Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV00437, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV00437 Hearing Date: March 27, 2025 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
HEARING DATE |
March 27, 2025 |
CASE NUMBER |
24SMCV00437 |
MOTION |
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint |
MOVING PARTY |
Plaintiff Megan Frilot |
OPPOSING PARTY |
none |
BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2023, Decedent Angela Shalome Streat Wilson (“Wilson”)
filed suit against Defendant The Regents of the University of California
(“Defendant”) in the related case number 23SMCV03800,[1]
alleging two causes of action for (1) elder abuse and (2) negligence, based on
allegations that Wilson eloped from Defendant’s medical facility while in
Defendant’s care, that Defendant’s conduct injured Plaintiff, and that
Plaintiff had still not been found.
On January 30, 2024, Plaintiff Megan Frilot (“Frilot”) brought suit in
this case against Defendant as the Decedent’s heir.
In the course of briefing in connection with a motion to quash discovery
in the related case, the parties discovered that Wilson had subsequently died
and Frilot was not Wilson’s heir because (1) Wilson was still married at the
time of her death; (2) Wilson had several other children; and (3) Frilot’s
legal connection to Wilson was severed by virtue of Frilot’s adoption under
Probate Code section 6451. (See Minute
Order, Oct. 30, 2024 in Related Case no. 23SMCV03800.)
The Court set an order to show cause in both cases why the complaints
should not be dismissed for lack of standing.
Plaintiff now moves for leave to amend the complaint to substitute Jon
Streat II, the Decedent’s husband at the time of her death, in place of Frilot
as the Plaintiff. The motion is
unopposed.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Amendments
to Pleadings: General Provisions
Under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (a)(1), “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and
on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or
proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may,
upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may
likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any
terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other
particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time
limited by this code.”
To wit, without notice to the other
party the Court has wide discretion to allow either party (i) to add or strike
the name of a party or (ii) to correct a mistake in the name of a party or a
mistake in any other respect “in furtherance of justice” and “on any terms as
may be proper.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); see also Marriage
of Liss (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1429.) Alternatively, after notice to
the other party, the Court has wide discretion to allow either party to amend
pleadings “upon any terms as may be just.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473,
subd. (a)(1). Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 576 states “Any judge,
at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of
justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any
pleading or pretrial conference order.”
Judicial policy favors resolution of
all disputed matters between the parties and, therefore, leave to amend is
liberally granted. (Berman vs. Bromberg (1986) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945; Hirsa
v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489 [this has been an
established policy in California since 1901] (citing Frost v. Whitter
(1901) 132 Cal. 421, 424; Thomas v. Bruza (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 150,
155).) The Court of Appeal in Morgan v. Superior Court held “If the
motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not
prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and
where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert
a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error
but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172
Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.) Moreover, “it is an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was
not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v.
Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [opposing party did not
establish harm by the delay in moving to amend the complaint].)
“The court may grant leave to amend
the pleadings at any stage of the action.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice
Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 6:636 (hereafter
Weil & Brown).) Denial of a motion to amend is rarely justified if the
motion is timely made and granting the motion will not prejudice the opposing
party. (Id. at ¶ 6:639, citations omitted.) However, if the party
seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the
opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Id. at
¶ 6:655, citations omitted. Absent prejudice, any claimed delay alone is not
grounds for denial. “If the delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or
prejudiced the other side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments prevails.
Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case even if
sought as late as the time of trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:653 (citing Higgins
v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565).) “Prejudice exists where
the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical
evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. . . .
But the fact that the amendment involves a change in legal theory which would
make admissible evidence damaging to the opposing party is not the kind of
prejudice the court will consider.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at
¶ 6:656, citations omitted.)
“Even if some prejudice is shown,
the judge may still permit the amendment but impose conditions, as the Court is
authorized to grant leave ‘on such terms as may be proper.’” (Weil &
Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:663, citation omitted.) For example, the court
may cause the party seeking the amendment to pay the costs and fees incurred in
preparing for trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:664 (citing Fuller v. Vista Del
Arroyo Hotel, 42 Cal.App.2d 400, 404).)
California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1324: Procedural Requirements
Pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must:
“(1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or
amended pleadings, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous
pleadings or amendments;
(2) state what allegations in the previous
pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and
line number, the deleted allegations are located; and
(3) State what allegations are proposed to be
added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line
number, the additional allegations are located.”
In addition, under Rule 3.1324(b), a
motion to amend a pleading before trial must be accompanied by a separate
declaration that specifies the following:
“(1) the effect of the amendment;
(2) why the amendment is necessary and proper;
(3) when the facts giving rise to the amended
allegations were discovered; and
(4) the reasons why the request for amendment was
not made earlier.”
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has provided a copy of the
proposed amended complaint, and seeks only to replace instances of “Megan
Frilot” with “Jon Streat II” throughout, without making any other changes to
the allegations.
In support of the motion, Plaintiff
provides the Declaration of David M. Medby, which provides:
4. The purpose and effect of the proposed
amendment is to substitute a plaintiff with standing (Jon Streat II, the
decedent’s husband) for Plaintiff Megan Frilot who lacks standing.
(Medby
Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also advances the
Declaration of William M. Artigliere, which provides:
2. In the intervening period of time since the
last hearing on this matter, we were informed that Angela Shalome Streat Wilson
was married to her husband, Jon Streat. Accordingly, Plaintiff wishes to report
to the Court that it is Plaintiffs intent upon moving the Court to have Jon
Streat appointed as the Successor in Interest for Plaintiff Angela Shalome
Streat Wilson.
(Artigliere
Decl. ¶ 2.)
Although the attorney declarations
in support of the motion could be cleaner, the Court is able to glean from the
record and the attorney declarations roughly when the facts giving rise to the
proposed amendment were discovered, why the amendment was not made sooner, why
the amendment is necessary and proper, and the effect of the amendment.
As such, the Court finds the motion
both procedurally and substantively proper.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court grants
Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for leave to amend the complaint to substitute Jon
Streat II in place of Angela Shalome Streat Wilson.
Plaintiff shall file and serve the proposed First Amended Complaint on
or before April 11, 2025.
The Court further orders Plaintiff
to provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of
service forthwith.
DATED: March 27, 2025 ___________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1] Case No. 23SMCV03800 was voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice on February 18, 2025. (See Request
for Dismissal filed February 18, 2025.)