Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 19STCV03462, Date: 2022-12-05 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV03462 Hearing Date: December 5, 2022 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion
to Quash Plaintiffs’ Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to
the Department of Motor Vehicles
Moving Party: Defendants
Jake Morris Dante, Cynthia Pett Dante, and Brillstein Entertainment Partners,
LLC
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Benjamin Nichols
Defendant Jake
Morris Dante’s Motion to Quash is DENIED.
PRELIMINARY COMMENT:
The Court’s denial of this motion to
quash does not preclude the parties from entering into an appropriate protective
order that would preclude the dissemination of the information discovered.
BACKGROUND:
On
February 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendants Jake Morris
Dante, Cynthia Pett Dante, and Brillstein Entertainment Partners, LLC to allege
the following causes of action related to an automobile accident:
(1) Negligence;
(2) Violation of Vehicle
Code Sections 20001 and 20003;
(3) Violation of Vehicle
Code Section 23152; and
(4) Negligent entrustment
of motor vehicle.
On July 2, 2019, Defendants filed their
Answer.
On
July 19, 2022, the Court: (1) denied summary adjudication as to the first and
fourth causes of action; (2) granted summary adjudication in favor of
Defendants as to the second and third causes of action; and (3) granted summary
adjudication in favor of Defendants as to punitive damages in the first,
second, and third causes of action.
On October 6, 2022, Defendant Jake
Morris Dante filed his Motion to Quash Plaintiffs’ Deposition Subpoena for
Production of Business Records to the Department of Motor Vehicles.
On November 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed
his Opposition. Plaintiff concurrently filed Declaration of Seri Kattan-Wright.
On
November 22, 2022, Defendant filed his Reply.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Legal
Standard
California Code of Civil Procedure section
1987.1, subdivision (a) provides:
If a subpoena requires the attendance of a
witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court,
or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the
court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b),
or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity
to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or
directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall
declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other
order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or
oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy
of the person.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) There
is no requirement that the motion contain a meet and confer declaration. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
“Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court . . . any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved . . . if the matter
either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
The California Constitution includes the
inalienable right to privacy. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1.)
“The party asserting a privacy right must
establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion
that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever
legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the
party seeking protection may identify feasible alternative that serve the same
interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A
court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Super.
Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)
The balancing test outlined in Hill applies
whenever lesser privacy interests are at stake. (Id. at 556.) The Court
only applies the higher “compelling interest” standard to justify “an obvious
invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” (Id.)
II.
Discussion
On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff served a Deposition Subpoena upon the
California Department of Motor Vehicles seeking the following records:
“Any and all records pertaining to Jake Morris Dante, DOB 10/20/1997,
Drivers License No. Y2973584.”
(Motion, p. 4:13–15;
Motion, Ex. A, p. 2.)
Defendant moves the Court to quash the
Deposition Subpoena, arguing: (1) that the Deposition Subpoena seeks records
that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence; (2) that evidence of automobile accidents have long been
held inadmissible and irrelevant; (3) that the Deposition Subpoena is not
narrowly tailored but is rather vague and ambiguous; (4) that the Deposition
Subpoena invades Defendant’s right to privacy; and (5) that Plaintiff cannot
show good cause as to why the documents should be produced.
The Court does not agree with
Defendant’s arguments.
First, the Court considers the issues of relevance, admissibility, and
good cause. Defendant’s automobile records are clearly relevant in this matter,
which regards an automobile accident. Moreover, the fourth cause of action for
negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle requires the element of awareness,
actual or constructive, that a person is unfit or incompetent to drive. (Diaz
v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1157.) Thus, discovery of Defendant Jake
Morris Dante’s automobile records are reasonably calculated to lead the
discovery of evidence of awareness, and such evidence would be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Good cause is
not part of the standard for discovery.
Second, the Court considers Plaintiff’s Deposition Subpoena, which only
requests Defendant Jake Morris Dante’s records. The Court finds that the
Deposition Subpoena is sufficiently narrowly tailored, specific, and
unambiguous.
Finally, the Court considers Defendant’s right to privacy. As
automobile records do not implicate “an obvious invasion of an interest
fundamental to personal autonomy,” the Court applies the Hill test. (Williams,
supra, at 556.) In this case, the Court finds that Defendant Jake Morris
Dante has a legally protected privacy interest in his automobile records, that
he has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy as to his automobile
records in the given circumstances, and that the threatened intrusion into his
automobile records is serious. Plaintiff, the party seeking the information,
has clearly explained why this information should be discovered. Defendant, the
party seeking protection, has not identified any feasible alternatives that
serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of
privacy. After balancing the Parties’ competing considerations, the Court finds
that Defendant’s right to privacy must give way to Plaintiff’s right to
discovery.
The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion. The
Court shall not quash the Deposition Subpoena on the Department of Motor
Vehicles.
III.
Conclusion
Defendant Jake
Morris Dante’s Motion to Quash is DENIED.