Judge: Michael E. Whitaker, Case: BC703002, Date: 2022-08-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC703002 Hearing Date: August 19, 2022 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
NOTE: 2 TENTATIVE RULINGS BELOW
TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 1
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DEPARTMENT |
32 |
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HEARING DATE |
August 19, 2022 |
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CASE NUMBER |
BC703002 |
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MOTION |
Motion for Summary Judgment |
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Defendant Universal Studios LLC dba Universal CityWalk Hollywood | |
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OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff Gerardo Gonzalez Felix |
MOVING PAPERS:
OPPOSITION PAPERS:
REPLY PAPERS:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gerardo Gonzalez Felix sued defendant Universal Studios LLC dba Universal CityWalk Hollywood (“Universal”) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges he sustained in a series of two physical altercations with defendant Anthony Michael Carter (“Carter”). Plaintiff alleges the first altercation occurred on property controlled by defendant REA-2003-1, LLC (“Saddle Ranch”), and the second on property controlled by Universal. (Complaint, p. 5.) Plaintiff therefore alleges Universal failed to provide appropriate security measures and maintain the premises in a safe manner for patrons. (Ibid.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Universal for premises liability and general negligence. Universal moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)
EVIDENCE
With respect to Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections raised in Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections to Universal’s evidence do not comply with the requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.
Objections to evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment must “be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: [i]dentify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located [and] [q]uote or set forth the objectionable statement or material…” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, subd. (b).)
Although the objections are procedurally defective, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections.
DISCUSSION
The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability, Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)
Liability in a premises liability action is based not on responsibility for the conduct of others, but on the failure of the landowner or occupier to act reasonably under the circumstances when he or she has reason to anticipate the probability of injury and has an opportunity to prevent the injury or warn of the peril (Cody F. v. Falleti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1242, see Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [a landowner’s duty to take steps to prevent the wrongful acts of a third party is imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated].) Accordingly, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner either (1) allowed a dangerous condition on its property or (2) failed to take reasonable steps to secure its property against criminal acts by third parties. (Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.)
Stated differently, because a property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability. (Hall v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-1140; Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 [“to impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to a defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises”] [cleaned up].)
Here, Universal argues that Plaintiff cannot establish (1) that the second incident was foreseeable such that Universal owed Plaintiff a duty of care and (2) that an act or omission by Universal was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.
“A proprietor’s general duty of maintenance, which is owed to tenants and patrons, includes the duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 236 [cleaned up].) “Duty in such circumstances is determined by a balancing of foreseeability of the criminal acts against the burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy of the proposed security measures.” (Id. at p. 238.) Due to the high social costs of imposing a duty on landowners to hire private police forces, “a high degree of foreseeability is required in order to find that the scope of a landlord’s duty of care includes the hiring of security guards.” (Ibid.) This “requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises.” (Ibid; see also Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1149-1150 [finding a heightened standard necessary due to the difficulty or impossibility of predicting when a criminal will strike, and the difficulty of removing all means available to a criminal intent on a particular victim or goal].)
With respect to causation, a defendant’s negligence is the actual cause of a plaintiff’s injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. (Mitchell v. Gonzalez (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1041, 1052.) Where a defendant has a duty to protect persons from being harmed by the foreseeable criminal conduct of others, the third party conduct is not considered a superseding cause of the harm. (Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777.) Thus, in this case, the key issue is whether the second incident was foreseeable.
Universal advances the declaration of Alfonso Cortez (“Cortez”), who is the senior security manager for Universal. Cortez states that at the time of the incident, Universal retained the services of third-party security company, Securitas USA (“Securitas”), to provide unarmed, uniformed security guards to patrol the common areas of the premises 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 7.) Cortez states that, at that time, fourteen Securitas security guards were assigned to patrol the premises, a security guard was assigned to each of the five parking structures on the property, two mobile vehicle units patrolled the property, and one supervisor patrolled the property. (Ibid.) Cortez states that Securitas security guards were assigned to a parking lot approximately 100 feet from the incident location as well as the valet parking lot, approximately 50 feet from the incident location. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 9.)
According to Cortez, the fourteen security guards assigned to patrol the premises composed a Crime Suppression Unit (“CSU”), which is a team of selected security personnel that receives beyond basic training in the areas of public relations/tactical communication, courtroom testimony, and handcuffing and weaponless defense. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 8.) Cortez states CSU’s primary mission is to stop criminal activity before it happens and to provide a safe atmosphere throughout the premises for Universal’s patrons. (Ibid.) Cortez states that CSU enforces the Code of Conduct established by Universal’s management to deter inappropriate behavior and criminal activities in conjunction with law enforcement personnel on the premises. (Ibid.)
Cortez states that at the time of the subject incident, during peak hours from Friday through Sunday from 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m., in addition to the Securitas security guards assigned to the premises, Securitas retained a team of six armed, off-duty law enforcement officers, commonly referred to as “Blue Coats,” to serve as a second layer of security personnel to patrol the common areas of the premises, respond to security calls, and assist Securitas security guards when needed. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 10.)
Cortez states that at the time of the incident, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department ( “LASD”) had a substation located at the premises with deputies assigned to monitor Universal’s security radio calls and respond to security incidents when any criminal activity was underway; when called by patrons, Securitas or the Blue Coats; or when the deputies, at their discretion, deemed their presence helpful or necessary. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 11.) Cortez avers that, as a result of the second incident involving Plaintiff, Securitas security guards, Blue Coats, LASD and emergency medical personnel from both Los Angeles County Fire Department and Universal all responded to the UHD turnaround within minutes of reports of this physical altercation. Plaintiff was examined by Los Angeles County Fire medical personnel and LASD deputies released the uninjured party only after all parties indicated that they did not wish to press charges. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 12.)
According to Cortez, prior to and at the time of the Subject Incidents, LASD deputies assigned to the premises, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were all in possession of and utilized Universal security radios. The use of a shared radio system allowed LASD deputies, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats to remain in constant communication with each other and allowed for each of the three security entities to monitor the activity of the other entities and quickly aid when needed. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 13.) Cortez states that, prior to and at the time of the incident, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were trained and required to report all incidents that arise while patrolling the premises, including any criminal activity, to Universal security personnel. Once received, Universal security personnel and Blue Coats were trained and required to input any and all information pertaining to reported incidents into a database maintained by Universal. In addition, due to the use of a shared radio system, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were made aware of every incident that LASD deputies responded to at the premises. Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were trained and required to input any and all information pertaining to LASD reported incidents into this same database maintained by Universal. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 14.)
Finally, Cortez avers that he searched and reviewed Universal’s incident reporting database for all physical altercations occurring at or near the incident area that involved patrons of Saddle Ranch Chop House, dating back to January 2013, the first available date of archived records retained by Universal. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 15.) Cortez states that his search of Universal's database revealed two prior incidents, neither of which involved individuals from Saddle Ranch occurring at the incident area, and both were resolved and dispelled of in short order. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶¶ 16-17.)
Universal also advances a copy of the transcript of Plaintiff’s deposition taken April 8, 2022. At deposition, Plaintiff testified that of the between 10 and 25 times he had been to Saddle Ranch prior to the incident, he had never encountered issues with either the security personnel of either Universal or Saddle Ranch. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, pp. 28, 30-31.) Plaintiff testified that the second altercation occurred within about five minutes of the time he was removed from Saddle Ranch. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, pp. 32-33.) Plaintiff testified that after being detained by Saddle Ranch security after the first incident, he informed Saddle Ranch security that he intended to leave the premises to go home, and pointed in the direction of the rideshare drop-off area outside of the Saddle Ranch premises – which was the location of the second incident. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, pp. 45-46.) Plaintiff testified that he never spoke to Universal’s security personnel after the first incident and before the second incident. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, p. 48.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that, while he was speaking with Saddle Ranch security, he did not see another group of people being removed from Saddle Ranch or speaking to Saddle Ranch security guards, nor did he see the individuals who attacked him in the first incident outside the entrance of Saddle Ranch prior to the second incident. (Ibid.)
Universal also advances the transcript of the February 4, 2020 deposition of Ashley Deleon (“Deleon”), who was one of the individuals with Plaintiff at the time of both incidents. At deposition, Deleon testified that after the first incident, Saddle Ranch security asked her and Plaintiff to leave the restaurant. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit D, pp. 17-18.) Deleon testified that Saddle Ranch security had detained her and Plaintiff for about five minutes prior to permitting them to leave the restaurant to allow the other parties involved in the initial altercation to exit first. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit D, pp. 34-35.) Deleon testified that she did not recall whether any other types of security, such as Sheriff’s deputies, came to the exit where they were detained while they were being held and before they were permitted to leave. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit D, p. 35.)
This evidence meets Universal’s burden to show the second incident was not foreseeable such that Universal owed Plaintiff a duty of care and that an act or omission by Universal was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. In particular, Universal’s evidence establishes it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the purported dangerous condition due to the lack of notice of the first incident and the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime in the incident area. Universal has shifted the burden to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the second incident was foreseeable.
In opposition, Plaintiff advances his own declaration. Plaintiff states that, after the first incident, he was asked to leave Saddle Ranch. (Declaration of Gerardo Gonzalez Felix, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff states that it was not until after the second incident that he became aware that neither security for Universal nor Saddle Ranch detained Carter. (Declaration of Gerardo Gonzalez Felix, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff avers that, when left Saddle Ranch after the first incident, he was under the impression that he would be safe when he went to the rideshare pickup area as that is where he had informed Saddle Ranch security he intended to go. (Declaration of Gerardo Gonzalez Felix, ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff does not advance any further evidence (other than relying on the deposition of Deleon noted above), but instead points to the evidence submitted by Universal in support of the motion. Plaintiff also proffers three additional material facts, which Universal does not dispute. Plaintiff’s declaration, the portions of Universal’s evidence upon which Plaintiff relies, and the three additional material facts do not, however, dispute Universal’s material facts in support of the motion to give rise to a triable issue of the foreseeability of the second incident. Plaintiff has thus failed to meet his burden to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
In considering the competent evidence proffered by Universal, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether second incident was foreseeable such that Universal owed Plaintiff a duty of care or that an act or omission by Universal was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm, and determines that Universal is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Therefore, the Court grants Universal’s motion for summary judgment. Universal is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling and to file a proof of service of the same.
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged). Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING - NO. 2
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DEPARTMENT |
32 |
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HEARING DATE |
August 19, 2022 |
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CASE NUMBER |
BC703002 |
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MOTION |
Motion for Summary Judgment |
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Defendant REA-2003-1, LLC | |
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OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff Gerardo Gonzalez Felix |
MOVING PAPERS:
OPPOSITION PAPERS:
REPLY PAPERS:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gerardo Gonzalez Felix sued defendant REA-2003-1, LLC (“REA”) based on injuries Plaintiff alleges he sustained in the second of two physical altercations with defendant Anthony Michael Carter (“Carter”). Plaintiff alleges the first altercation occurred in Saddle Ranch Chop House (“Saddle Ranch”), which is property controlled by REA, and the second outside of Saddle Ranch in common areas of property controlled by defendant Universal Studios LLC dba Universal CityWalk Hollywood (“Universal”). (Complaint, p. 5.) Plaintiff therefore alleges REA failed to provide appropriate security measures and maintain the area surrounding its premises in a safe manner for patrons. (Ibid.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against REA for premises liability and general negligence. REA moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)
EVIDENCE
With respect to Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections raised in Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections to REA’s evidence do not comply with the requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.
Objections to evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment must “be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement. Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: [i]dentify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located [and] [q]uote or set forth the objectionable statement or material…” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, subd. (b).)
Although the objections are procedurally defective, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections.
DISCUSSION
The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability, Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)
Liability in a premises liability action is based not on responsibility for the conduct of others, but on the failure of the landowner or occupier to act reasonably under the circumstances when he or she has reason to anticipate the probability of injury and has an opportunity to prevent the injury or warn of the peril (Cody F. v. Falleti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1242, see Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [a landowner’s duty to take steps to prevent the wrongful acts of a third party is imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated].) Accordingly, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner either (1) allowed a dangerous condition on its property or (2) failed to take reasonable steps to secure its property against criminal acts by third parties. (Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.)
Stated differently, because a property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability. (Hall v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-1140; Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 [“to impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to a defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises”] [cleaned up].)
Here, REA argues that Plaintiff cannot establish (1) that REA controlled the common area at Universal Hollywood Drive (“UHD”) where the second incident occurred such that it owed Plaintiff a duty of care, and (2) that an act or omission by REA was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.
Businesses such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars have an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to secure their premises, as well as adjacent common areas within their control, against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235.) “A proprietor’s general duty of maintenance, which is owed to tenants and patrons, includes the duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.” (Id. at p. 236 [cleaned up].) “Duty in such circumstances is determined by a balancing of foreseeability of the criminal acts against the burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy of the proposed security measures.” (Id. at p. 238.) Due to the high social costs of imposing a duty on landowners to hire private police forces, “a high degree of foreseeability is required in order to find that the scope of a landlord’s duty of care includes the hiring of security guards.” (Ibid.) This “requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises.” (Ibid; see also Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1149-1150 [finding a heightened standard necessary due to the difficulty or impossibility of predicting when a criminal will strike, and the difficulty of removing all means available to a criminal intent on a particular victim or goal].)
With respect to causation, a defendant’s negligence is the actual cause of a plaintiff’s injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. (Mitchell v. Gonzalez (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1041, 1052.) Where a defendant has a duty to protect persons from being harmed by the foreseeable criminal conduct of others, the third party conduct is not considered a superseding cause of the harm. (Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777.)
REA advances the declaration of Shane O’Neill (“O’Neill”), who is the manager for REA. O’Neill states that, as of the date of the incident, REA was the entity responsible for securing the lease agreement with Universal that was utilized by a separate entity to operate Saddle Ranch. (Declaration of Shane O’Neill, ¶ 3.) O’Neill states that by virtue of his duties as manager, he is aware of the premises for which REA was responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and managing on the date of the incident. (Declaration of Shane O’Neill, ¶ 4.) O’Neill states that, at the time of the incident, REA neither owned nor controlled the common areas around Saddle Ranch or the UHD, nor was REA responsible for the inspection, maintenance, or management of those locations. (Declaration of Shane O’Neill, ¶¶ 5-10.)
REA also advances a copy of the transcript of Plaintiff’s deposition taken April 8, 2022. At deposition, Plaintiff testified that of the between 10 and 25 times he had been to Saddle Ranch prior to the incident, he had never encountered issues with either the security personnel of either Universal or Saddle Ranch. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, pp. 28, 30-31.) Plaintiff testified that the second altercation occurred within about five minutes of the time he was removed from Saddle Ranch. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, pp. 32-33.) Plaintiff testified that after being detained by Saddle Ranch security after the first incident, he informed Saddle Ranch security that he intended to leave the premises to go home, and pointed in the direction of the UHD. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, pp. 45-46.) Plaintiff testified that he never spoke to Universal’s security personnel after the first incident and before the second incident. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit C, p. 48.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that, while he was speaking with Saddle Ranch security, he did not see another group of people being removed from Saddle Ranch or speaking to Saddle Ranch security guards, nor did he see the individuals who attacked him in the first incident outside the entrance of Saddle Ranch prior to the second incident. (Ibid.)
REA also advances the transcript of the February 4, 2020 deposition of Ashley Deleon (“Deleon”), who was one of the individuals with Plaintiff at the time of both incidents. At deposition, Deleon testified that after the first incident, Saddle Ranch security asked her and Plaintiff to leave the restaurant. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit D, pp. 17-18.) Deleon testified that Saddle Ranch security had detained her and Plaintiff for about five minutes prior to permitting them to leave the restaurant to allow the other parties involved in the initial altercation to exit first. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit D, pp. 34-35.) Deleon testified that she did not recall whether any other types of security, such as Sheriff’s deputies, came to the exit where they were detained while they were being held and before they were permitted to leave. (Index of Evidentiary Exhibits, Exhibit D, p. 35.)
REA also advances the declaration of Alfonso Cortez (“Cortez”), who is the senior security manager for Universal. Cortez states that at the time of the incident, Universal retained the services of third-party security company, Securitas USA (“Securitas”), to provide unarmed, uniformed security guards to patrol the common areas of the premises 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 7.) Cortez states that, at that time, fourteen Securitas security guards were assigned to patrol the premises, a security guard was assigned to each of the five parking structures on the property, two mobile vehicle units patrolled the property, and one supervisor patrolled the property. (Ibid.) Cortez states that Securitas security guards were assigned to a parking lot approximately 100 feet from the incident location as well as the valet parking lot, approximately 50 feet from the incident location. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 9.)
According to Cortez, the fourteen security guards assigned to patrol the premises composed a Crime Suppression Unit (“CSU”), which is a team of selected security personnel that receives beyond basic training in the areas of public relations/tactical communication, courtroom testimony, and handcuffing and weaponless defense. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 8.) Cortez states CSU’s primary mission is to stop criminal activity before it happens and to provide a safe atmosphere throughout the premises for Universal’s patrons. (Ibid.) Cortez states that CSU enforces the Code of Conduct established by Universal’s management to deter inappropriate behavior and criminal activities in conjunction with law enforcement personnel on the premises. (Ibid.)
Cortez states that at the time of the subject incident, during peak hours from Friday through Sunday from 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m., in addition to the Securitas security guards assigned to the premises, Securitas retained a team of six armed, off-duty law enforcement officers, commonly referred to as “Blue Coats,” to serve as a second layer of security personnel to patrol the common areas of the premises, respond to security calls, and assist Securitas security guards when needed. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 10.)
Cortez states that at the time of the incident, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department ( “LASD”) had a substation located at the premises with deputies assigned to monitor Universal’s security radio calls and respond to security incidents when any criminal activity was underway; when called by patrons, Securitas or the Blue Coats; or when the deputies, at their discretion, deemed their presence helpful or necessary. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 11.) Cortez avers that, as a result of the second incident involving Plaintiff, Securitas security guards, Blue Coats, LASD and emergency medical personnel from both Los Angeles County Fire Department and Universal all responded to the UHD turnaround within minutes of reports of this physical altercation. Plaintiff was examined by Los Angeles County Fire medical personnel and LASD deputies released the uninjured party only after all parties indicated that they did not wish to press charges. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 12.)
According to Cortez, prior to and at the time of the Subject Incidents, LASD deputies assigned to the premises, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were all in possession of and utilized Universal security radios. The use of a shared radio system allowed LASD deputies, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats to remain in constant communication with each other and allowed for each of the three security entities to monitor the activity of the other entities and quickly aid when needed. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 13.) Cortez states that, prior to and at the time of the incident, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were trained and required to report all incidents that arise while patrolling the premises, including any criminal activity, to Universal security personnel. Once received, Universal security personnel and Blue Coats were trained and required to input any and all information pertaining to reported incidents into a database maintained by Universal. In addition, due to the use of a shared radio system, Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were made aware of every incident that LASD deputies responded to at the premises. Securitas security guards and Blue Coats were trained and required to input any and all information pertaining to LASD reported incidents into this same database maintained by Universal. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 14.)
Finally, Cortez avers that he searched and reviewed Universal’s incident reporting database for all physical altercations occurring at or near the incident area that involved patrons of Saddle Ranch, dating back to January 2013, the first available date of archived records retained by Universal. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶ 15.) Cortez states that his search of Universal's database revealed two prior incidents, neither of which involved individuals from Saddle Ranch occurring at the incident area, and both were resolved and dispelled of in short order. (Declaration of Alfonso Cortez, ¶¶ 16-17.)
This evidence meets REA’s burden to show (1) REA neither owned nor controlled the UHD or that the second incident was foreseeable such that REA owed Plaintiff a duty of care, and (2) no act or omission by REA was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. REA has shifted the burden to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether REA owed Plaintiff a duty of care or its conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about Plaintiff’s harm.
In opposition, Plaintiff advances his own declaration. Plaintiff states that, after the first incident, he was asked to leave Saddle Ranch. (Declaration of Gerardo Gonzalez Felix, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff states that it was not until after the second incident that he became aware that neither security for Universal nor Saddle Ranch detained Carter. (Declaration of Gerardo Gonzalez Felix, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff avers that, when left Saddle Ranch after the first incident, he was under the impression that he would be safe when he went to the rideshare pickup area as that is where he had informed Saddle Ranch security he intended to go. (Declaration of Gerardo Gonzalez Felix, ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff does not advance any further evidence (other than relying on the deposition of DeLeon noted above), but instead points to the evidence submitted by REA in support of the motion. Plaintiff also proffers four additional material facts, which REA does not dispute. Plaintiff’s declaration, the portions of REA’s evidence upon which Plaintiff relies, and the three additional material facts do not, however, dispute REA’s material facts in support of the motion to give rise to a triable issue of either duty or causation. Plaintiff has thus failed to meet his burden to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
In considering the competent evidence proffered by REA, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of material fact as to whether REA owed Plaintiff a duty of care or that an act or omission by REA was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm, and determines that REA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Therefore, the Court grants REA’s motion for summary judgment. REA is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling and to file a proof of service of the same.