Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 24SMCV06009, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV06009    Hearing Date: May 22, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS

This case arises from an automobile collision. 

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff Shahnaz Fazelina (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, City of Santa Monica (“Defendant” or “City”), County of Los Angeles, State of California, California Department of Transportation, and John Doe, alleging two causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence and (2) general negligence.  Plaintiff subsequently dismissed Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Authority, State of California, California Department of Transportation, and County of Los Angeles.

City now demurs to the first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and uncertainty pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), respectively.  City also moves to strike various allegations regarding Plaintiff’s second cause of action. 

Plaintiff opposes both motions and City replies.

ANALYSIS

1.     DEMURRER

“It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.”  (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  In testing the sufficiency of a cause of action, a court accepts “[a]s true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed but disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [A court also gives] the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.”  (290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City & County of San Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 450 [cleaned up]; Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“in considering the merits of a demurrer, however, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

Further, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must “liberally construe” the allegations of the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.”  (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)  

In summary, “[d]etermining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the rule is that if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated, or may be intermingled with a statement of other facts irrelevant to the cause of action shown, or although the plaintiff may demand relief to which he is not entitled under the facts alleged.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

A.    UNCERTAINTY

“[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored.”  (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)  A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond - i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers.  (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) 

Although the City brings the demurrer in part on the ground of uncertainty, the City does not demonstrate that any portions of the Complaint are so bad that the City cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied or what claims are directed against it. 

The Court thus declines to sustain the City’s demurrer on uncertainty. 

B.    FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

                                                         i.          First Cause of Action – Motor Vehicle Negligence

Government Code section 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute.  (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a); see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.)  “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.”  (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)

The first cause of action does not cite to any authorizing statute.  In opposition, Plaintiff argues that although Government Code Section 815.2 and Vehicle Code Section 17001 are listed only in connection with the second cause of action; Plaintiff brings both causes of action pursuant to those statutes.

In reply, the City points out that both causes of action are structured to allege statutory liability, which is proper, and common law negligence, which is improper as to a governmental entity, like the City.

Because the first cause of action, as currently alleged, does not state an authorizing statute, the Court sustains the City’s demurrer to the first cause of action.

2.     MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) 

The City moves to strike allegations pertaining to common law negligence, which is not allowed against a governmental entity like the City, as contrasted with the statutory grounds for negligence, which are allowed.

Plaintiff alleges in connection with the second cause of action that “This claim is brought pursuant to Government Code Section 815.2; Vehicle Code Section 17001” and clarifies that pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17001, “a public entity is liable for death or injury to person or property proximately caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of his/her employment.”

Thus, in context, Plaintiff’s common law negligence allegations are proper, because Plaintiff alleges John Doe, City’s employee, negligently operated the motor vehicle, causing Plaintiff’s injuries.

Therefore, the Court denies City’s motion to strike.

3.     LEAVE TO AMEND

A plaintiff has the burden of showing in what manner the complaint could be amended and how the amendment would change the legal effect of the complaint, i.e., state a cause of action. (See The Inland Oversight Committee v. City of San Bernardino (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 771, 779; PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 189.) A plaintiff must not only state the legal basis for the amendment, but also the factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action or claim. (See PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Int'l, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.) Moreover, a plaintiff does not meet his or her burden by merely stating in the opposition to a demurrer or motion to strike that “if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.” (See Major Clients Agency v Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133; Graham v. Bank of America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618 [asserting an abstract right to amend does not satisfy the burden].)

Here, Plaintiff specifies that the deficiencies in the first cause of action can be remedied by adding references to Government Code section 815.2 and Vehicle Code section 17001.  Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, the Court sustains City’s demurrer to the first cause of action with leave to amend, but denies City’s motion to strike.

Plaintiff shall file and serve an amended complaint in accordance with this order on or before June 12, 2025. 

City shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  May 22, 2025                                                         ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court