Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 20STCV23817, Date: 2023-01-04 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV23817    Hearing Date: January 4, 2023    Dept: 34

SUBJECT:                 Motion for New Trial

 

Moving Party:          Defendant City of Los Angeles   

Resp. Party:            Plaintiff Brenda Baca

 

SUBJECT:                 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

 

Moving Party:          Defendant City of Los Angeles   

Resp. Party:            Plaintiff Brenda Baca

 

 

Defendant’s Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

 

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is DENIED.

 

BACKGROUND:

 

On June 24, 2020, Plaintiff Brenda Baca filed her Complaint against Defendant City of Los Angeles on causes of action for: (1) sex/gender harassment in a hostile work environment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA; and (3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation from occurring or continuing in violation of FEHA.

 

On July 29, 2022, after a four-day jury trial, the jury found Defendant City of Los Angeles liable on both Plaintiff’s claim for harassment and for retaliation by a vote of 10-2.  The jury was unanimous that Plaintiff suffered damages of $2,500,000.00. 

 

On November 9, 2022, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant.

 

On November 22, 2022, Defendant filed its Notice of Intent to File Motion for New Trial. Defendant concurrently filed: (1) Memorandum of Points and Authorities; (2) Declaration of Blithe S. Bock; and (3) Proposed Order.

 

On November 28, 2022, Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Defendant concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Blithe S. Bock; and (2) Proposed Order.

 

On December 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Oppositions to both Motions. For each Motion, Plaintiff concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Yuk K. Law; and (2) Compendium of Federal Authorities. As to the Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff also concurrently filed her Request for Judicial Notice.

 

On December 20, 2022, Defendant filed its Replies to both Motions.

 

ANALYSIS:

 

I.           Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following items:

 

(1)       The Amended Judgment, dated September 8, 2022, in the case of Vince v. City of Los Angeles, et al., Case Number BC704165; and

(2)       The Final Judgment After Trial by Jury on Special Verdict, dated November 2, 2022, in the case of Carranza v. City of Los Angeles, Case Number 19STCV02594.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.

 

II.        Motion for New Trial

 

A.      Legal Standard

A new trial is a re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after a trial and decision by a jury, court, or referee.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 656.)

 

“The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:

 

1.   “Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

 

2.   “Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.

 

3.   “Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

 

4.   “Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

 

5.   “Excessive or inadequate damages.

 

6.   “Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

 

7.   “Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.

. . .

 

“A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision. . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)

 

        If the evidence allows the trial court to conclude that different minds could come fairly come to different conclusions based on the state of the evidence, and that there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict, the court properly denies a new-trial motion. (Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 397, 414.) A new-trial motion is not a mechanism for the trial court to substitute its own judgment for that of the jury. (Id.) Hence, “a trial court cannot grant a new trial simply because it disagrees with the verdict.” (Barrese v. Murray (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 494, 505; Dominguez v. Pantalone (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 201, 215.)

 

 

B.      Discussion

Defendant moves the Court to grant a new trial on the following grounds:

 

(1)       Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court;

(2)       Irregularity in the proceedings of the Jury;

(3)       Irregularity in the proceeding caused by Plaintiff;

(4)       Improper orders of the Court;

(5)       Abuse of discretion by the Court;

(6)       Misconduct of the jury;

(7)       Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against;

(8)       Newly-discovered evidence, material to the moving party’s case, that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial;

(9)       The award of damages was excessive;

(10)    The evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict;

(11)    The verdict is contrary to law; and

(12)    Error in law occurring at trial and objected to by the moving party.

(Notice of Motion, pp. 1:27–28, 2:1–15.)

 

However, in its Memorandum, Defendant only makes the following arguments: (1) that the Court has broad discretion to order a new trial or remittitur; (2) that the factors favor vacating the damage award as excessive; (3) that the award far exceeds awards that other courts have deemed reasonable; (4) that insufficient evidence supports the Jury’s finding that there was a hostile environment; and (5) that insufficient evidence supports the Jury’s finding that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff. (Memorandum, pp. 3:10, 3:26, 6:20–21, 8:20–21.) Thus, the Court only addresses the grounds upon which Defendant has actually argued.

 

Plaintiff opposes the Motion, arguing: (1) that Plaintiff provided substantial evidence as to her emotional distress, including expert testimony, making the damage award not speculative; (2) that there are authorities supporting damage awards well in excess of the amounts awarded here; and (3) that sufficient evidence was introduced to support each cause of action. (Opposition, pp. 4:2–4, 8:6–7, 10:8–9.)

 

In its Reply, Defendant reiterates its argument that the Judgment for the incidents at issue is patently excessive. (Reply, p. 1:23–24.)

 

The Court disagrees with Defendant’s arguments.

 

First, while the Court does have discretion to grant a motion for a new trial, there must be some grounds for doing so. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) Moreover, as it relates to the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence or excessive damages, the Court must be convinced that that the Jury “clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.” (Id., emphasis added.) Notably, these grounds are the only ones that Defendant actually argues.

 

Second, the Court finds that the factors do not favor vacating the damage award as excessive. Rather, the Court finds that the evidence Plaintiff’s presented — which involved multiple instances of harassment and retaliation — strongly weigh against vacating the damages award as excessive.

 

Third, the Court does not find that the damages award, which is for $2.5 million, far exceeds awards that other courts have deemed reasonable. It is certainly true that other courts have reduced previous FEHA awards, but that does not mean that this award must be reduced.  Each case must be judged on its own facts.  The Court granted Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, which shows an award of $4 million in a case with similar facts. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 2, Final Judgment After Trial by Jury on Special Verdict in Carranza v. City of Los Angeles.)

 

Fourth, Defendant states that “[t]his jury award can only be the result of passion or prejudice by the jury as demonstrated by Baca’s counsel’s inflammatory language both during the questioning of witnesses and during his closing argument.”  (Motion, p. 5:14-16.)  Yet nowhere does Defendant state that it objected to any questions or argument made by Plaintiff’s counsel, that the Court overruled Defendant’s objections, and that the Court’s actions were anything more than harmless error.

 

Finally, the Jury’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Among other things, the evidence showed that Defendant’s police officers sent vulgar text messages to Plaintiff, disparaged her by calling her a “slut” and a “whore”, and reassigned Plaintiff to desk duty. It appears to the Court that the Jury then made its Verdict upon the evidence that was presented during the trial.

 

The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for New Trial.

 

C.      Conclusion

Defendant’s Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

 

III.     Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

 

A.      Legal Standard

“The court, before the expiration of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial, either of its own motion, after five days’ notice, or on motion of a party against whom a verdict has been rendered, shall render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for a directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion been made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 629, subd. (a).)

 

“The trial judges [sic] power to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is identical to his power to grant a directed verdict. The trial judge cannot weigh the evidence, or judge the credibility of witnesses. If the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. ‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of a jury may properly be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. If there is any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support of the verdict, the motion should be denied.’” (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110, quoting Brandenburg v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 282, 284 [other citations omitted].)

 

B.      Discussion

 

1.       The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant moves the Court to enter Judgment for Defendant, notwithstanding the Verdict of the Jury. (Motion, p. 1:4–7.) Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence does not support the Jury’s Verdict; (2) that no evidence supports Plaintiff’s claims of harassment and retaliation; (3) that Plaintiff did not experience a hostile work environment as a matter of law; (4) that personnel management decisions cannot form the basis for a harassment claim as a matter of law; and (5) that Plaintiff does not even state a prima facie claim of retaliation. (Id. at pp. 1:19–21, 2:18–19, 6:16–17, 9:22–24, 11:24.)

 

        Plaintiff opposes the Motion, arguing: (1) that substantial evidence supports the Jury’s conclusion that Plaintiff was sexually harassed in violation of FEHA; (2) that substantial evidence supports the Jury’s conclusion that Plaintiff was retaliated against in violation of FEHA; and (3) that the evidence produced at Trial supported the Verdict. (Opposition, pp. 19–20, 4:9, 10:11–12, 11:22.)

 

        Defendant reiterates its arguments in its Reply.

 

        For the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s arguments.

 

2.       The Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict

        Among other things, the evidence presented at trial showed that Defendant’s police officers sent vulgar text messages to Plaintiff, disparaged her by calling her a “slut” and a “whore”, and reassigned Plaintiff to desk duty. This evidence was substantial and it supported both of Plaintiff’s claims for harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA.  No evidence has been presented to indicate that the Jury made its Verdict based upon any facts not presented during trial or upon an extraneous influences.

 

3.           Whether Plaintiff Experienced a Hostile Work Environment was in this Case, a Question of Fact, not of Law

Defendant misapprehends the type of question that is posed when determining whether Plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment. Given the facts presented in this case, it was certainly possible, as a matter of law, that a jury could find that Plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment in violation of FEHA. It then became a question of fact as to whether Plaintiff did in fact experience a hostile work environment. The Jury returned a Verdict that implicitly made such conclusions of fact; as stated above, such a jury verdict was based on substantial evidence presented at trial.

 

4.           Personnel Management Decisions can form the Basis of a Harassment Claim

        Defendant is incorrect as a matter of law in arguing that personnel management decisions cannot form the basis of a harassment claim. (See, e.g., Motion, §V; Reply, §II(D).)

 

“[H]arassment is generally concerned with the message conveyed to an employee, and therefore with the social environment of the workplace, whereas discrimination is concerned with explicit changes in the terms or conditions of employment.¿Miller, however, makes clear that in some cases the hostile¿message that constitutes the harassment is conveyed through official employment actions, and therefore evidence that would otherwise be associated with a discrimination claim can form the basis of a harassment claim. Moreover, in analyzing the sufficiency of evidence in support of a harassment claim, there is no basis for excluding evidence of biased personnel management actions so long as that evidence is relevant to prove the communication of a hostile message.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 708, italics and underlines added, citing Miller v. Dept. of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446.) 

 

 

5.       Plaintiff Establishes a prima facie Case of Retaliation

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 878-879, brackets omitted.)

 

“An ‘adverse employment action,’ which is a critical component of a retaliation claim, requires a substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.” (Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1063, quotation marks omitted.)

 

        Here, Plaintiff showed: (1) that, among other things, Plaintiff engaged in the protected activity of making complaints of her mistreatment by Defendant’s officer; (2) that, among other things, Plaintiff’s supervisors then relegated her to desk duty, which was an adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and Defendant’s action. This adverse employment action did create a substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment as one of Defendant’s officers. Thus, Plaintiff both stated and proved a prima facie case of retaliation.

 

The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

 

C.      Conclusion

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is DENIED.