Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV01847, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV01847    Hearing Date: March 18, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

207

HEARING DATE

March 18, 2025

CASE NUMBER

24SMCV01847

MOTION

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

MOVING PARTY

Plaintiff Lina Ahdoot

OPPOSING PARTIES

Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Redwood Automotive I, LLC dba Land Rover Santa Monica

 

MOTION

 

            This case arises from a dispute under the Song-Beverly Act. 

 

            On January 30, 2025, Plaintiff Lina Ahdoot (“Plaintiff”) filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case (Conditional).  Plaintiff now moves to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to the terms of that settlement agreement and the Song-Beverly Act, in the amount of $20,468.50.  Plaintiff has separately filed a memorandum to recover costs in the amount of $1,345.69.

 

Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Jaguar”) and Redwood Automotive I, LLC dba Land Rover Santa Monica (“Redwood) (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the motion and Plaintiff replies. 

 

ANALYSIS

 

                I.          Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, which outlines recoverable costs to a prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) 

 

Moreover, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” 

 

Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under the Song-Beverly Act.  Instead, Defendants contest the reasonableness of the fees sought.

 

            Plaintiff seeks to recover $20,468.50 in attorneys’ fees actually incurred as follows:

 

·       Michael Saeedian, Esq. – 1.8 hours at $695 rate = $1,251.00

·       Christopher Urner, Esq. – 7.1 hours at $525 rate = $3,727.50

·       Jorge L. Acosta, Esq. – 3.6 hours at $350 partner rate = $1,620.00

·       Jorge L. Acosta, Esq. – 36.2 hours at $250 rate = $12,670.00

·       Evelyn Ghazarian (law clerk) – 4.8 hours at $250 rate = $1,200.00

           

(Saeedian Decl. ¶ 24.)  The request is also supported by itemized billing invoices. (See Ex. A to Saeedian Decl.)

 

            Defendants object to the amount of time spent on this case in which, by Defendants’ account was only active for approximately six months, during which time there was no motion practice, amended pleadings, cross complaints, Doe amendments, party depositions, vehicle inspections, trial prep, or expert designations.  There was a mediation and Plaintiff propounded discovery, but did not receive any discovery requests from Defendants.  As such, Defendants request that the fees be reduced to $13,618.50.

 

            Specifically, Defendants aver that Mr. Saeedian’s $695 per hour rate is unreasonable for a lemon law case, and $450 is more in line with a typical hourly rate for such cases.  Moreover, Defendants request the following specific reductions:

 

·       $2,219 billed to file the “boilerplate” complaint should be reduced by $1,100

 

·       $1,540 to draft boilerplate Lemon Law discovery should be reduced by $800

 

·       $3,420 to review Defendant’s discovery responses should be reduced by $1,700

 

·       $5,480.50 for fees in connection with this motion for fees should be reduced by $3,250

 

The Court analyzes each in turn.

 

Regarding the $2,219 billed to file the complaint, there is no entry for $2,219 to draft the complaint.  Rather, this amount encompasses the entire first page of time entries, including drafting the attorney/client agreement, conducting pre-filing investigation and review of the repair history.  Notwithstanding, the Court finds Christopher Urner’s 1.4 hours to review the repair records and file notes at a rate of $525 duplicative of Jorge L. Acosta’s 1.2 hours to do the same at the “partner” rate of $350.  As such, the Court reduces the request by the $735 billed by Mr. Urner.

 

As for the $1,540 to draft boilerplate Lemon Law discovery, Defendants do not specify any specific time entries they find objectionable, and upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel spent minimal time drafting each of the Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, and Requests for Production of Documents as to each Defendant, as well as the Deposition Notices for each Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable, and it was all billed at the rate of $350 per hour.  As such, the Court does not identify any reductions to be made to the entries for drafting discovery.

 

Regarding the $3,420 spent reviewing Defendants’ discovery responses, the Court finds the time spent reviewing Jaguar’s responses to the Requests for Production and Special Interrogatories to be a bit high, at 1.4 hours and 1.6 hours, respectively.  As such, the Court reduces these items by $700.  Similarly, the Court finds Ms. Ghazarian’s 2.9 hours spent reviewing Jaguar’s document production (805 pages) duplicative of Mr. Acosta’s 2.2 hours reviewing the same 805 pages.  As such, the Court reduces the request by the $725 billed by Ms. Ghazarian.  In total, the Court reduces the requested $3,420 reviewing discovery responses by $1,425.

 

Finally, regarding the $5,480.50 requested in connection with filing the instant motion, the Court agrees with Defendants that five hours of attorney time at a rate of $450 per hour is reasonable, and reduces the reasonable fees incurred bringing the instant motion by the requested $3,250.

 

In total, the Court finds reductions of $5,410 warranted, and awards reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,058.50.

 

              II.          Costs

 

In connection with the memorandum of costs, Plaintiffs seek 1,345.69, representing $723.38 in filing and motion fees, $154.90 for service of process, $39.42 in fees for electronic filing or service, and $427.99 in “other” fees, representing $16.99 for “CarFax”; $75 for “CAP – Fee for CMC Appearance (8/20/24); and $336.00 for “Smart ADR – Mediation (10/04/24).” 

 

Defendants have not moved to strike the memorandum of costs or otherwise challenged the costs sought, and none of the “other” costs are expressly disallowed by statute.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for costs is granted in its entirety.

           

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

            Therefore, the Court grants in part Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $15,058.50.  The Court further grants Plaintiff’s request for costs in the full amount of $1,345.69.

 

            The Court will enter the (proposed) Order granting in part the request, and orders Plaintiff to provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

           

           

 

DATED:  March 18, 2025                                                      ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court