Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV02131, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV02131    Hearing Date: June 12, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

This case arises from allegations that Plaintiff Barbara Gunning (“Plaintiff”) was injured as a pedestrian after being struck by a motor vehicle driven by Defendant Artak Abrahamyan (“Abrahamyan”) and owned by Modern Limo Services Inc. (“Modern”), due to negligence and a dangerous condition of public property of Defendants City of Beverly Hills (“BH”) and the City of West Hollywood (“WH”). 

The operative First Amended Complaint alleges three causes of action for (1) negligence (motor vehicle); (2) negligent hiring/training/retention/supervision; and (3) dangerous condition of public property.

BH and WH have cross-complained against Defendants Abrahamyan and Modern for apportionment of fault and indemnification.  WH has additionally cross-complained for contribution and BH has additionally cross-complained for declaratory relief. 

Plaintiff recently named Lyft, Inc. as a Defendant, and BH recently added Lyft, Inc. as a Cross-Defendant to its cross-complaint via Roe amendment.

Abrahamyan and Modern (“Moving Defendants”) now move for a determination of good faith settlement.  BH and WH oppose the motion and Moving Defendants have filed an omnibus reply.   

LEGAL STANDARD – GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENTS

Under section 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,[1] “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (§ 877.6, subd. (c).)  Additionally, a determination that a settlement was made in good faith will reduce the claims against the non-settling defendants by the amount specified in the settlement agreement.  (§ 877.6, subd. (a).)  “The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof on that issue.”  (§ 877.6, subd. (d).) 

Section 877.6 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement).  (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (hereafter Tech-Bilt).)  In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement was made in good faith.  The Tech-Bilt factors are: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants.  (Id. at pp. 498-501.)  “Practical considerations obviously require that the [trial court’s] evaluation [of the settlement] be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.”  (Id. at p. 499.) 

“The party asserting the lack of good faith . . . [is] permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to [the above] factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of [Section 877.6].  Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.) 

ANALYSIS

A.    APPLICATION OF THE TECH-BILT FACTORS TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE

1.      FIRST FOUR FACTORS: (1) A ROUGH APPROXIMATION OF PLAINTIFF’S TOTAL RECOVERY; (2) THE SETTLOR’S PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY AND THE AMOUNT PAID IN SETTLEMENT; (3) ALLCATION AMONG PLAINTIFFS; and (4) RECOGNITION THAT SETTLOR PAYS LESS IN SETTLEMENT

The first Tech-Bilt factor consists of two parts – a rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability.  When approximating a plaintiff’s total recovery or the settling defendant’s proportionate liability, “judges should . . . not yearn for the unreal goal of mathematical certainty.  Because the application of section 877.6 requires an educated guess as to what may occur should the case go to trial, all that can be expected is an estimate, not a definitive conclusion.”  (North County Contractor’s Assn. v. Touchstone Ins. Services (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090 (hereafter North County).) 

Additionally, “a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor’s liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury.  Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.  [Citation.]”  (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)

As for the second factor, ‘“[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the defendant’s liability to be.’  [Citation.]”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)  However, even though “an offer of settlement must bear some relationship to one’s proportionate liability, bad faith is not ‘established by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share.’  [Citation.]”  (North County, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p.1090.)  “Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements” and “convert the pretrial settlement approval procedure into a full-scale mini-trial.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)  Rather, to meet the proportionality requirement, “all that is necessary is that there be a ‘rough approximation’ between a settling tortfeasor’s offer of settlement and his proportionate liability.  [Citation.]”  (North County, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090–1091.)  In determining whether the settling defendant’s settlement figure is “within the ballpark” of his fair share of liability, the Court may rely on “the judge’s personal experience” and the experience of “experts in the field.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 500.)

Here, Moving Defendants seek to settle with Plaintiff for $750,000, which represents the Moving Defendants’ insurance policy limits.  Plaintiff’s past medical costs total approximately $300,000.  There is only one Plaintiff. 

BH opposes on the grounds that Moving Defendants have proffered no evidence demonstrating that the $750,000 is “in the ballpark” of their proportionate liability because Moving Defendants have not provided any estimate of the overall liability, especially given that Plaintiff claims a potentially permanent, traumatic brain injury.  Further, BH argues that Modern has not divulged any information about its financial condition apart from the insurance policy.

WH adds that the claims of a dangerous condition of public property against the City defendants are more attenuated than Plaintiff’s claims of motor vehicle negligence and negligent hiring, training, and supervising against Moving Defendants, given that Plaintiff was injured when Abrahamyan made an unsafe left turn into her.  As such, WH contends Moving Defendants’ proportionate liability will likely be greater than that of the remaining defendants.  Further, WH argues Moving Defendants have not provided corroborating evidence that the settlement represents their insurance limits, and the case is not yet at issue, given that Lyft is in the process of being added to the litigation.

Both BH and WH concede they have no current evidence of fraud or collusion, but request additional discovery as an alternative to denying the motion outright.  The Court finds this request to be warranted. 

Further, the City defendants contend that, because Lyft has been recently named as a defendant, the Court should not grant the motion without giving Lyft a fair opportunity to be heard.  The Court agrees.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court denies Moving Defendants’ motion without prejudice.  Moving Defendants may re-file the motion once Lyft has been given fair notice and an opportunity to respond to the motion, following necessary discovery by all parties including Lyft.      

Counsel for the City of Beverly Hills shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  June 12, 2025                                                         ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court