.

Thus, Defendants have met their initial burdens of production and persuasion that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from challenging the validity of the Three Day Notice again in this lawsuit.

Plaintiff does not offer any evidence in opposition, nor does Plaintiff provide his own separate statement disputing any of Defendant’s facts.[1] Instead, Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is inappropriate because there exist material issues of disputed fact as to whether (1) Defendants violated the Tenant Protection Act (“TPA”) by evicting Plaintiff pursuant to a defective Three-Day Notice; (2) Defendants acted in bad faith during settlement negotiations; and (3) Defendants violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Plaintiff also argues that Plaintiff has been unable to complete necessary discovery, due to Plaintiff’s former counsel withdrawing from representation.

Regarding Plaintiff’s first argument, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to create a triable issue of material fact that the validity of the Three-Day notice was not already finally determined in connection with the unlawful detainer action, or is otherwise not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Instead, Plaintiff merely argues that the dispute in the unlawful detainer action was limited possession of the premises, not whether Defendants violated the TPA, engaged in bad faith settlement negotiations, or violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

Although possession and back rent were at issue by virtue of the unlawful detainer complaint, Defendants have presented evidence that Plaintiff raised the validity of the Three Day Notice in the answer as an affirmative defense, which both the jury and the court determined was valid, in connection with the jury verdict and the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thus, Plaintiff has not raised any triable issue of material fact that collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff from again contesting the validity of the Three-Day Notice.

With regard to Plaintiff’s remaining arguments, the Court sustained without leave to amend Defendants’ demurrer to the first three causes of action for wrongful eviction, vacate void judgment, and breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment of the premises, respectively, and those issues are not pleaded in connection with the only remaining fourth cause of action for negligence. (See Complaint ¶ 27 [“Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached their duty of care owed to Plaintiff in their negligent management of the subject property, to the extent that they pursued unlawful detainer based on defective notice, which caused Plaintiff harm when he was evicted”].) Thus, whether Defendants engaged in bad faith during settlement negotiations or violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment are not at issue in this action.

Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s argument that further discovery is needed, the law provides, “If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).)

But here, it is unclear what additional discovery Plaintiff would need from Defendants to establish whether the issue of the validity of the Three Day Notice was already adjudicated in the prior unlawful detainer action—an action to which Plaintiff himself was a party and presumably privy to all relevant information and documents pertaining to that proceeding. Further, Plaintiff has not identified any specific discovery Plaintiff anticipates receiving that would be relevant to this issue.

Therefore, having found Defendants met their initial burdens of production and persuasion that the issue of the validity of the Three Day Notice at the heart of Plaintiff’s remaining cause of action for negligence was already fully and completely litigated in connection with the prior unlawful detainer action, and Plaintiff did not produce any argument or evidence creating a triable issue of material fact, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

Further, the Court orders Defendants to serve and lodge a proposed Order granting the motion for summary judgment and a proposed Judgment on or before December 6, 2024.

Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.

[1] Defendant requests that Plaintiff’s opposition be stricken on this basis. The Court declines to strike Plaintiff’s entire opposition, especially in light of Plaintiff’s pro per status, and the Court will consider Plaintiff’s legal arguments, but the Court does note that Plaintiff has neither provided his own evidence nor disputed any of Defendant’s evidence.

DEPARTMENT	207
HEARING DATE	November 20, 2024
CASE NUMBER	24SMCV00306
MOTION	Motion for Summary Judgment
MOVING PARTIES	Defendants Alliance Property Management, Inc. and Great for Six, LLC
OPPOSING PARTY	Plaintiff David Schlosberg