Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case 18STCV02043 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 18STCV02043, Date: 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 18STCV02043 Hearing Date: January 30, 2023 Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Motion for Reconsideration of State Farm’s Stipulation Dated April 6, 2020 and Motion to Vacate & Void Stipulation of April 6th, 2020 and to Restore Original Complaint 1st, 3rd and 4th Causes of Action October 23, 2018

Moving Party: Plaintiff Lynne Haaland

Resp. Party: Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Upon the Court’s own motion, the Order dated April 7, 2020 is VACATED. The first, third, and fourth causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint are RESTORED.

BACKGROUND:

On October 23, 2018, Plaintiff Lynne Haaland, in propria persona, filed her Complaint against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance on the following causes of action:

(1) Breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing;

(2) Breach of contractual duty to pay a covered insurance claim;

(3) Tortious breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and

(4) Unfair trade practices.

On March 22, 2019, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Pending Action.

On April 7, 2020, pursuant to the Parties’ Stipulation, the Court dismissed without prejudice the first, third, and fourth causes of action in the Complaint. The Court also maintained jurisdiction only for the purposes of enforcing the current order to compel arbitration, enforcement of discovery matters under Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f), and confirmation of any arbitration award that is entered.

On October 6, 2021, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.

On December 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Reconsideration of State Farm’s Stipulation Dated April 6, 2020 and Motion to Vacate & Void Stipulation of April 6th, 2020 and to Restore Original Complaint 1st, 3rd and 4th Causes of Action October 23, 2018.

On January 17, 2023, Defendant filed its Opposition.

On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Response.

ANALYSIS:

I. Legal Standard for a Motion for Reconsideration

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)

II. Discussion

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff moves the Court to vacate and void the Stipulation of March 27, 2020, reconsider the ruling made on April 6, 2020, and reinstate the first, third, and fourth causes of action originally contained in the Complaint filed October 23, 2018. (Motion, pp. 14:21–27, 15:1–3.) Plaintiff provides an extensive list and description of allegations, many of which have never been argued before the Court, for why she should be granted this relief. (Id. at pp. 2–14.)

Defendant opposes the Motion, arguing: (1) that Plaintiff has not presented evidence that prior Defense Counsel took advantage of Plaintiff or influenced her attorney; (2) the Stipulation accords with Plaintiff’s automobile policy; (3) current Defense Counsel has acted professionally and appropriately towards Plaintiff; (4) Plaintiff filed the Motion more than ten days after she was given notice of entry of the Order at issue; and (5) Plaintiff did not file an affidavit supporting her Motion. (Opposition, pp. 6:4–5, 7:5, 7:21–22, 8:20–21, 9:15.)

Plaintiff argues in her Reply that Defendant’s Opposition contains several false and misleading statements, ultimately arguing that there was no quid pro quo for the Stipulation because Plaintiff dismissed multiple causes of action, but Defendant has not offered settlement. (Response, pp. 3:13–14, 9:8–24.)

B. Reconsideration of this Matter

Defendant correctly notes that, among other things, a motion to reconsider pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) must (1) be filed “within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order”, (2) “based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law”, and (3) “state by affidavit” certain details.

However, while section 1008 (and Code of Civil Procedure section 437, subdivision (c)) “limit the parties’ ability to file repetitive motions but do not limit the court’s ability on its own motion to reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own errors.” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107.) Even if a motion to reconsider prompts the Court, the Court may still reconsider its decision based on “the court’s inherent authority to do so, once it realized that a mistake had been made.” (In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1308–09.) Simply put, the procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) do not apply to the Court’s own reconsideration of its Order date April 7, 2020.

As Plaintiff has failed to meet the procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.

However, the Court discusses below the reconsideration of this matter upon its own motion.

C. The Parties’ Stipulation and Consideration of Different Facts

The Parties’ Stipulation dated April 6, 2020 is clearly unbalanced. The first four numbered paragraphs simply restate what had occurred; the last two paragraphs invoke the Court’s jurisdiction (to maintain that jurisdiction for certain purposes) and maintain the status quo ante of the arbitration clause (to ensure that the Parties’ bear their own costs and fees and share equally the costs of the Arbitration). (Order dated April 7, 2020, ¶ 1–4, 6–7.) The only sentence that changes anything is the first sentence of the paragraph, which dismisses the first, third, and fourth causes of action from Plaintiffs Complaint. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Even the second sentence of the paragraph, which stipulates to arbitration of the second cause of action, is simply a restatement of the Court’s Order dated March 22, 2019.

To summarize, the Parties’ Stipulation benefits Defendant by having Plaintiff dismiss three of her fourth causes of action, while there does not seem to have been any benefit for Plaintiff. Plaintiff provides the following information to help clarify the situation:

(1) In October 2018, Plaintiff began this litigation in propria persona. (Complaint, p. 2:1.)

(2) In March 2019, Plaintiff retained Counsel Eric Sapir, who disappeared for weeks and months at a time. (Motion, Ex. 9.)

(3) On March 22, 2019, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. Neither Plaintiff nor Counsel Sapir appeared at the hearing on the motion.

(4) By February 2020, Plaintiff substituted Counsel Sapir with Counsel Goldy Berger. (Motion, Exs. 9–10.)

(5) At least as early as March 2020, Counsel Berger and Defense Counsel discussed the possibility of settlement. (Motion, Ex. 12.)

(6) Between March 27, 2020 through April 6, 2020, the Parties’ and their Counsel signed the Stipulation. (Order dated April 7, 2020.)

(7) On October 5, 2021, the day before the hearing on Defendant’s second Motion to Compel Arbitration, Counsel Berger notified Defense Counsel that he would no longer be representing Plaintiff, leaving her to represent herself in propria persona. (Motion, Ex. 16.) Notably, Counsel Berger never filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, nor did the Court otherwise grant him such leave. Further, neither Plaintiff nor Counsel Berger attended the October 6, 2021 hearing on the Motion to Compel Arbitration.

(8) Despite nearly three years passing since the signing of the Stipulation, there is no evidence of any settlement offer being presented to Plaintiff.

D. Analysis

Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has been representing herself, chasing absent counsel, or following the guidance of apparently incompetent counsel — sometimes all at once. Moreover, regardless of whether former and/or current Defense Counsel have acted “professionally” toward Plaintiff, it appears to the Court that Defense Counsel has taken advantage of Plaintiff’s situation by pushing an unbalanced stipulation on Plaintiff and her then-newly-retained attorney, making representations outside of the stipulation that settlement discussions would ensue, and then failing to engage in such settlement discussions.

The Court does not have the power to void the Parties’ Stipulation, as the Stipulation itself is not something the Court had a part in. But the Court does have the power to vacate its Order. (Kurwa v. Kislinger (2017) 4 Cal.5th 109, 119 (“Because the trial court did not render a judgment that was final and appealable, it retains power to act in the case.”) For the following reasons, the Court finds that it would be appropriate for the Court to vacate the Order dated April 7, 2020 and to restore the first, third, and fourth causes of action in this matter.

First, given the information that has now been presented to the Court, the Court finds that the interests of justice would be best served by vacating the order and restoring the causes of action.

Second, pursuant to the Stipulation, the Court’s Order dismissed without prejudice the first, third, and fourth causes of action. This case continues. In fact, Defense Counsel admits that arbitration has not even begun, despite the Court needlessly granting Defendant’s second Motion to Compel Arbitration on October 6, 2021. (Opposition, Decl. Magwood, ¶¶ 9–11.) Thus, considering the situation at hand and the fact that Plaintiff has not previously amended her Complaint, the Court believes that Plaintiff might have good cause to file for leave to amend her Complaint in order to restore her causes of action. As a matter of expediency, both on judicial resources and on the Parties’ resources, it would be better to grant such relief now.

Finally, the Court notes that this matter was stayed on March 22, 2019. The Parties never asked for a permanent or temporary lift of the stay, the stay was in fact never lifted, and the Court did not receive any argument as to why the Arbitrator should not be the one to grant dismissal without prejudice of the causes of action given that the Court had ordered this matter to Arbitration. While the Court bases its decision in all of the grounds discussed, the Court notes that for this reason alone the Court has grounds to vacate the Order dated April 7, 2020.

Upon its own motion, the Court vacates the Order dated April 7, 2020. The Court restores the first, third, and fourth causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

III. Conclusion