Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV04506, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV04506    Hearing Date: February 19, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

This case arises from allegations that Defendants rented Plaintiff’s iconic Beverly Hills mansion for the purpose of filming the Cardi B “Like What” music video without just compensation and falsely representing the home would merely be used to film a TikTok video.

On September 17, 2024, Plaintiff BI, LLC (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against Defendants Belcalis Marlenis Almánzar a/k/a Belcalis Marlenis Cephus (“Cardi B”); Kiari Kendrell Cephus (“Offset”); J3K Logistics Co (“J3K”); Atlantic Records Group, LLC (“Atlantic”); Capital Investment Realty Group, Inc. (“Capital”); and Patrick W. Michael (“Michael”) (together, “Defendants”) alleging three causes of action for (1) trespass; (2) restitution/unjust enrichment; and (3) intentional misrepresentation.

Moving Defendants Cardi B and Atlantic (“Moving Defendants”) now demur to all three causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and Moving Defendants reply.

ANALYSIS

1.     DEMURRER

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.”  (290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe” the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)  

In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

A.    FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

                                                         i.          First Cause of Action – Trespass

“The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant's intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.”  (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.)

Plaintiff alleges:

12. The Property at issue in this lawsuit is a modern luxury home, designed by renowned architect Ed Niles, and located in the heart of Beverly Hills’ exclusive 90210 area code. The Property is well-known due to the home’s unique modern architecture, being constructed almost entirely of glass and aluminum.

13. Over the years, the Property has been leased to high-net-worth individuals and celebrities, including Justin Bieber, who famously lived there. It has also been leased on a short-term basis for commercial purposes. For example, it was used as the set for Jake Paul’s “It’s Everyday Bro” music video, which reached over 300 million views on YouTube.

14. Defendants decided to film the music video for Cardi B’s song “Like What” at the Property, likely due to the home’s status and recognizability. However, as explained herein, Defendants never obtained authorization from Plaintiff to do so.

15. Defendants knew that they would need to pay a significant cost to rent the Property to film a high-end music video with a prominent music artist. So, they devised a plan to use the Property without paying fair value for it. Specifically, in or around late 2023 or early 2024, Defendants Michael and DOES 1-5, on behalf of themselves and all other Defendants, orally represented to Plaintiff, via Plaintiff’s real estate agents Bryce Lowe and Kirby Gillon, that they had an unnamed client that wanted to film a “TikTok” at the Property (the “Representation”). TikTok is a social media application where users create and share short videos shot on mobile devices or webcams.

16. Defendants’ Representation was false when they made it, as they always intended to use the Property for the “Like What” video, and not a TikTok. Based on Defendants’ Representation that they were only using the Property for a TikTok, Plaintiff agreed to let them use it. Defendants made the Representation to induce Plaintiff to let Defendants use the Property free of charge (or for a nominal sum), and not the full short term rental cost for the Property that would have been charged had Defendants told the truth about how they intended to actually use the Property. Had Plaintiff known the truth, it would not have let Defendants use the Property as they did.

17. In or around late 2023 or early 2024, under the false pretense of making a TikTok, Defendants used the Property as the set to film Cardi B’s “Like What” music video. This was not a short TikTok, but a full production music video. Defendants featured Plaintiff’s Property prominently throughout the entirety of the music video, making the Property’s distinctive architecture the video’s centerpiece. For example, Defendants opened the music video with numerous external shots of Plaintiff’s Property to show the video’s viewers the exact, famous home that was being used.

18. Throughout the entirety of the video, Cardi B is shown performing at the Property, using the home’s unique indoor and outdoor architectural features as a backdrop. Every scene of the video appears to have been filmed at the Property. Offset directed the “Like What” video from the Property.

19. Defendants later published the “Like What” video to the internet, including uploading it to YouTube. As of the time of the filing of this Complaint, the video garnered over 26 million views in six months by the public. As such, Defendants have obtained, and continue to obtain, substantial monetary benefits from their unauthorized use the Property.

20. Some Defendants, including without limitation Cardi B, Offset, Michael and DOES 1-25, inclusive, physically trespassed on the Property to make the “Like What” video. Some Defendants, including without limitation DOES 26-50, inclusive, provided access to the Property, knowing that such access was wrongful, unauthorized, and without the permission of Plaintiff. Some Defendants, including without limitation Atlantic, J3K, Capital Investment, and DOES 51-65, inclusive, either approved the wrongful conduct beforehand, and/or ratified the wrongful conduct afterwards. All Defendants improperly profited from their unauthorized use of the Property at Plaintiff’s expense, and continue to do so.

21. Plaintiff first learned that Defendants trespassed on its Property and improperly used the Property as the set for the “Like What” video, after the video was uploaded to YouTube and released to the public.

[…]

26. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff owned the Property.

27. Defendants entered Plaintiff’s Property. Some Defendants, including without limitation Cardi B, Offset, and Michael, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, intentionally, recklessly, or negligently, entered Plaintiff’s Property to film the “Like What” music video. Other Defendants, including without limitation DOES 26-50, inclusive, intentionally, recklessly, or negligently, caused, facilitated, and/or allowed Defendants to enter Plaintiff’s Property to film the “Like What” music video. Some Defendants, including without limitation J3K, Atlantic, Capital Investment, and DOES 51-65, inclusive, approved the tortious entry onto the Property beforehand, and/or ratified that conduct thereafter.

28. Plaintiff did not give permission for the entry.

29. Plaintiff was harmed by Defendants’ conduct as described herein. Not only did Defendants fail to pay Plaintiff for the use of the Property, but their wrongful use of the Property to film (and later release) the “Like What” music video that conferred substantial monetary benefits on Defendants, which pursuant to California law (including without limitation, Civil Code § 3334), must be paid to Plaintiff.

30. Defendants’ entry and/or conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

(Complaint at ¶¶ 12-30.)

            Thus, Plaintiff has alleged ownership of the property (Complaint ¶ 26); Defendants’ intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property (Complaint ¶ 27); lack of permission for the entry (Complaint ¶ 28) and acts in excess of permission (Complaint ¶ 17); harm (Complaint ¶ 29); and that Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm (Complaint ¶ 30.)

            Moving Defendants argue that, as the Complaint concedes, Defendants had permission for the entry (Complaint ¶ 16 [“Plaintiff agreed to let them use it”].)

            But “a trespass may occur if the party, entering pursuant to a limited consent, i.e., limited as to purpose or place, proceeds to exceed those limits by divergent conduct on the land of another. A conditional or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition or restriction is complied with.”  (Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178, emphasis added (hereafter Donahue).)  In Donahue, the defendants were held to have committed a trespass on shopping center property that was open to the public for purposes of shopping because the defendants solicited charitable donations, which was an activity that exceeded the scope of consent given for entry.

            Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that it provided Defendants limited consent to film a TikTok video, and Defendants exceeded the scope of Plaintiff’s permission by filming a full production music video they released on YouTube and to the general public. 

            In reply, Defendants argue that their conduct of filming did not exceed the scope of permission given.  Whether the scope of Defendants’ filming production was more elaborate or invasive than a typical TikTok filming such that Defendants exceeded the scope of permission given is a factual question to be determined at later stages of the litigation.

            Therefore, the Court overrules Moving Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action.

                                                       ii.          Second Cause of Action – Unjust Enrichment

Moving Defendants demur to the second cause of action for unjust enrichment on the grounds that California does not recognize any such cause of action.  The Court agrees.

[T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. The phrase Unjust Enrichment does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so.  Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself. It is synonymous with restitution.

(Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 [cleaned up]; accord Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 911 [unjust enrichment is not a cause of action].) 

Therefore, the Court sustains Moving Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action.

                                                     iii.          Third Cause of Action – Intentional Misrepresentation

The elements for fraudulent misrepresentation are “(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff.”  (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 605–606.) 

“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)  “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”  (Ibid.) 

“One of the purposes of the specificity requirement is notice to the defendant, to furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.”  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)  As such, less specificity is required “when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy[.]”  (Ibid.)  “Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.”  (Ibid.)

In addition to the above allegations, Plaintiff alleges:

35. In or around late 2024 or early 2024, Defendants made the Representation to Plaintiff via Plaintiff’s real estate agents, Bryce Lowe and Kirby Gillon.

36. The Representation was false. Defendants knew that the Representation was false when they made it, or Defendants made the Representation recklessly and without regard for its truth.

37. Defendants intended for Plaintiff to rely on the Representation to induce Plaintiff to let them use its Property free of charge, or for a nominal charge. Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendants’ Representation, and based thereon, allowed Defendants to use the Property.

38. Plaintiff was harmed by Defendants’ conduct, including the lost value of the use of the Property.

(Complaint ¶¶ 35-38.)

            Moving Defendants argue the Complaint fails to allege justifiable reliance because it was objectively unreasonable for Plaintiff to charge Defendants little or nothing to film at the property in reliance on Michael’s vague assertion that an unnamed client intended to film a TikTok at the property without clarifying the identity of the unnamed client, the scope of the planned production, the length of the finished video, or the extent of its distribution.  In support, Defendants cite to Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178 (hereafter Hoffman); Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289 (hereafter Hinesley); and Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Brodkin (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 206 (hereafter Pacesetter). 

            In Hoffman, the plaintiff leased and ultimately purchased property adjacent to the defendant’s property, upon which defendant claimed an easement.  While renting, the plaintiff complained to the defendant about the traffic across the property, to which the defendant responded he “would take care of it.”  Subsequently, the plaintiff purchased the property, after which time, the defendant asserted his interest in the easement.  On a motion for summary adjudication, the court held that the plaintiff’s reliance upon the defendant’s vague statement that he “would take care of it” was not justifiable given that the plaintiff leased the property prior to the sale and witnessed the traffic along the easement as a “common occurrence,” including after the defendant said he “would take care of it,” as it is incumbent on purchasers of real property to make an ordinary inspection and inquiry.  (Hoffman, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.)  Thus, the court held the statement that defendant “would take care of it” was too vague to be enforced.”  (Id. at p. 1198.)   

            Similarly, in Hinesley, the plaintiff alleged the defendant fraudulently induced him to enter into a five-year commercial lease in a shopping center by falsely representing that a Starbucks, a Baskin-Robbins, and a popular local restaurant chain Dos Coyotes would all occupy nearby suites in the shopping center.  On motion for summary judgment, the court held that the plaintiff’s reliance on these representations was not justifiable in light of language in the lease that lessor did not represent, and lessee did not rely on, any other lessee occupying any space in the shopping center.  (Hinesley, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 300-302.)

            Finally, in Pacesetter, on motion for summary judgment, the court held that the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representations concerning the potential future rental amounts the plaintiff could receive upon purchasing the property was not justifiable because the representation was adequately hedged with language “if” the rents “we contemplate” were to be collected in the future.  (Pacesetter, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 213.)

            By contrast, here, unlike in Hinesley and Pacesetter, the misrepresentation that a client intended to film a TikTok video is not a representation about speculative event, like whether third parties will rent certain lease spaces in a shopping center or what the rental market will be like in the future.  Nor did Plaintiff, by virtue of its prior experience with Defendants or their productions, have notice that the purported filming of a TikTok might actually be a full production music video, unlike the plaintiff’s prior extensive knowledge of traffic along the easement in Hoffman.

            Furthermore, as is apparent by the fact that all of Defendants’ case law was decided at the summary judgment stage, whether Plaintiff’s reliance on the representation that the intent as to film a TikTok was actually justifiable is a question of fact to be determined at later stages of the litigation.  Accordingly, for pleading purposes, the Complaint adequately alleges that Plaintiff justifiably relied to its detriment on Defendants’ misrepresentation that the intent was to merely film a TikTok, when in fact Defendants filmed a professional music video.

2.     LEAVE TO AMEND

A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v. City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v. Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

Although Plaintiff generally requests leave to amend, Plaintiff does not specify any facts that could be added to the Complaint to cure the defect identified above.  Further, because there is no cause of action for Unjust Enrichment, the Court sees no facts Plaintiff could add to cure this defect.    

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, the Court overrules Moving Defendants’ Demurrer to the First and Third causes of action, but sustains Moving Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action without leave to amend.   Further, the Court orders Moving Defendants to file and serve an Answer or Answers to the Complaint on or before March 19, 2025. 

Moving Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling on the Demurrer and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

Further, on the Court’s own motion, the Court continues the Case Management Conference from March 14, 2025 to June 25, 2025 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207.  All parties shall comply with California Rules of Court, rules 3.722, et seq., regarding Initial and Further Case Management Conferences.  In particular, all parties shall adhere to the duty to meet and confer (Rule 3.724) and to the requirement to prepare and file Case Management Statements (Rule 3.725).    

Plaintiff shall provide notice of the continued Case Management Conference and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.

DATED:  February 19, 2025                                                  ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court