Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV04357, Date: 2024-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV04357    Hearing Date: December 16, 2024    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

On September 9, 2024, Plaintiff Sephora Weber (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against Defendants 11045 Strathmore, LLC; Uncommon Developers, LLC; Ryan Hekmat; Ryan and Jasmin Hekmat Family Trust; and Thomas Marroquin, alleging eleven causes of action as follows:

(1)   Breach of implied warranty of habitability

(2)   Breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment

(3)   Constructive eviction

(4)   Nuisance

(5)   Intentional infliction of emotional distress

(6)   Premises liability

(7)   General negligence

(8)   Negligent maintenance of the premises in violation of Civil Code, § 1714, subd. (a)

(9)   Negligent hiring and supervision in violation of Civil Code, § 1714, subd. (a)

(10)                   Violation of health and safety code, § 17920.3

(11)                   Unfair and illegal business practices in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200

Defendant 11045 Strathmore, LLC (“Defendant”) now demurs to the fifth and eleventh causes of action, on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), respectively.  Defendant also moves to strike allegations requesting attorneys’ fees and punitive damages.

Plaintiff opposes both motions and Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS

1.     DEMURRER

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.”  (290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe” the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)  

In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

A.    UNCERTAINTY

“[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored.”  (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)  A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond - i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers.  (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) 

Although Defendant brings the demurrer on the grounds of uncertainty, all of the arguments Defendant raises in the Demurrer concern the sufficiency of the allegations; the Demurrer does not actually raise any arguments that the Complaint or the subject claims are uncertain.  Ultimately, Defendant does not assert that any portion of the Complaint are so bad that Defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against it. 

The Court thus declines to sustain Defendant’s demurrer on the basis of uncertainty. 

B.    FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

                                                         i.          Fifth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prevail on the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) cause of action, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when “it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].)  Further, the defendant’s conduct must be “intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Id. at p. 1051 [cleaned up].)

Here, the Complaint alleges numerous habitability issues, including gas leaks/appliance issues and water leaks/mold issues.  As to the gas leaks and appliance issues, Plaintiff alleges:

12. On or about September 15, 2022, Plaintiff noticed a smell of gas in the Subject Property.

13. When it had not been resolved by the next day, on or about September 16, 2022 Plaintiff contacted an employee, agent, and/or joint venturer of Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, who, upon information and belief, was the on-site manager of the Subject Property, and was instructed by such employee, agent, and/or joint venturer of Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, to call SoCal Gas and have an emergency technician identify the problem.

14. On or about October 13, 2022, Plaintiff again contacted an employee, agent, and/or joint venturer of Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, who, upon information and belief, was the on-site manager of the Subject Property, to report another gas smell overtaking the Subject Property appearing to originate from inside the kitchen oven.

15. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, eventually sent over the Subject Property’s handyman, who simply turned the oven off and then on again. Defendants then told Plaintiff that the oven was fine and that if the gas smell appeared again, to just let it run for a few minutes, and it should disappear.

[…]

17. On or about December 9, 2022, Plaintiff left the Subject Property for a personal vacation for a period of approximately three weeks. On or about the second or third of January 2023, following her return to Subject Property, Plaintiff asked the same employee, agent, and/or joint venturer of Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, who, upon information and belief, was the on-site manager of the Subject Property, to turn on the heater because her apartment had become unbearably cold and there was no heat retention within the Subject Property.

18. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that the Subject Property’s handyman came to her apartment, took the whole heater off the wall, and turned it on. However, Plaintiff was thereafter not able to safely control the heat because the knob on the heater did not work. As a result, the heat became so unbearable that Plaintiff had to leave a window open when she went to class.

19. When Plaintiff returned to the Subject Property from class, she could smell the gas from outside the Subject Property. Upon information and belief, her apartment was full of gas despite the heat being turned off. The smell was overwhelming, and Plaintiff was immediately nauseous. As a result, Plaintiff called SoCal Gas, who confirmed there was a gas leak.

20. On or about January 23, 2023, Plaintiff again contacted the same employee, agent, and/or joint venturer of Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, who, upon information and belief, was the on-site manager of the Subject Property, due to her heater again not working. At this point, Plaintiff’s roommate had gotten so ill from the still undiscovered mold, lack of heat, and gas leaks that she had gone home for two weeks.

21. On or about January 30, 2023, Plaintiff sent Defendant’s same employee, agent, and/or joint venturer, believed to be the Subject Property’s on-site manager, another message because a circuit in the apartment had shut down her Wi-Fi system and the refrigerator to which it was connected. As a result, multiple items in the apartment were now no longer working.

22. On or about February 14, 2023, Defendant’s same employee, agent, and/or joint venturer, believed to be the Subject Property’s on-site manager, provided Plaintiff with a small space heater that was not at all sufficient to heat the Subject Property.

(Complaint ¶¶ 12-15, 17-22.)   As for the water leaks and mold issues, Plaintiff asserts:

16. On or about December 3, 2022, Plaintiff sent the same employee, agent, and/or joint venturer of Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, who, upon information and belief, was the on-site manager of the Subject Property, photos of a hole in the ceiling of the garage and the fallen pieces of wood and drywall that had collapsed onto her motorcycle. Upon information and belief, the hole had been caused by a water leak in the apartment above Plaintiff’s parking spot. The hole was eventually patched, but the debris from the hole was never cleaned nor damages remedied.

23. On or about March 11, 2023, Plaintiff sent Defendant’s same employee, agent, and/or joint venturer, believed to be the Subject Property’s on-site manager, another message to inform Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, that the bathroom in the apartment above unit in the Subject Property had leaked, causing the ceiling to begin caving and debris to fall.

24. Upon information and belief, in April of 2023, Plaintiff first noticed mold in the Subject Property’s bathroom that, upon information and belief, existed before Plaintiff’s tenancy at the Subject Property began and remained hidden and growing all throughout the term of Plaintiff’s tenancy.

25. Defendant’s handyman attempted to clean the mold from the Subject Property by scrubbing and leaving a dehumidifier within Plaintiff’s apartment. These minimal and negligent efforts were not successful and, upon information and belief, caused the mold to further spread through Plaintiff’s apartment in the Subject Property.

(Complaint ¶¶ 16, 23-25.)  As for intentional infliction of emotional distress specifically, Plaintiff alleges:

70. Plaintiff was in a landlord-tenant relationship with Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, paying rent and occupying the Subject Property, pursuant to a written agreement.

71. The conduct of Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, was outrageous in the extreme. As landlords and managers of the Subject Property, Defendants were in a position of authority, which they consistently abused by, among other things, knowingly failing and refusing to abate a dangerous and unhealthy nuisance; failing to maintain Plaintiff's lawfully leased units so that Plaintiff lived and continues to live in filth and decrepitude; harassing and intimidating Plaintiff; and retaliating against Plaintiff by issuing illegal notices and reducing services.

72. Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, did these things with actual knowledge that the conditions in the Subject Property were causing sickness and injury to Plaintiff and that such harassment and intimidation would cause emotional distress, worry, and anxiety. Defendants and their agents abused their positions as owners and managers of a Subject Property occupied by student tenants by refusing to make Subject Property habitable, harassing and intimidating Plaintiff, and reducing the services Plaintiff should be receiving for the purpose of Defendants’ business profits.

73. Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, knew that Plaintiff was particularly vulnerable to the conditions in the Subject Property. Defendants knew that Plaintiff was a student with limited resources, and that locating comparably priced housing would be impossible and/or impracticable. Defendants knew that Plaintiff's interest in holding onto the housing in Los Angeles's competitive rental market is great, and that such interest would cause Plaintiff to continue their tenancy in Subject Property despite its uninhabitable state, unless and until it became so unbearable such that Plaintiff had to leave, and Defendants could rent the Subject Property for a higher rate of rent. Additionally, but without limitation, Defendants knew that Plaintiff was a student and, therefore, would be less likely to lodge a complaint with government officials regarding the Subject Property’s conditions and Defendants' abuse. Thus, Defendants knew, or reasonably should have known, that their conduct would result in Plaintiff's severe and extreme emotional distress and financial freefall.

74. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, and that of their agents and employees, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress, including extreme suffering, anguish, fearfulness, horror, anxiety, worry, humiliation, and shame, resulting in damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but which amount is in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.

75. Defendants' intentional infliction of emotional distress has been despicable, malicious, willful, knowing, cruel, unjust, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

(Complaint ¶¶ 70-75.)

Although the Complaint adequately alleges that there were persistent gas leaks and mold issues, the allegations do not rise to the level of extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of Defendants.  Specifically, although Plaintiff alleges persistent gas leaks, Plaintiff also alleges that each time Plaintiff contacted Defendants about the issue, they remediated (or at least attempted to remediate) it. 

Moreover, the allegations on this point are incomplete, or even contradictory.  For example, Plaintiff alleges she first contacted Defendants about the smell of gas on September 16, 2022 (Complaint ¶ 13).  But there are no further allegations about what happened next.  Thus, the Court cannot glean from this allegation that Defendants either with conscious or reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s health and safety ignored the complaint or otherwise responded with extreme and outrageous conduct.

Plaintiff next alleges she informed Defendants of the smell of gas on or about October 13, 2022, to which Defendants responded by sending the handyman out, who investigated Plaintiff’s oven/stove.  (Complaint ¶¶ 14-15.)  But Plaintiff does not allege that she continued to smell gas immediately following that incident.

Plaintiff next alleges that in late January 2023, she asked Defendants to turn on her heater, which the handyman did, but that Plaintiff could not turn the heater off because the knob was broken, and had to leave her windows open while she went to class to diffuse the overwhelming heat in her unit.  (Complaint ¶¶ 17-18.)  Upon arriving home from class, Plaintiff could smell gas outside the unit (presumably emanating through the open windows), which the gas company confirmed was a gas leak “despite the heat being turned off.”  (Complaint ¶ 19.)  Thus, Plaintiff has alleged conflicting information that the heat was on and could not be turned off (which caused her to leave the windows open) and also that the heat was turned off.  In any event, there are no allegations about Defendants’ response to the gas leak in late January 2023, whether extreme and outrageous or otherwise.

Similarly, with respect to the mold issues, the Complaint alleges Defendants informed Plaintiff of the leak above her unit, and upon being informed of mold issues, the handyman “negligently” attempted to clean the mold.  But mere negligence does not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” conduct done either intentionally or with reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s emotional wellbeing to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action.

                                                       ii.          Eleventh Cause of Action – Unfair and Illegal Business Practices

Business and Professions Code section 17200, known as the Unfair Competition Law, or “UCL,” bars unfair competition, defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.  “An ‘unlawful’ business practice or act within the meaning of the UCL is an act or practice, committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.”  (Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of Am. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 351.)  “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.”  (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.)  Moreover, “a practice may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law.”  (Ibid.)

In order to have standing to bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.”  (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322.)

Here, in addition to the allegations above, Plaintiff alleges:

109. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, have engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices as part of a scheme to make more money by not complying with laws and regulations. Defendants' unfair and fraudulent practices include, but are not limited to:

a. Failing to maintain and repair the premises as required by numerous residential, health, and safety laws, including, but not limited to, California Civil Code section 1941, and as required by the implied warranty of habitability;

b. Decreasing services and staffing; and

c. Making fraudulent representations regarding the efforts taken to remedy dangerous and hazardous conditions of the Subject Property.

110. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, intentionally and negligently made fraudulent representations to Plaintiff and other tenants of the Subject Property about, without limitation, the efforts taken to remedy complaints related to the habitability of the Subject Property and the success of such negligent efforts.

111. Upon information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, made said fraudulent representations about, without limitation, the efforts taken to remedy complaints related to the habitability of the Subject Property and the success of such negligent efforts, in order to maintain their tenancy at the Subject Property and continue receiving steady rent payments throughout the period that renting to new tenants at a higher rate would not be feasible.

112. Upon information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, had a personal financial interest in wrongfully misleading Plaintiff and other tenants of the Subject Property and put said personal financial interests ahead of the legal interests and securities of Plaintiff.

113. Upon information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, including DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, intentionally engaged in the unfair and illegal business practices described herein for the purpose of increasing his personal assets and wealth, defrauding Plaintiff and other tenants of the Subject Property for their personal and larger business benefit.

114. Defendants' conduct, as herein alleged, was and is a part of Defendants' general business practice. This business practice exists in part because Defendants expected that few adverse consequences would flow from their mistreatment and neglect of student tenants of the Subject Property.

115. By their continuous violations of the statutes and common law referenced herein, Defendants have engaged in per se unlawful business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq.

116. As a result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer substantial injury. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to restitution of all funds paid to Defendants by Plaintiff.

(Complaint ¶¶ 109-116.)

Thus, the Complaint alleges (1) unlawful conduct (violations of Civil Code section 1941); and (2) economic injury (rent paid to Defendants for the uninhabitable unit) that was caused by Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct.

Defendant argues that the Complaint fails to allege a violation of the UCL with requisite specificity.  But no more specificity is required at the pleadings stage.

Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer to the eleventh cause of action.

2.     MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

            Here, Defendant moves to strike allegations requesting attorneys’ fees and punitive damages.

A.    ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, which outlines recoverable costs to a prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)  Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 provides “[e]xcept as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties [….]”  Similarly, Civil Code section 1717 provides “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.”  (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff seeks Attorneys’ fees in connection with the Second Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment pursuant to Civil Code section 3304.  (Complaint ¶ 50.)  Section 3304 provides:

The detriment caused by the breach of a covenant of “seizin,” of “right to convey,” of “warranty,” or of “quiet enjoyment,” in a grant of an estate in real property, is deemed to be:

1. The price paid to the grantor; or, if the breach is partial only, such proportion of the price as the value of the property affected by the breach bore at the time of the grant to the value of the whole property;

2. Interest thereon for the time during which the grantee derived no benefit from the property, not exceeding five years;

3. Any expenses properly incurred by the covenantee in defending his possession.

However, an action on a breach of a covenant is an action sounding in contract.  (Barrows v. Jackson (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 534, 538.)  Pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, in an action on a contract, attorneys’ fees are only available where the contract specifically so provides. 

Further, Section 3304 of the Civil Code limits damages in cases involving leases of real estate to the value of the term of the lease.  (Standard Live Stock Co. v. Pentz (1928) 204 Cal. 618, 638.)  And even in cases where the plaintiff has purchased title to the property, although such a plaintiff is entitled to “the sum actually and in good faith paid for the paramount title and the amount expended in defending his possession, provided such damages shall in no case exceed the purchase money and interest.”  (McGary v. Hastings (1870) 39 Cal. 360, 369, emphasis added.)

Thus, the Court does not find legal support for Plaintiff’s contention that Section 3304 permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees in cases on contract involving a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment in the absence of a contractual provision entitling Plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees, and Plaintiff does not address this attorneys’ fees issue in the opposition.

B.    PUNITIVE DAMAGES

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

Moreover, “the imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault.  It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.”  (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.)  “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive.  An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.  But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation.  Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders:  the officers, directors, or managing agents.”  (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].) 

Here, as discussed above, although Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, Plaintiff’s factual allegations fall short of alleging that Defendants acted either intentionally or with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. 

Further, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants fraudulently rented the unit to Plaintiff, despite known habitability issues, and refused to adequately repair those issues in order to constructively evict Plaintiff so that they could rent out the unit to a new tenant for a higher rent (see Complaint ¶¶ 27-28,  110-113), Plaintiff has not pleaded facts with the requisite specificity as to what specifically was known, by whom specifically, and when, or what specific misrepresentations were made, by whom, to whom, how, and when, to support a claim for punitive damages.  Furthermore, all allegations are made as to Defendants generally and/or the “handyman” specifically, and therefore Plaintiff does not allege any specific knowledge or conduct on the part of Defendant’s corporate leadership to support a claim of punitive damages against entity defendant. 

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike in its entirety.

3.     LEAVE TO AMEND

A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v. City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v. Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden as she does not specify any facts that could be added to the Complaint to address the deficiencies identified above.  Rather, as to the demurrer, Plaintiff merely indicates, “should the Court find that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to sufficiently state its claims for relief, leave to amend should be granted” and as to the motion to strike, Plaintiff merely indicates, “Plaintiff requests leave to amend to address any deficiencies identified by the Court.”   

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, the Court overrules Defendant’s Demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action, but Sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action without leave to amend.

Further, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Strike in its entirety, and orders the identified allegations requesting attorneys’ fees and punitive damages stricken from the Complaint, without leave to amend.

Further, the Court orders Defendant to file and serve an Answer to the Complaint on or before January 13, 2025.

Further, on the Court’s own motion, the Court continues the Case Management Conference from January 14, 2025 to March 17, 2025 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207.  All parties shall comply with California Rules of Court, rules 3.722, et seq., regarding Initial and Further Case Management Conferences.  In particular, all parties shall adhere to the duty to meet and confer (Rule 3.724) and to the requirement to prepare and file Case Management Statements (Rule 3.725).    

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  December 16, 2024                                                ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court