Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 25SMCP00007, Date: 2025-03-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25SMCP00007    Hearing Date: March 3, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING- NO. 1

MOTION

This case stems from allegations that Defendants The Regents of the University of California (“UC Regents”) and Thomas Whalen (“Whalen”) (together, “Defendants”) improperly terminated Plaintiff Antonio Escobar, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) from his Pediatric Cardiology fellowship program at the University of California at Los Angeles (“UCLA”) pursuant to a petition that was filed against Plaintiff in Juvenile Court that was subsequently sealed and dismissed. 

Plaintiff now seeks a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from rendering a final decision regarding Plaintiff’s employment and ordering the status quo be preserved until the merits of Plaintiff’s first cause of action (alleging violations of Labor Code section 432.7) are adjudicated.

UC Regents oppose the motion and Plaintiff replies. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (a), “[a] preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (a).) “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial.” (Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.) Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. (See, e.g., ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016; Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150.)

The trial court considers two factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a); Husain v. McDonald’s Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-867 (hereafter Husain).) The balancing of harm between the parties “involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo.” (Husain, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 867.)

“The decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . before the trial court can exercise its discretion the applicant must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to injunctive relief. The applicant must demonstrate a real threat of immediate and irreparable injury.” (Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of Cal. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 138.) “[A]n injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff,” and the party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden to prove its absence. (Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1564-1565.)

ANALYSIS

            “The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits.”  (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.)

1.     REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

A preliminary injunction may not issue unless it is “reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442; see Costa Mesa City Employees’ Association v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 309 [no injunction may issue unless there is at least “some possibility” of success].)

Plaintiff alleges:

9. Plaintiff was hired to join the UCLA Pediatric Cardiology fellowship program on July 8, 2019. This employment position was for a period of at least three years of work and training.

10. In late 2020 Plaintiff was arrested and subsequently placed on an investigatory leave from his employment. In 2022 a Petition was filed against Plaintiff in the Los Angeles Juvenile Court.

11. Plaintiff’s juvenile case was dismissed and sealed on February 8, 2024, as confirmed by court orders.

12. Upon the dismissal Plaintiff notified Defendant of his intent to resume his employment.

13. Labor Code § 432.7 prohibits employers, including healthcare facilities, from inquiring about, using, or disclosing juvenile records that did not lead to a conviction for any employment decision.

14. Plaintiff informed Defendant during a February 14, 2024 meeting, that his case was dismissed and sealed. Defendant nevertheless used this information unlawfully in its employment decision.

15. Despite the clear protections under the law, Defendant UCLA unlawfully requested and used sealed juvenile court records to justify Plaintiff’s dismissal.

16. Defendant Thomas Whalen, a UCLA compliance officer, knowingly accessed and disclosed Plaintiff’s sealed juvenile records in violation of Labor Code § 432.7(g).

17. Based on Defendants’ review of the sealed juvenile records, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

18. Defendant’s actions led to Plaintiff’s wrongful termination, citing participation in sexual boundaries sessions that were part of the dismissed and sealed juvenile case.

19. Plaintiff was given the right to appeal to Defendant the decision to terminate his employment. However, Defendant upheld the Decision to terminate.

(Complaint ¶¶ 9-19.)  Labor Code section 432.7, subdivision (a) provides:

(1) An employer, whether a public agency or private individual or corporation, shall not ask an applicant for employment to disclose, through any written form or verbally, information concerning an arrest or detention that did not result in conviction, or information concerning a referral to, and participation in, any pretrial or posttrial diversion program, or concerning a conviction that has been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed pursuant to law, including, but not limited to, Sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.425, 1203.45, and 1210.1 of the Penal Code. An employer also shall not seek from any source whatsoever, or utilize, as a factor in determining any condition of employment including hiring, promotion, termination, or any apprenticeship training program or any other training program leading to employment, any record of arrest or detention that did not result in conviction, or any record regarding a referral to, and participation in, any pretrial or posttrial diversion program, or concerning a conviction that has been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed pursuant to law, including, but not limited to, Sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.425, 1203.45, and 1210.1 of the Penal Code. This section shall not prevent an employer from asking an employee or applicant for employment about an arrest for which the employee or applicant is out on bail or on their own recognizance pending trial.

(2) An employer, whether a public agency or private individual or corporation, shall not ask an applicant for employment to disclose, through any written form or verbally, information concerning or related to an arrest, detention, processing, diversion, supervision, adjudication, or court disposition that occurred while the person was subject to the process and jurisdiction of the juvenile court. An employer also shall not seek from any source whatsoever, or utilize, as a factor in determining any condition of employment including hiring, promotion, termination, or any apprenticeship training program or any other training program leading to employment, any record concerning or related to an arrest, detention, processing, diversion, supervision, adjudication, or court disposition that occurred while a person was subject to the process and jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

            Here, Plaintiff has provided evidence that on February 22, 2024, Thomas Whalen of UCLA requested Plaintiff send him “the court disposition documents” from his juvenile court matter.  Plaintiff sent him the documents, dated February 29, 2024, which ordered the case records sealed, on March 18, 2024.  (Ex. B to Escobar Decl.) 

            Subsequently, on July 5, 2024, John C. Mazziotta, M.D. and Steven M. Dubinett, M.D. of UCLA sent Plaintiff a letter terminating his employment with the pediatric fellowship program on the grounds that “your conduct [as alleged in the juvenile complaint] warrants dismissal.”  (Ex. C to Escobar Decl.) 

            Plaintiff subsequently appealed that decision, which the Ad Hoc Committee issued a decision to deny on the grounds that Plaintiff volunteered the information about his participation in the sexual boundaries sessions at an investigatory meeting on February 14, 2024.  (Ex. D to Escobar Decl.)

            Thus, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits that The UC Regents improperly sought, and utilized in its decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, sealed juvenile court records in violation of Labor Code section 432.7, subdivision (a).

2.     IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE HARM

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 526, an injunction may be granted “[w]hen it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(2).) The threat of irreparable harm must be imminent as opposed to a mere possibility of harm sometime in the future. “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) Plaintiffs need not wait until they have suffered actual harm before applying for an injunction, however, they may seek injunctive relief against threatened infringement of their rights. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292.)

Moreover, an injunction may be granted only “[w]hen pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 526, subd. (a)(4).)  “Specific performance of a contract will not be compelled when an adequate remedy exists at law, and if monetary damages afford adequate relief and are not extremely difficult to ascertain, an injunction cannot be granted.”  (Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 306.)

Plaintiff contends he will suffer immediate and irreparable harm in the form of (1) lost wages, (2) further emotional distress, and (3) reputational harm. 

UC Regents argues in opposition that the request is moot, as it already terminated Plaintiff effective February 14, 2025, and in any event, Plaintiff has sufficient legal and equitable remedies available under the law.

The Court agrees with UC Regents.  As a threshold matter, lost wages is mere pecuniary compensation, precluding injunctive relief.  Regarding further emotional distress and reputational harm, while the Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s termination is distressing, particularly if it turns out that that termination turns out to be wrongful, Plaintiff has already been terminated.

At this point, the Court does not see any appreciable difference, and Plaintiff has not provided any evidence or case law demonstrating otherwise, compelling the Court to issue an injunction requiring the UC Regents to reinstate Plaintiff and place him on administrative leave again during the pendency of this litigation. 

Should Plaintiff ultimately prevail, Plaintiff may be entitled to an injunction reinstating him in the fellowship program, but Plaintiff has not demonstrated any immediate and irreparable harm requiring that his employment and administrative leave status be reinstated during the pendency of the litigation.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, having found no showing of immediate or irreparable harm, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 

Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. 

DATED:  March 3, 2025                                                        ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court

TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 2

MOTION

This case stems from allegations that Defendants The Regents of the University of California (“UC Regents”) and Thomas Whalen (“Whalen”) (together, “Defendants”) improperly terminated Plaintiff Antonio Escobar, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) from his Pediatric Cardiology fellowship program at the University of California at Los Angeles pursuant to a petition that was filed against Plaintiff in Juvenile Court that was subsequently sealed and dismissed. 

Plaintiff has moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from rendering a final decision regarding Plaintiff’s employment and ordering the status quo be preserved until the merits of Plaintiff’s first cause of action (alleging violations of Labor Code section 432.7) are adjudicated.

In connection with Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff has lodged unredacted versions of the memorandum of points and authorities and accompanying evidence conditionally under seal, and moved for an order sealing those records.

UC Regents opposes the motion to seal and Plaintiff replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

            Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to the public, pursuant to a potent “open court” policy undergirded by the First Amendment and favoring the public nature of court proceedings.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c); see¿NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court¿(1999)¿20 Cal.4th 1178, 1199-10.)¿ Consequently, pleadings, motions, discovery documents, and other papers may not be filed under seal merely by stipulation of the parties; filing under seal requires a court order.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a); see¿H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe¿(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 888.)¿

A sealing order must be sought by means of a motion (or application) and accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities, as well as evidence and testimony containing facts sufficient to justify the mandatory findings required to support a sealing order.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.550(d) & 2.551(b).)¿ The proponent of the sealing order must also conditionally lodge the¿unredacted¿matter to be sealed with the court.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(4).)¿

To grant a motion to seal, a trial court must expressly find that: (1) an overriding interest exists that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the records; (3) a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) no¿less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550 (d).) “If the trial court fails to make the required findings, the order is deficient and cannot support sealing.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th  471, 487; see also In re Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1087 [“express findings must be made to seal records”].)

DISCUSSION

This case is premised on the following allegations:

9. Plaintiff was hired to join the UCLA Pediatric Cardiology fellowship program on July 8, 2019. This employment position was for a period of at least three years of work and training.

10. In late 2020 Plaintiff was arrested and subsequently placed on an investigatory leave from his employment. In 2022 a Petition was filed against Plaintiff in the Los Angeles Juvenile Court.

11. Plaintiff’s juvenile case was dismissed and sealed on February 8, 2024, as confirmed by court orders.

12. Upon the dismissal Plaintiff notified Defendant of his intent to resume his employment.

13. Labor Code § 432.7 prohibits employers, including healthcare facilities, from inquiring about, using, or disclosing juvenile records that did not lead to a conviction for any employment decision.

14. Plaintiff informed Defendant during a February 14, 2024 meeting, that his case was dismissed and sealed. Defendant nevertheless used this information unlawfully in its employment decision.

15. Despite the clear protections under the law, Defendant UCLA unlawfully requested and used sealed juvenile court records to justify Plaintiff’s dismissal.

16. Defendant Thomas Whalen, a UCLA compliance officer, knowingly accessed and disclosed Plaintiff’s sealed juvenile records in violation of Labor Code § 432.7(g).

17. Based on Defendants’ review of the sealed juvenile records, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

18. Defendant’s actions led to Plaintiff’s wrongful termination, citing participation in sexual boundaries sessions that were part of the dismissed and sealed juvenile case.

19. Plaintiff was given the right to appeal to Defendant the decision to terminate his employment. However, Defendant upheld the Decision to terminate.

(Complaint ¶¶ 9-19.)

            Plaintiff seeks to seal portions of his motion for preliminary injunction and supporting evidence on the grounds that they reference the sealed juvenile records and their disclosure would violate the juvenile court’s sealing order.  Importantly, Plaintiff does not seek to seal the records based on any privacy interest.  (Reply at p. 2:24-3:3.)

            UC Regents oppose on the grounds that (1) this Court already denied Plaintiff’s ex parte application to seal; (2) although Dr. Escobar seeks to seal Exhibits A through E to Dr. Escobar’s declaration filed in support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on the grounds that they “contain, incorporate, and reference information connected to” the sealed juvenile court records, the juvenile court’s sealing order applies only to records in that case, not of other facts disclosed by Dr. Escobar relating to that case; and (3) Dr. Escobar filed a substantially identical ex parte application for a preliminary injunction and supporting declaration that did not contain any redactions.

            Plaintiff seeks to redact virtually the entirety of his motion for preliminary injunction, including the recitation of basic facts that were included in the publicly-filed Complaint, as well as the section reciting the “Legal Standard for a Preliminary Injunction.”  Thus, at a minimum, Plaintiff’s request is extraordinarily overbroad and unquestionably not narrowly tailored.

            Indeed, upon review of the motion for preliminary injunction, the Court does not find that any portion of it contains information that is not already publicly available in the Complaint itself.

            Similarly, the Court finds nothing in the Escobar Declaration itself that reveals any information beyond that alleged in the publicly-filed Complaint in this matter.

With regard to the Exhibits, however, the Court agrees that portions of Exhibit B, specifically the “Dismissal and Sealing of Records-Welfare and Institutions Code Section 786” and the February 8, 2024 Minute Order from the now-sealed juvenile case contain additional information about the original Penal Code under which Plaintiff was charged, as well as specifics about how many “sexual boundaries sessions” alleged in Paragraph 18 of the Complaint Plaintiff attended. 

Similarly, portions of Exhibit C, specifically the letter from UCLA to Plaintiff, contains this information.  The UCLA GME Academic Due Process Policy, however, does not contain any information from the juvenile matter.

Similarly, portions of Exhibit D, the “Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee” also contain the same information from the juvenile case identified in Exhibits B and C.

As for Exhibit E, Plaintiff’s letter appealing the Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, other than referencing the specific number of sexual boundaries sessions Plaintiff attended, it does not contain any other information not already publicly available in Plaintiff’s complaint.

Further, as UC Regents points out, these documents are already part of the public record by virtue of Plaintiff’s prior failed attempt to seal them.

Moreover, while the juvenile court’s order to seal the records applies to court records in that case, it does not necessarily apply to Plaintiff’s voluntary public disclosure of the facts in this case.

As such, the Court does not find that the juvenile court’s order sealing its case records creates any overriding interest to seal Plaintiff’s voluntary disclosure of and reference to the underlying facts of that case in a separate forum.  Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated prejudice, as these facts are already substantially publicly available, by virtue of the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint in this matter. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Therefore, having found no overriding interest that supports the request to seal and no prejudice, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to seal in its entirety.  The unredacted versions of the documents shall be publicly filed on the Court’s docket. 

            Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.

DATED:  March 3, 2025                                ___________________________

                                                                  Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                  Judge of the Superior Court