Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 20STCV07655, Date: 2023-05-03 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV07655 Hearing Date: May 3, 2023 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion for
Evidentiary Sanctions Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.030 [and]
Request for [Monetary] Sanctions
Moving Party: Defendants/Cross-Defendants
Compass California, Inc., Shane Douglas Markland, Anthony J. Stellini, and
Sherri Ann Rogers
Resp. Party: Plaintiff Zohar Management, LLC
Defendants/Cross-Defendants’
Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND:
On February
24, 2020, Plaintiff Zohar Management, LLC filed its Complaint against
Defendants Holloway Drive, LLC, Lubov Azria, Compass California, Inc., Shane
Douglas Markland, Anthony J. Stellini, Sherri Ann Rogers, Utopia Development,
Inc., and Daniel Angelo Moizel. This action arises out of allegations of the
breach of a real estate contract regarding four residential units located at
8451 Carlton Way, Los Angeles, CA 90069.
On June 26,
2020, by request of Plaintiff, the Clerk’s Office dismissed without prejudice
Defendants Daniel Angelo Moizel and Utopia Development, Inc.
On June 2,
2021, Plaintiff amended its Complaint to substitute Doe 1 for Compass, Inc.
On August 9,
2021, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint.
On October
27, 2021, Defendants/Cross-Complainants Holloway Drive, LLC and Lubov Azria
filed their Cross-Complaint against Defendants/Cross-Defendants Compass
California, Inc., Shane Douglas Markland, Anthony J. Stellini, and Sherri Ann
Rogers.
On November
1, 2021, Defendants/Cross-Complainants filed their Verified Answer to
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
On November
3, 2021, Defendants/Cross-Defendants Compass California, Inc., Shane Douglas
Markland, Anthony J. Stellini, and Sherri Ann Rogers filed their Verified
Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
On November
30, 2021, Defendants/Cross-Defendants filed their Answer to Cross-Complainants’
Cross-Complaint.
On March 21, 2023,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants filed their Motion for Evidentiary Sanctions
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.030 [and] Request for [Monetary]
Sanctions (“Motion”).
On April 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed its
Opposition.
On April 17, 2023,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants filed their Reply.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Legal
Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 gives
the court the discretion to impose sanctions against anyone engaging in a
misuse of the discovery process. A court may impose terminating sanctions by
striking pleadings of the party engaged in misuse of discovery or entering
default judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030(d).) A violation of a discovery
order is sufficient for the imposition of terminating sanctions. (Collison
& Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1620.) Terminating
sanctions are appropriate when a party persists in disobeying the court's
orders. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 795–96.)
A terminating sanction is a "drastic
measure which should be employed with caution." (Id. at p. 793.)
"A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But
where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence
shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the
discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate
sanction." (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Ca1.App.4th 262, 279-280.)
While the court has discretion to impose
terminating sanctions, these sanctions "should be appropriate to the
dereliction and should not exceed that which is required to protect the
interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery." (Deyo, supra,
84 Cal.App.3d at p. 793.) "[A] court is empowered to apply the ultimate
sanction against a litigant who persists in the outright refusal to comply with
his discovery obligations." (Id.) Discovery sanctions are not to be
imposed for punishment, but instead are used to encourage fair disclosure of
discovery to prevent unfairness resulting for the lack of information. (See Midwife
v. Bernal (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 57, 64 [superseded on other grounds as
stated in Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 9711.)
"A trial court has broad discretion to
impose discovery sanctions, but two facts are generally prerequisite to the
imposition of nonmonetary sanctions . . . (1) absent unusual circumstances,
there must be a failure to comply with a court order, and (2) the failure must
be willful." (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th
1315, 1327; but see Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1291
["willfulness is no longer a requirement for the imposition of discovery
sanctions."].)
II.
Discussion
A.
The
Parties’ Arguments
Defendants/Cross-Defendants move
the Court to issue: (1) evidentiary sanctions that bar Plaintiff from
introducing evidence that should have been produced in response to Requests for
Production, Set Two; (2) terminating sanctions that dismiss the action filed by
Plaintiff; and (3) monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
Counsel. (Motion, p. 9:8–15.) Defendants/Cross-Defendants argue that these
sanctions are appropriate because of Plaintiff’s alleged misuse of the
discovery process. (Id. at pp. 6:5–6, 7:11–12, 8:11–12.)
Plaintiff
opposes the Motion, arguing: (1) that the Motion is untimely; (2) that the
Motion is without merit because Plaintiff substantially complied with its
discovery obligations; (3) that the meet and confer process was delayed because
of the untimely death of a witness’s brother, Plaintiff’s Counsel falling ill
with COVID-19, and the demands of Defendants/Cross-Defendants’
recently-adjudicated Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) that unpaid monetary
sanctions do not warrant the imposition of evidentiary or terminating
sanctions. (Opposition, pp. 3:2–5, 4:20–23, 10:1–5, 11:10–12.)
In their Reply,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants argue: (1) that Plaintiff did not respond to
Requests for Production, Set Two in violation of the Court’s Order; (2) that
Plaintiff did not refute that evidentiary sanctions are warranted; (3) that
Plaintiff did not refute that terminating sanctions are warranted; (4) that
Plaintiff did not refute that monetary sanctions are warranted; and (5) that
the Motion is timely. (Reply, pp. 2:20–21, 3:17–18, 4:4–5, 5:1–2, 5:12.)
B.
Timeliness
Motions concerning discovery must be heard
on or before the 15th day before the date initially set for trial, and a
continuance or postponement of the trial date does not automatically operate to
reopen discovery proceedings without a motion or other court ruling so
ordering. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2024.020, subds. (a)–(b).)
The Court last reset the discovery
deadlines by Order dated July 5, 2022, which moved discovery deadlines to
accord with the then-trial date of May 1, 2023. That made the deadline to hear
discovery motions April 14, 2023 because 15 days before May 1, 2023 was Sunday,
April 16, 2023. Although the Court recently postponed trial to August 7, 2023,
no extension of the discovery deadline was provided. (Minute Order dated March
29, 2023, pp. 21–22.) Notably, the Ex Parte Application dated March 28,
2023, upon which that extension was granted, did not request an extension of
discovery deadlines (except for an extension of expert witness depositions,
which was ultimately not included in the Court’s Order).
The hearing on this Motion is scheduled
for May 3, 2023. Thus, the Motion is untimely.
“On motion of any party, the court
may grant leave to complete discovery proceedings, or to have a motion
concerning discovery heard, closer to the initial trial date, or to reopen discovery
after a new trial date has been set. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet
and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050,
subd. (a).)
The Motion at
hand involves discovery sanctions, and Defendants/Cross-Defendants have not
moved for leave to file this late Motion. Indeed, Defendants/Cross-Defendants
continue to argue that the Motion is timely. (Reply, p. 5:12–22.) The Court
declines to exercise its discretion here to grant leave. (Accord Pelton-Shepherd
Indus., Inc. v. Delta Packaging Prods., Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568,
1585–88.)
As the Court is
denying this motion on procedural grounds, the Court does not reach the merits
of the Motion.
III.
Conclusion
Defendants/Cross-Defendants’
Motion is DENIED.