Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 20STCV13849, Date: 2022-07-29 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV13849 Hearing Date: July 29, 2022 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Defendant FS Hotels LA, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Stay, the Representative Action
Moving Party: Defendant
FS Hotels LA, Inc.
Resp. Party: Plaintiff
Raul Maldonado
The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss the Representative action and STAYS Plaintiff’s representative PAGA
action pending direction from the California Supreme Court or California Court
of Appeal as to Plaintiff’s standing as an “aggrieved employee.”
I.
BACKGROUND
This is a Labor Code dispute
arising from alleged violations of law governing required rest periods,
overtime pay, reimbursement of employer related expenses, and improper wage
statements.
On April 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed a
complaint alleging Defendant violated provisions of the Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq.
On July 5, 2022, Defendant moved
this Court to dismiss, or in the alternative stay, the representative PAGA
action.
On July 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed
opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, but did not oppose a stay of
proceedings related to the representative PAGA action.
On July 22, 2022, Defendant and
Movant replied to Plaintiff’s opposition.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Legal
Standard
A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if “one
cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on
what theory.” (McHenry v. Renne (9th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 1172, 1178.)
Indeed, a judge should be able to dismiss claims “that are sufficiently
fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696
[129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868] (2009) J. Souter, dis.)
B.
Discussion
1.
Arbitration
“If an application has been made to a court of competent jurisdiction . .
. to arbitrate a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or
proceeding pending before a court . . . the court in which such action or
proceeding is pending shall stay the action or proceeding until . . . an
arbitration is had.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) The issue in question is then
“held in abeyance until the arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement . . . [and] the court retains vestigial jurisdiction
over the court action during time.” (Weiler v. Marcus & Millichap Real
Estate Investment Services, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 970, 979.) It
is undisputed the parties have agreed to arbitrate Plaintiff’s individual PAGA
claim. (Lerma Decl., ¶ 5; Opposition, p.2:10-11.) Accordingly, the Court is
inclined to either stay, or in the alternative proceed with trial on the
representative PAGA claims.
2.
It is
unclear whether or not Viking River Cruise effects this matter.
The Supreme Court of the United
States recently held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a rule of
California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to assert
representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) in any
forum. (Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906, 2022 WL
2135491.) The Viking opinion holds that individual, not representative,
PAGA claims can be compelled into arbitration if the parties have consented. (Id.
at *11.) However, the Supreme Court upheld case law which prohibits a wholesale
waiver of PAGA claims, including a waiver of representative standing altogether
to assert PAGA actions. (Id. at *6, 11.)
The California legislature enacted
PAGA with the goal of enhancing limited labor law enforcement resources by
empowering employees to enforce Labor Code as private attorneys general, or
representatives of the state. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th
969, 980.) PAGA confers a cause of action on “aggrieved employees” to bring
representative claims. (Id. at 980, see also Cal. Lab. Code §
2699(a).) A PAGA claim is distinct from individual civil claims under the labor
code because the employee becomes a proxy or agent of the state, thus the claim
is unlike others that confer a right to statutory damages under the Labor Code.
(Kim v. Reins Int’l Cal. Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81.)
Under PAGA,
civil penalties may be “recovered through a civil action brought by an
aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former
employees.” (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a).) Aggrieved employees are defined as “any
person who was employed by the alleged violator” and “against whom one or more
of the alleged violations was committed.” (Id. at (c).) Case law holds that
a plaintiff’s rights to a representative action are not barred by settlement or
dismissal of individual claims. (Kim, at 80, 83-91.) The Kim
court further held that settlement, or other means to remediate a violation,
did not “nullify” the fact of the violation. (Id. at 84.) The California
Supreme Court found that a narrow construction of PAGA standing was “contrary
to the statute’s purpose to ensure effective code enforcement” and “runs
counter to the broader statutory scheme,” including the express authority to
bring a PAGA suit separately from an individual claim for relief. (Id.
at 87-88.)
“The authority
and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the
State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court)
should utter the last word.” (Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S.
64, 78-9.) The Erie rule is the cornerstone of our unique blend of
federalism, and thus limits the power of the federal government to usurp
substantive legal matters spoken to by either a legislature or a state Supreme
Court. Standing in state court is thus a matter for California courts to
determine under guidance from the legislature.
Defendant and
movant FS Hotels argues that Viking River Cruises controls this
case. (Motion, p. 5:22-24.) Respondent and plaintiff Maldonado counter that
Movant is relying on a misreading of the Supreme Court’s Viking opinion.
(Opposition p.6:3-9.) There is no dispute as to whether Plaintiff signed an
agreement to arbitrate, that Defendant is a party to the same agreement, nor
that the parties have agreed to arbitrate Maldonado’s individual PAGA claim.
(Hiller Decl., Ex. 2; Lerma Decl., Ex. 3.) However, Movant relies upon dicta that
would in effect nullify California labor law in a substantive matter that is
squarely with the purview of the state legislature. (Reply, p. 2:6-10.)
The issue then hinges upon the
standing of the representative action, and whether Plaintiff Maldonado
maintains his legal standing as an aggrieved employee. Without determining the
underlying issue, this Court does acknowledge that this question has not been
answered definitively. The rule established under Kim would dictate that
Maldonado became an aggrieved employee at the time that a violation was
committed against him. (Kim, at 85.)
To further complicate the matter Jarobe
v. Hanlees Auto Group is
is currently under review by the California Supreme Court. The
Jarobe Court stated that “[b]ecause a PAGA claim is representative and
does not belong to an employee individually, an employer should not be able to
dictate how and where the representative action proceeds. . . . Accordingly . .
. the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to stay the PAGA
action pending the arbitration of [plaintiff’s] individual claims.” (Jarobe
v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539, 557.) If the Supreme Court
concludes that the trial court has not abused its discretion, then it would
stand to reason that Maldonado’s representative claim could advance. The Court
is not prepared to either dismiss or rule on Maldonado’s status while
uncertainty surrounding PAGA and the Viking decision are being decided
within the California Supreme Court.
In addition to Jarobe, the
California Supreme Court has also granted review in Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 11, 2022, No. G059860) 2022 WL
1073583, review granted (July 20, 2022). Adolph holds that
the status of an employee as aggrieved is to be determined by the trial court,
not an arbitrator. (Id., at *5.) Should the California Supreme Court
agree with the holding of the Court of Appeal, then it is within the power of
this Court to rule on Plaintiff’s status as an aggrieved employee.
This Court is
bound by California common law and adheres to doctrines and decisions that
reflect matters defined by the state legislature and state courts. While Viking
has effectively allowed individual PAGA claims to be pared away from representative
actions where there is an arbitration agreement, the matter of standing is
unclear. Because of this, the Court must stay, pending further direction from
the California Supreme Court. Should the reasoning of Jarobe stand, then
Maldonado may move the Court to lift its stay and commence with trial
proceedings.
3.
Viking
River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana
has been petitioned for rehearing, Rule 45 may govern.
Rule 45 of the Supreme Court of the
United States deals with procedures when a petition for rehearing has been
filed. (U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 45.) The rule states, “[t]he filing of a petition for
rehearing stays the mandate until disposition of the petition, unless the Court
orders otherwise. If the petition is denied, the mandate issues forthwith.” (Id.,
at subpart 2.) Moriana filed a petition for rehearing on the Viking
decision on July 1, 2022 which in effect stays the Viking decision that
defendant’s entire argument is based upon. (Viking, petition No.
20-1573.)
As of the writing of this tentative
decision, Viking River Cruises is not the law. As such, the Court cannot determine the
validity of Defendant’s arguments regarding part IV of the Viking
opinion. Thus, a stay of proceedings is the most appropriate remedy while the
Supreme Court of the United States and the California Court’s decide these
matters.
III.
CONCLUSION
Because of the reasons listed
above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Representative action
and STAYS Plaintiff’s representative PAGA action pending direction from the
California Supreme Court or California Court of Appeal as to Plaintiff’s
standing as an “aggrieved employee.”