Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 19STCV07879, Date: 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 19STCV07879    Hearing Date: September 13, 2022    Dept: 34

SUBJECT:                 George Apea-Adu Jr.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Moving Party:          Defendant George Apea-Adu, Jr. (“Apea-Adu”)

Resp. Party:             Plaintiff Student Loan Solutions, LLC, successor in interest to Bank of America, N.A. (“SLS”)

 

 

Defendant George Apea-Adu, Jr.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $4,725.00.

 

I.           BACKGROUND

 

On March 6, 2019, Plaintiff Student Loan Solutions, LLC, successor in interest to Bank of America, N.A., filed a complaint against Defendants George Apea-Adu, Jr. and Zenas Park alleging monies had and received. (Complaint, p. 4:22—5:13.)

 

On May 25, 2022, the Court found in favor of Defendants and against SLS. (Judgment, p. 1:6-9.)

 

On May 26, 2022, the Court ordered “judgment entered for Defendant George Apea-Adu Jr and Defendant Zenas Park against Plaintiff Student Loan Solutions LLC, Successor in Interest to Bank of America, N.A. on the Complaint filed by STUDENT LOAN SOLUTIONS LLC, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. on 03/06/2019 for a total of $0.00.” (Minute Order, May 26, 2022, p. 1.)

 

On July 25, 2022, Apea-Adu moved for an order granting attorney’s fees against SLS in the amount of $9,450.00.

 

On August 29, 2022, SLS opposed Apea-Adu’s attorney’s fees motion.

 

II.        ANALYSIS

 

A.          Legal Standard

 

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134. “In determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee when a contract or statute provides for such an award, courts should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, and the skill required and success of the attorney's efforts, his or her learning, age and experience in the particular type of work demanded, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed.” Contractors Labor Pool, Inc. v. Westway Contractors, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 152, 168.

 

“Except as provided by statute or agreement, each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay their own attorney’s fees.” (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 750.) During statutory fee-shifting cases, when the prevailing party is statutorily authorized to recover their attorney’s fees from the losing party, the lodestar method is the primary method for establishing the recoverable fee amount. (Id.) The basic fee for comparable legal services in a community is called the lodestar; adjustment of this figure by the Court is based on factors including issue novelty/ difficulty, skill in legal presentation, the extent to which litigation precludes other attorney employment, and the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

 

““Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (CCP § 1032(a)(4).)

 

“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then “ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended, and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.”” (Id.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing for private attorneys in the community conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.” (Glaviano, 22 Cal.App.5th at 751.) “The “‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’”” (Id.) Once a party establishes that they are entitled to attorney’s fees the lodestar is the presumed analytical starting point to determine the appropriate amount. (K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.

 

The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. [Citation.] “Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Trial courts enjoy discretion to increase or decrease the amount of attorney's fees they award pursuant to the lodestar adjustment method. Such adjustment is known as a "fee enhancement" or "multiplier." (Mikhaeilpoor, 48 Cal.App.5th at 247.) "The Supreme Court has “set forth a number of factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar figure. These include: ‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.’”” (Mikhaeilpoor, 48 Cal.App.5th at 248.)

 

B.          Discussion

 

1.           Prevailing Party

 

SLS invoked a contract during trial that included a provision that specifically provided for attorney’s fees and costs. (Chowdhury Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A, p. 17.) The Court finds that under Civil Code § 1717(a) Defendant George Apea-Adu, Jr. is a prevailing party for purposes of the instant motion. (Judgment, p. 1:6-9; Minute Order, May 26, 2022, p. 1.)

 

2.           Hourly Rates

 

Apea-Adu’s counsel attests that his billing rate is $500.00 per hour, given his twenty-three (23) years of experience as an attorney. (Chowdhury Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court finds this figure reasonable.

 

3.           Number of Hours Worked

 

Apea-Adu’s counsel attests that he worked for 18.9 hours on this case, including “successfully defending against a motion for summary judgment with unusual issues and an opposition and evidentiary objections that were distinctly non-boiler plate”, custom-drafting a trial brief, and preparing for and prevailing at a remote trial with one witness. (Chowdhury Decl., ¶ 3.) SLS notes that Apea-Adu’s counsel “began his representation mid-stream” by filing a four-page opposition to a summary judgment motion that “omitted a Statement of Disputed Facts and relied on objections to Plaintiff’s Custodian of the Record’s Declaration supported by three commonly cited cases”. (Opposition, p. 2:9-14.) SLS further highlights that Apea-Adu’s trial brief lasted four pages and that Defendants offered no evidence to object to SLS’s records custodian’s testimony. (Opposition, p. 2:14-16.)

 

SLS states that Apea-Adu’s counsel offers no billing records to specifically identify how he spent his alleged 18.9 hours. (Opposition, p. 2:18-21.) The Court notes that SLS also fails to offer the Court billing records from its counsel. “It is not uncommon for courts to compare opposing counsel’s fees to help determine whether the moving party’s fees are reasonable. That is because a ‘comparative analysis of each side’s respective litigation costs may be a useful check on the reasonableness of any fee request.’”  (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 273, 281, quoting Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272.)

 

Nonetheless, the Court reduces Apea-Adu’s counsel’s requested hours by 50% to address the anemic and procedurally-flawed filings, lack of travel, lack of counter-evidence, and absence of billing records. Apea-Adu’s counsel requested 18.9 hours of work on the present case. (Chowdhury Decl., ¶ 3.) The Court reduces this request by 50% and grants Apea-Adu’s counsel attorney's fees for 9.45 billed hours.

 

4.           Lodestar

 

Thus, at a rate of $500.00 per hour, 9.45 billed hours equals a lodestar of $4,725.00 in attorney’s fees.

 

III.     CONCLUSION

 

Defendant George Apea-Adu, Jr.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $4,725.00.