Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV05820, Date: 2025-06-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV05820    Hearing Date: June 2, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

This case arises from alleged violations of the Song-Beverly Act. 

On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff Tionna G Carvalho FKA Tionna G Dolin (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Jaguar”) and Land Rover Santa Monica (“Land Rover”) (together “Defendants”) alleging six causes of action for (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subd. (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subd. (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subd. (a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5) negligent repair; and (6) fraudulent inducement-concealment. 

The fifth cause of action (negligent repair) is alleged against Land Rover only, and the remaining causes of action (first through fourth, and sixth) are alleged against Jaguar only.

Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings as to the fifth and sixth causes of action and to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.  Plaintiff opposes both motions and Defendants reply. 

ANALYSIS

1.      Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but may be made after the time to demur has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).)  “Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013.)  In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true.” (Rippon v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313.) 

a.       Fraudulent Inducement-Concealment

“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact.”  (Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.)

“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)  “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”  (Ibid.) 

“One of the purposes of the specificity requirement is notice to the defendant, to furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.”  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)  As such, less specificity is required “when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy[.]”  (Ibid.)  “Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.”  (Ibid.)

“There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.”  (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311 (hereafter Bigler-Engler).)  In the absence of a fiduciary duty, “[a] duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement.”  (Ibid.) 

Further, “Under California law, a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.”  (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 839.)  In the context of automobile manufacturers, the appellate court has explained:

In its short argument on this point in its appellate brief, Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.

(Dhital v. Nissan N. Am. Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843-844 (hereafter Dhita).)

            Thus, under Dhital, there would be a fiduciary duty between Jaguar, as the manufacturer of the subject vehicle, and Plaintiff, as the purchaser of the subject vehicle, giving rise to a duty for Jaguar to disclose the defect, if Plaintiff either purchased the vehicle directly from Jaguar or from one of its authorized dealers. 

            In this regard, “The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion.  The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.  As our Supreme Court has explained it:  The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings, which set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.  Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.”  (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 [cleaned up]; see also Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258 [“The complaint limits the issues to be addressed at the motion for summary judgment. The rationale is clear: It is the allegations in the complaint to which the summary judgment motion must respond”].) 

            Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement-concealment cause of action fails because the Complaint does not allege she purchased the vehicle from Jaguar. 

            The Complaint alleges:

4. Defendant JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC. ("Defendant" or “JLRNA”) is a corporation organized and in existence under the laws of the State of Delaware and registered with the California Department of Corporations to conduct business in California. At all times relevant herein, Defendant was engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, constructing, assembling, marketing, distributing, and selling automobiles and other motor vehicles and motor vehicle components in Los Angeles County, California.

5. Defendant LAND ROVER SANTA MONICA ("LRSM") is an unknown business entity organized and in existence under the laws of the State of California. At all times relevant herein, LRSM was engaged in the business of selling automobiles and automobile components, and servicing and repairing automobiles in Los Angeles County, California.

[…]

7. On or about November 2, 2019, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant JLRNA regarding a 2020 Land Rover Range Rover Sport, vehicle identification number SALWG2SU8LA896752 (hereafter "Vehicle"), which was manufactured and or distributed by Defendant.

(Complaint ¶¶ 4-5, 7.)  Plaintiff further alleges that on several occasions, Plaintiff brought the subject vehicle to “Defendant’s” authorized repair facility for repair, and each time Plaintiff picked up the vehicle, “Defendant’s authorized repair facility” represented that the car had been repaired and was functioning normally.  (Complaint ¶¶ 24-29.)  However, Plaintiff continued (and continues) to experience defective vehicle.  (Complaint ¶ 30.) 

Plaintiff alleges Jaguar knew that Plaintiff’s vehicle, and others equipped with the same 3.0L engine, contains an engine oil consumption defect:

32. Prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Vehicle, Defendant JLRNA knew that vehicles equipped with the same 3.0L engine as the Vehicle contain one or more defect(s) that causes them to be unable to properly utilize engine oil and, in fact, to improperly burn off and/or consume abnormally high amounts of oil (the “Oil Consumption Engine Defect” or “Defect”).

33. Vehicles that are equipped with a 3.0L Engine contain one or more defect that causes their engines to consume abnormally high amounts of oil.

34. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant JLRNA acquired this knowledge prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Vehicle through various sources of information, including but not limited to pre-production testing, pre-production design failure mode and analysis data, production failure mode and analysis data, early consumer complaints made exclusively to JLRNAs network of dealers and directly to JLRNA, aggregate warranty data compiled from JLRNA's network of dealers, testing conducted by JLRNA in response to consumer complaints, and repair order and parts data received by JLRNA from JLRNA's network of dealers and from other internal sources.

35. Plaintiff would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle, or would have paid less for it, had Plaintiff known of the Oil Consumption Engine Defect, given the unsafe nature of the Defect. Furthermore, Plaintiff unknowingly exposed herself to the risk of accident, injury, and/or liability to others as a result of the nature or the Oil Consumption Engine Defect.

36. Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer who expected the Subject Vehicle to be safe and free of defects, and that Defendant JLRNA would not sell or lease vehicles with known safety-related defects, such as the Oil Consumption Engine Defect, and would disclose any such defects to its consumers when it learns of them.

37. Although it has been fully aware of the Oil Consumption Engine Defect, Defendant JLRNA actively concealed the existence and nature of the Defect from Plaintiff at the time of purchase, repair, and thereafter.

(Complaint ¶¶ 32-37.)  As to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment specifically, the Complaint alleges:

66. Defendant JLRNA committed fraud by allowing the Subject Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiff without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle and its 3.0L Engine was suffering from an Oil Consumption Engine Defect. JLRNA’s 3.0L Engine contains one or more design and/ or manufacturing defects that causes it to be unable to properly utilize engine oil and, in fact, to improperly burn off and/or consume abnormally high amounts of oil (the “Oil Consumption Engine Defect” or “Defect”).

67. Motor oil functions as an essential lubricant for the moving parts in internal combustion engines. The oil creates a film separating surfaces of adjacent moving parts to minimize direct contact of those parts, thereby decreasing heat caused by friction and reducing wear. Motor oil also has important cleaning and sealing functions and serves as an important medium for dissipating heat throughout the engine. As a result, these vehicles, including the Subject Vehicle, need the proper amount of engine oil in order for the engine and its related parts to function properly and safely.

68. Thus, the Oil Consumption Engine Defect is a safety concern because it prevents the engine from maintaining the proper level of engine oil and causes voluminous oil consumption that cannot be reasonably anticipated or predicted.

69. The Oil Consumption Engine Defect is therefore unreasonably dangerous to consumers because it can cause engine failure while the JLRNA Vehicles are in operation at any time and under any driving condition or speed, thereby exposing the drivers, their passengers, and others who share the road with them to serious risk of accident and injury.

70. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that prior to the sale of the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff, Defendant knew that the Subject Vehicle and its 3.0L Engine suffered from an inherent defect, was defective, would fail, and was not suitable for its intended use.

71. Defendant was under a duty to Plaintiff to disclose the defective nature of the Subject Vehicle and its 3.0L Engine, its safety consequences and/or the associated repair costs because:

a. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that Defendant acquired their knowledge of the Oil Consumption Engine Defect and its potential consequences prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Subject Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff, including but not limited to pre-production testing data, early consumer complaints about the Oil Consumption Engine Defect made directly to JLRNA and its network of dealers, aggregate warranty data compiled from JLRNA’s network of dealers, testing conducted by Defendant in response to these complaints, as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by JLRNA from JLRNA’s network of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information;

b. JLRNA was in a superior position from various internal sources to know (or should have known) the true state of facts about the material defects contained in vehicles equipped with the 3.0L Engine; and

c. Plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to learn or discover of the Subject Vehicle’s Oil Consumption Engine Defect and its potential consequences until well after Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle.

72. In failing to disclose the defect in the Subject Vehicle’s 3.0L Engine, Defendant has knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts and breached its duty not to do so.

73. The facts concealed or not disclosed by Defendant to Plaintiff are material in that a reasonable person would have considered them to be important in deciding whether or not to purchase the Subject Vehicle. Had Plaintiff known that the Subject Vehicle and its 3.0L Engine were defective at the time of sale, Plaintiff would not have leased and/or purchased the Subject Vehicle.

74. Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer who interacted with JLRNA’s sales representatives and/or reviewed materials disseminated by Defendant concerning Defendant’s Vehicles prior to purchasing the Subject Vehicle. Had Defendant disclosed the Oil Consumption Engine Defect to its sales representatives and/or the consumer public, Plaintiff would have been aware of it and would not have leased and/or purchased the Subject Vehicle.

75. As a result of Defendant’s misconduct, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages. Plaintiff was harmed by purchasing a Vehicle that Plaintiff would not have leased and/or purchased had Plaintiff known the true facts about the Oil Consumption Engine Defect. Furthermore, Plaintiff unknowingly exposed herself to the risk of liability, accident and/or injury as a result of Defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the Oil Consumption Engine Defect.

(Complaint ¶¶ 66-75.)

Thus, although Plaintiff does not actually allege who she purchased the vehicle from, the closest reasonable inference the Court is able to make is that Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle from Land Rover, as the dealer, and the subject vehicle was manufactured and warranted by Jaguar, although it is unclear whether Plaintiff actually purchased the vehicle from Land Rover or simply brought it to Land Rover for repair.  (See Complaint ¶ 61 [alleging Plaintiff brought the vehicle to Land Rover for repair on at least one occasion].)

However, crucially, even if the Court were to infer from the allegations that Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle from Land Rover, Plaintiff does not allege that Land Rover was Jaguar’s authorized dealer, nor does Plaintiff otherwise allege the subject vehicle was purchased from Jaguar or Jaguar’s authorized dealer.  As such, Plaintiff has not alleged the requisite relationship to Jaguar to give rise to a duty to disclose. 

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Jaguar also satisfies one of the other circumstances in which a duty to disclose arises—namely, that Jaguar had exclusive knowledge of the engine oil consumption defect and actively concealed that information from Plaintiff and other purchasers like Plaintiff.  But Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to Jaguar’s exclusive knowledge and active concealment are made only on information and belief.  (See Complaint ¶ 71.a.)  Allegations made “on information and belief” are insufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement “unless the facts upon which the belief is founded are stated in the pleading.”  (Dowling v. Spring Valley. Water Co. (1917) 174 Cal.218, 221.)  Here, there are no specific facts about the alleged pre-production testing data, early consumer complaints, aggregate warranty data, testing conducted in response to complaints, or warranty repair and part replacement data, much less who specifically at Jaguar had that information, when they had it, how they received it, etc.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment.

b.            Negligent Repair

Defendants first argue that the fifth cause of action for negligent repair is barred by the economic loss doctrine.

“[T]he economic loss rule provides: where a purchaser’s expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only economic losses.”  (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (quoting Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc. (1992) 439 Mich. 512, 486 N.W.2d 612, 615, fns. omitted) (quotations omitted).)  “This doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law of torts.”  (Ibid.) 

In summary, the economic loss doctrine applies when the parties have entered into a contract; the plaintiff sues for tort damages, alleging defendant failed to perform as the contract requires; and negligently caused economic losses flowing from the breach. In such a case, plaintiffs are generally limited to recovery of those economic damages and cannot seek to expand their remedies beyond those available in contract. The doctrine does not apply if defendant's breach caused physical damage or personal injury beyond the economic losses caused by the contractual breach and defendant violated a duty flowing, not from the contract, but from a separate, legally recognized tort obligation.

A case in which the plaintiff sues a contractual party for fraud based on conduct committed during the course of a contractual relationship falls outside the economic loss doctrine. 

(Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 44 (hereafter Rattagan).)

The economic loss rule is best understood as a specific application of the same independent tort principle reflected in Tameny, Applied Equipment, and Freeman & Mills. Whenever a contract breach causes physical harm to a person or property, the economic loss rule's limitation gives way to the recognition that an independent tort duty of care was likely also breached, resulting in an injury not contemplated and provided for by the parties. This is so because any contractual breach resulting in physical injury or property damage normally resides outside the reasonable expectations of the parties when they entered their contractual relationship. The inverse may also be true. When a contractual breach results only in economic losses, the pecuniary injury may fall within the scope of parties' precontractual expectations and their allocation of risks, and it is less likely to implicate the breach of a tort duty independent of their contractual rights and obligations. Whether the alleged harm arises independently from the contract can be a nuanced question. 

When evaluating whether the parties' expectations and risk allocations bar tort recovery, the court must consider the alleged facts. First, applying standard contract principles, it must ascertain the full scope of the parties' contractual agreement, including the rights created or reserved, the obligations assumed or declined, and the provided remedies for breach. Second, it must determine whether there is an independent tort duty to refrain from the alleged conduct. Third, if an independent duty exists, the court must consider whether the plaintiff can establish all elements of the tort independently of the rights and duties assumed by the parties under the contract.

The guiding and distinguishing principle is this. If the alleged breach is based on a failure to perform as the contract provides, and the parties reasonably anticipated and allocated the risks associated with the breach, the cause of action will generally sound only in contract because a breach deprives an injured party of a benefit it bargained for. However, if the contract reveals the consequences were not reasonably contemplated when the contract was entered and the duty to avoid causing such a harm has an independent statutory or public policy basis, exclusive of the contract, tort liability may lie. 

(Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 26-27.)

“The lesson to be drawn from this review is that contract and tort obligations are different. The independent tort principle, and its specific application in our economic loss rule cases, honors those differences. The law of contracts protects the interests of parties who enter into an agreement that secures rights and obligations of their choosing. The parties make clear those rights and obligations by the terms they put in the contract. Contract law functions to facilitate commerce by enforcing the agreement the parties adopt. Tort law operates on a different principle. A tort remedy arises, not based on an agreement between the parties, but because the defendant has violated a societal duty that the law itself imposes on everyone. A tortfeasor is held liable not for violating a contract, but for violating an independent legal duty.”  (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 37 [cleaned up].)

“But to be held liable in tort, a defendant must commit a tort. If all the defendant has allegedly done is violate the terms of the parties' contract, depriving the plaintiff of the benefits the contract ensures, the defendant's liability is limited by the contract. Broader tort liability only arises if a defendant violates an independent legal duty and the type of harm that ensues was not reasonably contemplated or accounted for by the contractual parties.”  (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 37.)

“Within the context of the broader independent tort principles previously summarized, our answer encapsulates steps one and three of the required analysis: (1) a court must ascertain the full scope of the parties' contractual agreement; and (3) the court must determine whether the plaintiff can establish all elements of the tort independent of the rights and duties assumed by the parties under the contract. Step two is satisfied here because, as discussed post, the independent tort duty to refrain from engaging in fraudulent conduct is well established by statute and common law.”  (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 38 [cleaned up].)

In addition to the allegations above, as to the fifth cause of action for negligent repair, the Complaint alleges:

61. Plaintiff delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant LRSM for substantial repair on at least one occasion.

62. Defendant LRSM owed a duty to Plaintiff to use ordinary care and skill in storage, preparation, and repair of the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.

63. Defendant LRSM breached its duty to Plaintiff to use ordinary care and skill by failing to properly store, prepare and repair the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.

64. Defendant LRSM's negligent breach of its duties owed to Plaintiff was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

(Complaint ¶¶ 61-64.)

As discussed above, it is unclear with whom Plaintiff contracted for the purchase of the vehicle.  Notwithstanding, Land Rover’s obligation to repair allegedly stems from Plaintiff’s contract to purchase the vehicle.  Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not adequately allege fraud.  As such, Plaintiff does not adequately allege any independent tort duty above and beyond the parties’ contractual duties.  Nor does Plaintiff allege any damage or harm above and beyond the diminution in value of her vehicle.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the defective repairs subjected Plaintiff to a risk of liability, should her defective vehicle cause injury or other property damage.  But Plaintiff has not alleged any such injury or property damage. 

Therefore, the Court finds that the Economic Loss Doctrine bars Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for negligent repair.

2.      Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)   As set forth in the Civil Code,

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.  (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)-(3), emphasis added.) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.”  (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].) 

Moreover, “the imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault.  It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.”  (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.)  “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive.  An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.  But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation.  Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders:  the officers, directors, or managing agents.”  (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].) 

Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not alleged facts with requisite specificity to state a cause of action for fraud against Defendants.  Similarly, because Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendants’ exclusive knowledge and concealment are made only on information and belief, Plaintiff has not alleged oppression or malice with requisite specificity.  As such, the Court finds that the allegations similarly do not adequately support a claim for punitive damages.   

3.      Leave to Amend

A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v. City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden.  Plaintiff merely requests leave to amend and does not articulate any facts that could be added to the Complaint to address the deficiencies identified by the Court.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to strike punitive damages in their entirety and dismisses the fifth and sixth causes of action and request for punitive damages without leave to amend. 

Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  June 2, 2025                                                           ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court