Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV00697, Date: 2024-06-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV00697 Hearing Date: June 14, 2024 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
207 |
|
HEARING DATE |
June 14, 2024 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
24SMCV00697 |
|
MATTER |
Request for Default Judgment |
Plaintiff Robert Bookman (“Plaintiff”) requests for default judgment
against Defendant Cameron Hughes (“Defendant”) in the amount of
$511,622.25, which is composed of special damages in the amount of $511,056.00
and costs in the amount of $566.25.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges twelve causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2)
account stated; and (3) fraud/misrepresentation as to each of four separate
alleged promises/agreements whereby Defendant promised to sell bottles of wine
from Plaintiff’s collection to prospective buyers in exchange for a 7.5%
commission of the total sales price.
Defendant
was personally served with a copy of the summons, complaint, and statement of
damages on March 6, 2024. Default was entered against Defendant on April 8,
2024, and the Doe defendants were dismissed on May 1, 2024.
Plaintiff’s
Complaint seeks a total of $127,764.00, representing $5,949 lost in connection
with the first agreement; $55,800 in connection with the second agreement;
$51,615 in connection with the third agreement; and $14,400 in connection with
the fourth agreement. (See Complaint.) Plaintiff now seeks exactly four times that
amount, or $511,056 in “special” damages (see CIV-100).
First,
the Court cannot award damages that are in excess of what is pled in the
Complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a) [“The relief granted to the
plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint”]; Levine v.
Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131,
1136-1137 [“when recovering damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is
limited to the damages specified in the complaint”].) Further, Plaintiff’s declaration indicates:
·
Regarding the first
agreement, the wine was sold for $115,145, and Defendant made payments of
$79,315; $5,000; $5,000; $10,000, totaling $99,315, leaving a balance owed of $15,830
(Bookman Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)
·
Regarding the second
agreement, the wine sold for $55,800, which Defendant failed to pay any portion
of, leaving a balance owed of $55,800 (Bookman Decl. ¶ 7.)
·
Regarding the third
agreement, the wine sold for $51,615, which Defendant failed to pay any portion
of, leaving a balance owed of $51,615 (Bookman Decl. ¶ 8.)
·
Regarding the fourth
agreement, the wine sold for $14,400, which Defendant has failed to pay any
portion of, leaving a balance owed of $14,400 (Bookman Decl. ¶ 9.)
As such, the Bookman Declaration
only addresses $127,764 in special damages, and does not account for the
additional $383,292 sought. Furthermore,
the Bookman declaration’s accounting of the $127,764 sought does not account
for the 7.5% commission owed to Defendant for making the sales.
Notwithstanding,
Plaintiff contends the additional “special” damages requested were set forth in
a Statement of Damages served on the Defendant.
However,
Plaintiff failed to submit the Statement of Damages with the request for entry
of default judgment.
But more important, the service of a
Statement of Damages in lieu of alleging specific damages in the operative
complaint is not apt. Generally, “A
statement of damages cannot be relied on to establish a plaintiff's monetary
damages on the defendant's default, except in a personal injury or wrongful
death case.” (Cal. Judges Benchbook,
Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 16.16, p. 1924, citations omitted.) In Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., the
Court of Appeal determined:
Defendant
also attacks the judgment under section 425.11, contending that plaintiff was
required to serve it with a statement of damages and failed to do so. Section
425.11 applies to an action for personal injuries or wrongful death and was
passed concurrently with the amendment to section 425.10 that prohibits stating
the amount demanded in the complaint filed in such an action. Section 425.11
was enacted to satisfy the due process requirement that defendants be apprised
of their exposure before a default may be taken. But here the complaint, which was not limited
to personal injuries and did not claim wrongful death, expressly apprised
defendant of the amount demanded. A statement of damages would have been
superfluous and was not required under these circumstances.
(Sporn
v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1302 [Plaintiff’s
claims of negligence, gross negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation and fraud
centered on the theft of his identity] [cleaned up].) Similar to the appellate court’s
determination Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., this Court finds that
Plaintiff’s action is not one for personal injuries or wrongful death as
defined pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 425.10 and 425.11. As such, Plaintiff will need to amend the
complaint and serve it on Defendant before the Court will enter default
judgment as requested.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff
seeks damages in excess of those demanded in the Complaint, the Court denies
without prejudice Plaintiff’s request to enter default judgment.
Further, the
Court vacates the Case Management Conference and sets an Order to Show Cause re
Entry of Default Judgment on October 22, 2024 at 8:30 A.M. in Department
207.
DATED: June 14, 2024 ________________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court