Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 20STCV36221, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV36221    Hearing Date: May 10, 2023    Dept: 34

SUBJECT:         Motion to Compel Further Responses and Compliance from Defendant Mario Beltran to Plaintiff From The Earth, LLC’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One [and] Request for Sanctions in the Amount of $6,935.00 Against Defendant Mario Beltran and Its Counsel

 

Moving Party:  Plaintiff From The Earth, LLC

Resp. Party:    Defendant Mario Beltran

                                     

 

       

Plaintiff’s RPDs Motion is GRANTED as to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 1, 3, 4, 9 and 12.

 

 Monetary sanctions are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant and his Counsel in the amount of $4,953.57.  

 

BACKGROUND:

 

On September 22, 2020, Plaintiff From The Earth, LLC filed its Complaint against Defendants City of Commerce and Mario Beltran on causes of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and extortion.

 

On October 28, 2020, Defendant City of Commerce filed its Answer to the Complaint.

 

On March 17, 2023, Defendant Mario Beltran filed his Answer to the Complaint.

 

On April 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Compel Further Responses and Compliance from Defendant Mario Beltran to Plaintiff From The Earth, LLC’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One [and] Request for Sanctions in the Amount of $6,935.00 Against Defendant Mario Beltran and Its Counsel (“RPDs Motion”). Plaintiff concurrently filed its Separate Statement.

 

On April 25, 2023, Defendant Mario Beltran (“Defendant”) filed his Opposition. Defendant concurrently filed his POS-050/EFS-050, Proof of Service. The Opposition includes a request for sanctions.

 

On May 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Reply.

 

ANALYSIS:

 

I.           Legal Standard

 

On receipt of a response to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and/or demand requests, the propounding and/or demanding party “may move for an order compelling further response” if: (1) the response is evasive or incomplete; (2) the representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) the objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a), 2031.310, subd. (a).)¿¿¿¿ 

 

“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response” to the demands or interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c), 2031.310, subd. (c).) 

 

The court shall impose monetary sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further interrogatories and/or a motion to compel further production of documents, unless the Court finds that the one subject to sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h).)¿ 

¿¿ 

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d).) 

 

II.        Discussion

 

A.      The Requests for Production of Documents

 

On October 27, 2022, Plaintiff propounded its requests for production of documents (“RPDs”) on Defendant. (RPDs Motion, p. 3:17–21 and Exh. A.) Plaintiff now seeks further responses to the following RPDs. (Separate Statement.)

 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #1

 

Produce all DOCUMENTS that reference or refer to plaintiff From The Earth, LLC, (“FTE”).

 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #3

 

Produce all DOCUMENTS identified in Form Interrogatories, Set No. 1, served upon defendant Mario Beltran (‘BELTRAN") by FTE in this lawsuit.

 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #4

 

Produce all DOCUMENTS that support defendant BELTRAN’s affirmative defenses in this lawsuit.

 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #9

 

Produce all written communications, including, without limitation, text messages and emails, between BELTRAN and FTE from January 1, 2017, through October 27, 2022.

 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #11

 

Produce all DOCUMENTS that reference or refer to all commercial cannabis applicants for which BELTRAN acted as a lobbyist from January 1, 2017, through October 27, 2022.

 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #12

 

Produce all DOCUMENTS that support the BELTRAN’s contention that BELTRAN is not liable to FTE for violation of extortion.

 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION #17

 

Produce all DOCUMENTS that reference or refer to any cannabis license applications filed with that CITY for which BELTRAN acted as the applicant’s lobbyist.

 

B.      The Parties’ Arguments

 

Plaintiff argues: (1) that Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling Defendant’s compliance with his agreement to produce documents responsive to RPD Nos. 1, 3, 4, 9, 12, and 17; (2) that Plaintiff has good cause for an order compelling Defendant to provide a further responses to RPD No. 11; and (3) that Plaintiff has met and conferred with Defendant to informally resolve this discovery dispute. (RPDs Motion, pp. 6:2–4, 7:5–7, 10:22–23.)

 

Defendant argues: (1) that Defendant has substantially complied in providing three Bates Numbers responsive to the RPDs in which he agreed to provide documents; (2) that Defendant is asserting his First Amendment privilege regarding his lobbying activity; and (3) that if the Court does compel any information, that it should be made with a protective order that contains a provision for attorney eyes only. (Opposition, pp. 2:18–19, 4:1–4, 5:8–11.)

 

In its Reply, Plaintiff argues: (1) that there is no evidence that Defendant engaged in protected petitioning activity; (2) that Defendant only produced one single-paged invoice and two voice messages, which is insufficient as that is not all possible documents responses to the RPDs; (3) that Defendant has not complied with the Code of Civil Procedure, including by not properly asserting why no further responses can be made; (4) that Defendant’s citation to St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762 does not help Defendant; and (5) that Defendant’s privilege log is deficient in that it does not provide any information that would allow one to evaluate what is the claimed privilege. (Reply, pp. 2:3–6,

 

C.      Discussion

 

        Defendant cites St. Mary, supra, at 778 for the proposition that Defendant has substantially complied. (Opposition, p. 3:2–17.) Defendant quotes St. Mary as stating that “Where there is compliance as to all matters of substance technical deviations are not to be given the stature of noncompliance.”  (See Opposition, p. 2:7-9.)  But the submission of one document and two voice messages is not “substantial compliance” to the RPDs when it appears that Defendant is withholding a significant amount of documents.

 

        The Court agrees with Defendant that lobbying local governments (which is what Defendant claims to have been doing) is an activity protected by the First Amendment. However, the protection of private associational rights is not an absolute bar to discovery.

 

For example, Defendant cites Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844. (Opposition, p. 4:18–24.) In relevant part, Britt states:

 

“Of course, as with all other First Amendment rights, the right of associational privacy is not absolute, and past cases recognize that under some circumstances disclosure may permissibly be compelled. Because of the constitutional interests at stake, however, the authorities establish that private association affiliations and activities such as those at issue here are presumptively immune from inquisition, and thus the government bears the burden of demonstrating the justification for compelling disclosure. Moreover, the cases also make clear that in this context the government's burden is a particularly heavy one: To justify any impairment there must be present a compelling state interest which justifies the substantial infringement of First Amendment rights. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”

 

(Britt, supra, at p. 855 [cleaned up].) Notably, the Court of Appeal in Britt denied a discovery request for private associational information of multiple types and a complete medical history when the causes of action merely involved issues with diminution of property values, personal injuries and emotional disturbances allegedly cause by the noise, vibrations, air pollution and smoke associated with the operation of an airport.

 

Here, Plaintiff has generally met the compelling interest standard. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant is liable for extortion, based on the same activities that Defendant is now claiming are protected activity. The documents Plaintiff requests in discovery are the same materials that would assist Plaintiff in discovering whether there is evidence of Defendant extorting Plaintiff.

 

Moreover, with the exception of RPDs Nos. 11 and 17, they requests are sufficiently narrow as to not require any further piercing of Defendant’s First Amendment rights than is necessary. (Britt, supra, at p. 856.) Unlike in Britt, the RPDs are not requesting information about Defendant’s unrelated political affiliations, medical information, or other areas that Defendant retains the right to protect. Nor does Plaintiff request in the RPDs information about Defendant’s non-cannabis lobbying.

 

However, the Court finds that RPDs Nos. 11 and 17 are overbroad.  They require production of all documents that “reference or refer” to any other cannabis applications “for which BELTRAN acted as the applicant’s lobbyist.”  This would include any invoice or bill, note, message or other communication involving third parties.  The Court will not require production of documents in response to these requests. 

 

Finally, Defendant requests a protective order in case the Court grants the motion and compels a further response to the RPDs. At this time, the Court declines to issue such a protective order. Defendant has not provided sufficient evidence for the Court to determine that a protective order would be appropriate. The Parties may file a stipulation on the issue of a protective order if they so choose.

 

The Court GRANTS the RPDs Motion as to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 1, 3, 4, 9 and 12.

 

The Court notes that the papers include a discussion of privilege logs. To the extent any documents are withheld, the withholding party must provide the other party with a privilege log. The privilege log must include the basis upon which any documents are being withheld.

 

D.      Sanctions

 

Both Plaintiff and Defendant request sanctions. Plaintiff requests $6,935.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant his Counsel. (RPDs Motion, p. 11:10–1.) Defendant requests the same amount of monetary sanctions that Defendant requests. (Opposition, p. 5:12–14.)

 

The Court granted the majority of Plaintiff’s RPDs Motion. The Court does not find that Defendant acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of a monetary sanction unjust on Defendant. Thus, the Court is required to impose a monetary sanction on Defendant and his Counsel.

 

        It is not uncommon for courts to compare opposing counsel’s fees to help determine whether the moving party’s fees are reasonable. That is because a “comparative analysis of each side’s respective litigation costs may be a useful check on the reasonableness of any fee request.”¿¿(Mountjoy v. Bank of Am., N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 273, 281, quoting¿Donahue v. Donahue¿(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272.)¿“[T]here is one particularly good indicator of how much time is necessary [for the purpose of determining reasonableness of attorneys’ fees] . . . and that is how much time the other side’s lawyers spent . . . [S]uch a comparison is a useful guide in evaluating the appropriateness of time claimed. If the time claimed by the prevailing party is of a substantially greater magnitude than what the other side spent, that often indicates that too much time is claimed. Litigation has something of the tennis game, something of war, to it; if one side hits the ball, or shoots heavy artillery, the other side necessarily spends time hitting the ball or shooting heavy artillery back.” (Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed¿(9th¿Cir. 2004) 388 F.3d 1281, 1287.)¿ 

 

Here, Plaintiff requested $6,935.00 in monetary sanctions, and Defendant requested the exact same amount. While the Court might normally find that $6,935.00 is an unreasonably large lodestar for these filings, the Parties’ Counsel appear to agree that the value of their work is worth at least that amount. 

 

However, since Plaintiff was only successful on 5 of its 7 Requests for Production of Documents, the Court is going to reduce the requested sanctions by 5/7. 

 

The Court AWARDS monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant and his Counsel in the amount of $4,953.57.

 

III.     Conclusion

 

Plaintiff’s RPDs Motion is GRANTED as to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 1, 3, 4, 9 and 12.

 

 Monetary sanctions are AWARDED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant and his Counsel in the amount of $4,953.57.