Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV01178, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV01178    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

            This case arises from a dispute concerning provisions of the Song-Beverly Act. 

            On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff Kamo Asatrian (“Plaintiff”) filed a Notice of Settlement OF Entire Case (Conditional).  Plaintiff now moves to recover reasonable costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses, pursuant to the terms of that settlement agreement and the Song-Beverly Act, in the amount of $29,359.34, representing $15,060 in attorneys’ fees incurred, $7,530 representing a 1.5 multiplier enhancement of attorneys’ fees, $769.34 in costs, and $6,000 for Plaintiff to review the opposition, draft the reply, and attend the hearing on this motion.

            Defendants Volskwagen Group of America, Inc. and Sherman Oaks-A, Inc. d/b/a Audi Van Nuys (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the motion and Plaintiff replies.

ANALYSIS

            Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under the Song-Beverly Act.  Instead, Defendants argue that the motion for fees is untimely and Defendants contest the reasonableness of the fees sought.

I.                TIMELINESS OF MOTION

Defendants argue, without citing any authority, that Plaintiff’s deadline to move for attorneys’ fees is 90 days after July 1, 2024, when Plaintiff accepted Defendants’ settlement offer. 

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1) provides, “A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court--including attorney's fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court--must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case or under rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.”  (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).)

A notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves the Notice of Entry of judgment; (B) 60 days after a party serves the Notice of Entry of judgment; (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.

No judgment has yet been entered.  As such, the Court finds the motion to be timely.

II.             REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, which outlines recoverable costs to a prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) 

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” 

Defendants contend that counsel’s request for 3.6 hours of time to Draft Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission is excessive, as Plaintiff serves identical written discovery in all its cases and a deduction of $960, representing 2.4 hours is warranted.  (Pratt Decl. ¶ 12.)  The Court agrees and applies the requested $960 reduction. 

Defendants also contend that a reduction of $1,796 representing 4.2 hours of time is warranted for billing entries that are too vague. (Pratt Decl. ¶ 14.)  Upon review of the entries, the Court finds only the entry on 1/31/25 to “Review and analyze case file, docket, and procedural history” for .8 hours, representing $316 to be excessive and/or unwarranted.

Defendants further request a reduction of .5 hours or $262.50 for Kevin Jacobson’s time to “Review Declaration in support of Motion for Attorney’s Fees (REDUCED)” that Stephanie Argent spent 2.4 hours drafting.  (Pratt Decl. ¶ 15.)  The Court does not find any further reduction of this time warranted.

Defendants further request a reduction of .6 hours or $264 billed for internal “strategy” meetings.  (Pratt Decl. ¶ 17.)  Upon review, the Court does not find this time excessive or unwarranted.

Defendants also argue that the multiplier is not warranted in this case.  Factors to be considered include “the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.”  (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 556.) 

Plaintiff contends the multiplier is warranted because counsel obtained an exceptional outcome in the amount of a $43,363 settlement, despite enduring “substantial risks” by virtue of the contingency fee arrangement. 

While the Court encourages settlement, the Court does not find Plaintiff has demonstrated the results to be particularly “exceptional” or the risks to be “substantial” warranting a lodestar multiplier.  Therefore, the Court reduces the request by the $7,530 requested multiplier enhancement.

The Court further finds $6,000 to review the opposition, draft the reply, and attend the hearing on this motion to be excessive, and reduces that amount to $1,000.

Finally, Defendants contest the requested $769.34 in costs, representing $461.75 in filing and motion fees, $150 in jury fees, $93.75 for service of process, and $63.84 for electronic filing or service fees.  The Court finds the requested costs reasonable and warranted under existing law, and does not tax or otherwise reduce them.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Therefore, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $15,553.34 representing $14,784 in attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred up to and including the hearing on this motion, and costs in the amount of $769.34. 

            The Court will enter the (proposed) Order granting in part the request, and orders Plaintiff to provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  March 5, 2025                                                        ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court