Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV04442, Date: 2025-05-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV04442 Hearing Date: May 5, 2025 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPARTMENT 207
HEARING DATE May 5, 2025
CASE NUMBER 24SMCV04442
MOTION Motion
to Set Aside Entry of Default
MOVING PARTY Defendants Shawn Credle; Matthew Feinstein; PNPL
Holdings, Inc.; and Pineapple Venice, Inc.
OPPOSING PARTY none
MOTION
This case arises from a business
dispute involving an investment deal.
On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff
Joseph Corsello (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendants Vincent Mehdizadeh
aka Vincent Zadeh (“Mehdizadeh”); Shawn Credle (“Credle”); Jaime Ortega
(“Ortega”); Matthew Feinstein (“Feinstein”); PNPL Holdings, Inc. (“PNPL”); and
Pineapple Venice, Inc. (“Pineapple”) alleging eight causes of action for (1)
fraud; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) breach of contract; (4) unjust
enrichment; (5) constructive trust; (6) violation of California Business and
Professions Code section 17200; (7) theft; and (8) RICO.
On November 27, 2024, default was
entered against Defendants Credle, Feinstein, PNPL, and Pineapple (“Moving
Defendants”). Moving Defendants move to
set aside the entries of default. The
motion is unopposed.
ANALYSIS
I.
DISCRETIONARY AND MANDATORY RELIEF
“Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary
and disfavored practice in Anglo–American jurisprudence: The policy of the law is to have every
litigated case tried upon its merits, and it looks with disfavor upon a party,
who, regardless of the merits of the case, attempts to take advantage of the
mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary.” (Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th
958, 963 [cleaned up].)
Code of Civil procedure section 473 “includes a discretionary
provision, which applies permissively, and a mandatory provision, which applies
as of right.” (Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 25
(hereafter Minick).) “Section 473
is a remedial statute to be “applied liberally” in favor of relief if the
opposing party will not suffer prejudice.
Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any
doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking
relief from default. Unless inexcusable
neglect is clear, the policy favoring trial on the merits prevails.” (Minick, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 24
[cleaned up].)
The party or the legal
representative must seek such relief “within a reasonable time, in no case
exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was
taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 [“because more than
six months had elapsed from the entry of default, and hence relief under
section 473 was unavailable”]; People v.
The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Ca.App.4th 712, 721 [motion
for relief under section 473 must be brought “within a reasonable time, in no
case exceeding six months”]). “The
six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under
section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the
six-month period.” (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340,
citations omitted.)
A.
DISCRETIONARY
RELIEF
Per Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (b), a court may “relieve a party or his or her legal
representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken
against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
B.
MANDATORY
RELIEF
Notwithstanding any other requirements of this
section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more
than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied
by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any
(1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which
will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment
or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the
court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the
attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) “In considering whether the trial court
properly denied relief under section 473(b), the first question is the
sufficiency of defendants' showing of attorney fault, if believed, to trigger
the mandatory relief provisions of that statute.” (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond
Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 868, 896, disapproved on other
grounds by Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire
Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830 (hereafter Standard).) “Under section 473(b), a party is entitled to
relief from a default and resulting judgment whenever, on timely application
for relief, his attorney ‘attest[s] to his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect’ in connection with the default or the judgment.” (Ibid.)
In support of the request, Moving Defendants advance the attorney
declaration of Andrew B. Holmes, which provides:
2. I am the attorney responsible for this case at
my firm. The defaults were entered through my mistake, inadvertence, or neglect
in that I failed to properly calendar the response dates for the Complaint.
3. After learning about the entry of defaults in
this case, I reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel of record, Mr. Yourist, to seek
a stipulation to set aside the defaults. Mr. Yourist declined, but understood
that Defendants intended to seek relief from the Court.
4. While I intended to move to set aside the
defaults in early 2025, the fires that devastated the Los Angeles area struck
in January and frustrated those plans. As a result of the fires, I was forced
to evacuate my home and I am still residing in temporary housing. Consequently,
the fires also disrupted my practice of law, and I am still in the process of
clearing up the resulting backlog.
(Holmes
Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Moving Defendants have
also provided a proposed answer to the complaint.
Therefore, the Court finds that
Moving Defendants have demonstrated the entries of default were due to
counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and Plaintiff
has not opposed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
grants Moving Defendants’ motion to set aside the entries of default, and
orders set aside the defaults entered against Moving Defendants on November 27,
2024.
Moving Defendants Shawn Credle;
Matthew Feinstein; PNPL Holdings, Inc.; and Pineapple Venice, Inc. shall file
and serve the proposed Answer to the Complaint on or before May 19, 2025.
Further on the Court’s own motion,
the Court vacates the Order to Show Cause re Entry of Default Judgment set on
May 21, 2025, and sets a Case Management Conference on July 2, 2025 at 8:30
A.M. in Department 207. All parties shall
comply with California Rules of Court, rules 3.722, et seq., regarding Initial and
Further Case Management Conferences. In particular,
all parties shall adhere to the duty to meet and confer (Rule 3.724) and to the
requirement to prepare and file Case Management Statements (Rule 3.725).
Moving Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s orders and file
the notice with a proof of service forthwith.
DATED: May 5, 2025 ___________________________
Michael E. Whitaker
Judge of the Superior Court