Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV04237, Date: 2025-04-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV04237    Hearing Date: April 8, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

207

HEARING DATE

April 8, 2025

CASE NUMBER

24SMCV04237

MOTION

Motion for Summary Judgment

MOVING PARTY

Plaintiff Arf Financial, LLC f/k/a Advance Restaurant Finance, LLC

OPPOSING PARTY

none  

 

MOVING PAPERS:

 

  1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
  2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
  3. Declaration of Ashley Mulhorn
  4. Declaration of Vince Monard

 

BACKGROUND

 

On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff Arf Financial, LLC, f/k/a Advance Restaurant Finance, LLC (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against Defendants Renascence, Inc. dba Pip Marketing Signs Print (“Renascence”) and Donald A. Stocks Sr. (“Stocks”) (together, “Defendants.”)  Although the caption of the Complaint lists the causes of action as (1) breach of written agreement; (2) money lent; (3) indebtedness; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) account stated, the body of the Complaint actually alleges six causes of action as follows: (1) Breach of Written Agreement; (2) Breach of Guarantee; (3) Money Lent; (4) Indebtedness; (5) Unjust Enrichment; and (6) Account Stated.  Defendants answered the complaint on October 14, 2024. 

 

Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment.  The motion is unopposed. 

 

On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed “Cause of Action 4” without prejudice. 

 

LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  

 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

 

DISCUSSION

 

“To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.”  (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) 

 

Similarly, “A lender is entitled to judgment on a breach of guaranty claim based upon undisputed evidence that (1) there is a valid guaranty, (2) the borrower has defaulted, and (3) the guarantor failed to perform under the guaranty.”  (Gray1 CPB, LLC v. Kolokotronis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 480, 486.)

 

The elements of an “Account Stated” cause of action are (1) at the time of the statement, an indebtedness from one party to the other existed (2) a balance was then struck and agreed to be the correct sum owing from the debtor to the creditor; and (3) the debtor expressly or impliedly promised to pay to the creditor the amount thus determined to be owing.  (Truestone, Inc. v. Simi West Industrial Park II (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 715, 725.)  The second and third elements can be established where an account is sent to the debtor, and the debtor does not object within a reasonable time.  Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d 17, 25; Atkinson v. Golden Gate Tile Co. (1913) 21 Cal.App. 168, 171.) 

 

Furthermore, a plaintiff may recover for money lent to the defendant at the defendant’s insistence and request that has not been repaid.  (Moya v. Northrup (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 276, 278.)

 

Further, “A common count for money had and received “is not a specific cause of action; rather, it is a simplified form of pleading normally used to aver the existence of various forms of monetary indebtedness.”  (Camden Systems, LLC v. 409 North Camden, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082 [cleaned up].)  “A cause of action for money had and received is stated if it is alleged [that] the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.”  (Ibid.) 

 

Regarding claims for Unjust Enrichment, however,

 

[T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. The phrase Unjust Enrichment does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so.  Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself. It is synonymous with restitution.

 

(Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 [cleaned up]; accord Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 911 [unjust enrichment is not a cause of action].) 

 

            The motion for summary judgment addresses the fourth cause of action for “indebtedness” but not the fifth cause of action for “unjust enrichment.”  Accordingly, it appears to the Court that when Plaintiff dismissed “Cause of Action 4,” Plaintiff intended to dismiss the unjust enrichment cause of action, which is labeled number 4 on the caption page, and which is not a valid cause of action, and not the “Indebtedness” common count, which is labeled number 4 in the body of the Complaint.  Consequently, the Court interprets the dismissal of “Cause of Action 4” as dismissing the unjust enrichment cause of action, as that cause of action is labeled on the caption page of the complaint.

 

            In support of the motion, Plaintiff has advanced the following evidence:

 

·       Defendants executed a Loan Application with Plaintiff on or about November 9, 2023.  (UMF No. 1.)

 

·       On or about November 9, Renascence executed a loan agreement, obtaining a loan for $100,000.  (UMF No. 2.)

 

·       Stocks executed a written guarantee for Renascence’s obligations under the loan agreement.  (UMF No. 14.)

 

·       Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises of the Agreement, including funding the $100,000 loan.  (UMF No. 3.)

 

·       Plaintiff kept a written record of all funds paid toward the loan.  (UMF No. 5.)

 

·       The statement of accounts was sent to Defendants.  (UMF No. 6.)

 

·       Defendants did not dispute the accuracy of the statement balances or any entries on the account.  (UMF No. 7.)

 

·       Defendants stopped making loan payments on or about June 12, 2024.  (UMF No. 8.)

 

·       Stocks has failed to repay the loan pursuant to the terms of the guarantee.  (UMF No. 17-18.)

 

·       A balance of $116,761.99 remains due and owing on the loan under the Agreement. (UMF No. 9.)

 

·       Pursuant to the loan agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees from Renascence.  (UMF No. 10.)

 

·       Pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee, Plaintiff is entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees from Stocks.  (UMF No. 19.)

 

Therefore, Plaintiff has met its initial burdens of production and persuasion that it is entitled to summary judgment against Defendants as to all remaining causes of action, and Defendants have not opposed the motion.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

 

The Court will enter the Order and Judgment as proposed in conformity with the ruling. 

 

 

Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling including the entry of the Order and Judgment, and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith .   

 

 

 

 

 

DATED:  April 8, 2025                                                          ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court