Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: 25STCV02387, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV02387    Hearing Date: June 4, 2025    Dept: 207

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Victor Neal (“Plaintiff”) filed a previous Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) class action lawsuit in San Diego County captioned Victor Neal v. Del Frisco’s of California, LLC, Case No. 37-2024-00030549-CU-OE-CTL.  In that case, Defendant Del Frisco’s of California, LLC (“Defendant”) filed a motion to compel the individual claims to Arbitration and to dismiss the action, which was apparently denied and is currently on appeal.[1] 

On January 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant PAGA representative action.  Defendant now moves to stay this action pending the outcome of the San Diego class action.  Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendant replies.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Defendant requests judicial notice of the following:

1. The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) notice letter filed with the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and served on Defendant by Plaintiff Victor Neal (“Plaintiff”) dated June 20, 2024. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s PAGA notice letter to the LWDA dated June 20, 2024 is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

2. The Order Granting Defendant Marriott International, Inc.’s Motion to Stay Action on Grounds of Another Similar Action Pending in Los Angeles County Superior Court, dated October 1, 2024 in the action captioned Brenda Mendoza v. Marriott International, Inc., (Case No. 24STCV06964), a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

3. The Minute Order on Defendant’s Motion for Stay in Santa Clara County Superior Court, dated April 23, 2025 in the action captioned Rodel Eugenio v. Marriott Hotel Services, LLC, (Case No. 24CV442763), a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

4. The Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Stay in Riverside County Superior Court, dated September 4, 2024 in the action captioned Bailey v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, (Case No. CVRI2400595), a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D.

5. The Minute Order on Defendant’s Motion for Stay of Proceedings in Los Angeles County Superior Court, dated April 17, 2023 in the action captioned Trevor Johnson v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., (Case No. 22STCV37775), a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

            Regarding Exhibits B-E, Judicial notice may be taken of records of any court in this state.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)  However, “while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files.  Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof.”  (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [cleaned up].)  Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence, filing, and legal consequences of the court records above, but not the truth of the allegations contained therein.

Concerning Exhibit A, Official notices, statements, and certificates made by a government agency are properly the subject of judicial notice as documents reflecting official acts of the executive department of the United States or a state of the United States, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c).  (See generally Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1483–1484.)  However, “materials prepared by private parties and merely on file with the state [or federal] agencies” may not generally be judicially noticed as an official act of a legislative, executive, or judicial department of the United States or any state of the United States.  (People v. Thacker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 594, 598.)

Notwithstanding, Defendant cites to an unpublished federal district court case where the court took judicial notice of PAGA notice letters to evaluate a motion to dismiss because the PAGA claim depends on the sufficiency of the letter’s content and Plaintiffs did not dispute its authenticity.  (Ovieda v. Sodexo (C.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2013) No. CV 12-1750-GHK (SSx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99293, at *4.)  Although Ovieda is not binding on this Court, the Court finds the reasoning behind taking judicial notice of the PAGA notice letters to be persuasive.  Similarly, here, Plaintiff does not oppose or otherwise dispute the authenticity of Exhibit A.  Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of the filing, contents, and legal consequences of Exhibit A, but not the truth of the statements contained therein.

ANALYSIS

The court has inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency. (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.)  Trial judges have inherent powers to manage and fashion procedures to control litigation to ensure the orderly administration of justice. (Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-1379.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion to stay on the grounds that the earlier filed action is a wage and hour class action, whereas the instant action seeks to recover civil penalties pursuant to PAGA, and is therefore distinct from the earlier filed class action.  In support, Plaintiff cites to Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, which held that a plaintiff in a PAGA representative suit need not satisfy the class action requirements.  The appellate court did not address the issue of whether a stay is appropriate.  Plaintiff also cites to various other cases which stand for the general proposition that an action to recover unpaid wages is separate and distinct from a PAGA representative action, but does not address whether a stay is appropriate.

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s request is inconsistent because Defendant did not first seek to consolidate the two actions and Defendant moved to compel arbitration of the individual claims in the San Diego action.  But Plaintiff does not cite to any authority that consolidation is required before a stay can issue. And Plaintiff does not adequately explain  Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims in the San Diego action, or the subsequent appeal of the order denying that motion, are inconsistent with Defendant’s request to stay this action pending the outcome of the earlier-filed case, which Plaintiff concedes will “involve the same parties and similar alleged violations of the Labor Code.”  (Opp. at p. 1.)

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to stay this action and stays this action pending the outcome of the San Diego action and/or arbitration.   

            Further, the Court vacates the Case Management Conference and sets a Status Conference re Stay of Action on January 28, 2026 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207.  The parties shall meet and confer, and file a Joint Status Report no later than 5 court days, addressing the status of the San Diego action and whether the stay of this action may be vacated.         

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s order and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.   

DATED: June 4, 2025                                                                        ___________________________

Michael E. Whitaker

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court