Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 25SMCP00028, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25SMCP00028    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

207

HEARING DATE

March 5, 2025

CASE NUMBER

25SMCP00028

MOTION

Petition to Compel Arbitration

MOVING PARTY

Petitioner Saeedian Law Group

OPPOSING PARTIES

Respondents SoCal Injury Lawyers and Hussein Chahine

 

MOTION

 

This case arises from a fee dispute between two law firms.  Petitioner Saeedian Law Group (“Petitioner”) seeks to compel Respondents SoCal Injury Lawyers and Hussein Chahine (“Respondents”) to arbitration.  Respondents oppose the petition and Petitioner replies. 

 

ANALYSIS

 

1.     MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION – LEGAL STANDARDS

 

            “[T]he advantages of arbitration include a presumptively less costly, more expeditious manner of resolving disputes.  It follows a party to a valid arbitration agreement has a contractual right to have its dispute with another party to the contract resolved quickly and inexpensively.”  (Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 94, 99–100 [cleaned up].)  Thus, “on petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see also

EFund Capital Partners v. Pless (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1320 [the language in section 1281.2 compelling arbitration is mandatory].) The right to compel arbitration exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subds. (a)-(c).)   

 

            “On a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court must first determine whether an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.  Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.  The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent's signature.”  (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544 [cleaned up].)  The party seeking to compel arbitration must also “plead and prove a prior demand for arbitration and a refusal to arbitrate under the agreement.”  (Mansouri v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 633, 640-641.) 

 

            And while the moving party on a motion to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, [a] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.  The trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.”  (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 [cleaned up]; see also Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [“The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability”].) 

 

2.     ENFORCEABLE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

 

Petitioner seeks to compel Respondents to arbitration, not pursuant to an arbitration agreement, but rather, pursuant to Business & Professions Code sections 6200 et seq. and Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 authorizes the Court to compel arbitration when a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.  As Petitioner concedes, no such agreement exists here.

 

Respondents argue in opposition that Business and Professions Code sections 6200 et seq. was designed to apply to fee disputes between an attorney and client.  (See section 6200, subd. (c) [“arbitration under this article shall be voluntary for a client and shall be mandatory for an attorney if commenced by a client.”)

 

As explained in the State Bar Rules, “If initiated by a client, fee arbitration is mandatory for an attorney.”  (State Bar Rule 3.501 [citing Bus. & Prof. Code § 6201.])  However, the rule does not apply to “claims between attorneys for division of fees.”  (State Bar Rule 3.503(F) [citing Bus. & Prof. Code § 6200, subd. (b)(1).]) 

 

CONCLUSION

 

            Therefore, finding no enforceable arbitration agreement or statutory basis to compel Respondents to arbitrate their dispute concerning the division of attorneys’ fees between the law firms, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration.

 

            Petitioner shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of the same.

 

 

DATED:  March 5, 2025                                                        ___________________________

                                                                                          Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court