Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV05941, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV05941 Hearing Date: June 9, 2025 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
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DEPARTMENT |
207 |
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HEARING DATE |
June 9, 2025 |
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CASE NUMBER |
24SMCV05941 |
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MATTER |
Request for Default Judgment |
Plaintiff Shelli Jarrett, Trustee
of the Cordelia Belle Grischow Exempt and Non-Exempt Trust Dated October 27,
1986 aka C. Belle Grischow Trust Dated October 27, 1986 Molly M. Murphy
(“Plaintiff”) requests for default judgment against Defendants PFN
Distribution, Inc. and Jayan Partow (“Defendants”) in the amount
of $64,699.20, which is composed of past due rent in the amount of $55,950; costs
in the amount of $887.95; and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,861.25.
A.
Damages
Plaintiff filed the verified complaint for unlawful
detainer against Defendants and Does 1-50 on November 26, 2024, seeking $55,590
in unpaid rent. Defendants were served
with a copy of the summons and complaint by substitute service on December 14,
2024. Default was entered against
Defendants on January 30, 2025, and the Doe defendants were dismissed on
February 19, 2025.
Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks
$64,673.00 in general damages. (See Compl.) Therefore, Plaintiff does not seek
damages that are in excess of what is pled in the Complaint. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 580, subd. (a) [“The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no
answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint”]; Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136-1137 [“when
recovering damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the
damages specified in the complaint”].)
In support
of the request, Plaintiff has provided the Declaration of Dave Torres, attached
to which is a copy of the Lease and Guaranty, and the November 19, 2024 Notice
to Pay Rent or Quit that demanded $55,950.
Therefore,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to the requested
$55,950 in damages regarding past due rent.
B.
Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs
Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, which outlines recoverable costs
to a prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, permits the
recovery of attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd.
(a)(10).) Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021 provides “[e]xcept as attorney’s fees are specifically provided
for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties
[….]” Similarly, Civil Code section 1717
provides “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically
provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that
contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing
party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the
contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not,
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other
costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)
The Code of Civil Procedure defines
the “prevailing party” as follows:
[T]he party with a net monetary
recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where
neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against
those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any
party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as
specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court, and
under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not
and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse
sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) Section 31 of the Lease provides:
31. Attorneys’ Fees. If any Party or Broker brings an action or
proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in tort, contract or equity,
or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) in
any such proceeding, action or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’
fees. Such fees may be awarded in the same suit or recovered in a separate
suit, whether or not such action or proceeding is pursued to decision or
judgment. The term, "Prevailing Party" shall include, without limitation
a Party or Broker who substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought, as
the case may be, whether by compromise, settlement, judgment, or the
abandonment by the other Party or Broker of its claim or defense. The attorneys’ fees award shall not be
computed in accordance with any court fee schedule, but shall be such as to
fully reimburse all attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred. In addition, Lessor shall be entitled to attorneys’
fees, costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and service of notices of
Default and consultations in connection therewith, whether or not a legal
action is subsequently commenced in connection with such Default or resulting
Breach ($200 is a reasonable minimum per occurrence for such services and
consultation).
(Exhibit 1 to Torres Decl.)
Plaintiff seeks
$7,861.25 in attorneys’ fees, representing 4.75 hours of attorney Scott R.
Laes’ time at the 2024 rate of $695 per hour and 4 hours of time at the 2025
rate of $750 per hour and 3.25 hours of associate Amber Miller’s time at a rate
of $480 per hour.
Plaintiff’s
request for attorneys’ fees is granted.
Plaintiff also requests $887.95 in costs composed of $608.45 in filing fees and $279.50 in process server fees. (CIV-100.) Plaintiff’s request for costs is
granted as Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. (Code Civ. Proc., §
1032, subd. (a)(4).)
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s request for default judgment is granted. The Court will enter the proposed Default
Judgment as proposed, except for holdover damages as that was not requested as
part of the Request for Entry of Default Judgment filed on February 10,
2025.
DATED: June 9, 2025 ________________________________
Michael
E. Whitaker
Judge
of the Superior Court