Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 21STCV03461, Date: 2023-02-14 Tentative Ruling
The Court often posts its tentative several days in advance of the hearing. Please re-check the tentative rulings the day before the hearing to be sure that the Court has not revised the ruling since the time it was posted.
Please call the clerk at (213) 633-0154 by 4:00 pm. the court day before the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative.
Case Number: 21STCV03461 Hearing Date: February 14, 2023 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary
Adjudication
Moving Party: Defendant FCA US LLC
Resp. Party: Plaintiffs
Maria Gutierrez, Jesus Gutierrez, and Jesus Gutierrez, Jr.
Defendant FCA US LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment/ Summary
Adjudication is GRANTED in part. Summary adjudication is GRANTED in favor of Defendant
and against Plaintiffs regarding the sixth cause of action (the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act claim) and the prayer for punitive damages listed in Plaintiffs’
Complaint. Summary judgment is DENIED.
BACKGROUND:
On March 30, 2021,
Defendant FCA US LLC filed its Answer.
On March 30, 2021,
Defendant Champion Dodge, LLC (erroneously sued as Champion Chrysler Jeep Dodge
Ram Fiat) filed its Answer.
On February 9, 2022,
by request of Plaintiffs, the Clerk’s Office dismissed without prejudice the
first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in the Complaint.
On November 9, 2022,
Defendant FCA US LLC (“Defendant”) filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment/Summary Adjudication. Defendant concurrently filed: (1) Memorandum of
Points and Authorities; (2) Appendix of Documentary Evidence; (3) Declaration
of Katherine P. Vilchez; (4) Proposed Order; (5) Separate Statement; and (6)
Request for Judicial Notice.
On January 25, 2023,
Plaintiffs filed their Opposition. Plaintiffs concurrently filed: (1)
Declaration of Maria Gutierrez, Jesus Gutierrez, and Jesus Gutierrez, Jr.; (2)
Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Katherine P. Vilchez; (3)
Statement of Genuine Disputes; and (4) Request for Judicial Notice.
No reply or other
response has been filed to the Motion.
ANALYSIS:
I.
Evidentiary
Objections
Plaintiffs filed an Evidentiary
Objection to the Declaration of Katherine P. Vilchez. The Court overrules the
evidentiary objection.
II.
Requests
for Judicial Notice
A.
Defendant’s
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant requests that the Court
take judicial notice of Defendant’s Form LLC-12, which was filed on June 18,
2021 with the Secretary of State of the State of California.
Judicial notice is GRANTED as to
this item.
B.
Plaintiffs’
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs’ request that the Court
take judicial notice of the following items:
(1)
January
13, 2017 order on the Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication in Townsend
v. Ford Motor Company; and
(2)
Legislative
history for the 2007 addition of section 1795.8 of the California Civil Code.
Judicial notice is denied as to both of
these items. Judicial notice is denied as superfluous as to the first item. Any
party that wishes to cite another court’s opinion may simple do so. Judicial
notice is denied as irrelevant to the second item. “Although a court may
judicially notice a variety of matters (Evid. Code, §¿450 et seq.), only relevant
material may be noticed” (Am. Cemwood Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 431, 441, fn. 7.)
As part of its assessment of the
moving papers, the Court does consider the abovementioned order in Townsend
v. Ford Motor Company.
III.
Legal
Standard
“[T]he party
moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no
triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in
favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850.)
“[T]he party
moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a
prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact;
if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing
party is then subjected to a burden of production of his
own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact.” (Id.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar
apply to summary adjudication motions].)
In line with Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the
trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact
exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If
there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's
Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary
judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the
opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While
viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its
primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may
the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict,
the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)
Further, “the
trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to
determine whose version is more likely true.
Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's
evaluation of credibility.” (Id.
at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the
light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party”].)
IV.
Discussion
A. The
Parties’ Arguments
Defendant moves for summary judgment, or, alternatively,
summary adjudication as to the following:
(1) Summary adjudication of
Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act; and
(2) Summary adjudication of
Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages.
(Motion, p. 1:6–12.)
Defendant argues: (1) that the sixth cause of action fails
under both the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the California Commercial
Code because the vehicle was not purchased (or taken possession of) in
California; (2) that the sixth cause of action fails because the Subject
Vehicle was used when purchased and Plaintiffs have no valid implied warranty
claims; and (3) that the prayer for punitive damages fails because it is not
supported by a viable cause of action. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
pp. 5:14–15, 6:8–9, 7:11–12, 8:4–5, 10:20, 11:25.)
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion, arguing: (1) that Defendant did
not sign the purchase agreement and therefore cannot invoke the agreement’s
choice-of-law clause; (2) that California remedies apply through the MMWA by
default; (3) that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides for its own rights
and remedies; (4) that Plaintiffs can pursue Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
remedies through the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, even in the absence of a
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claim; (5) that there exists a triable issue
of fact regarding the state in which title passed; (6) that, for a variety of
reasons, the Court should follow the Jensen line of cases and not the Rodriguez
line of cases; and (7) that punitive damages are recoverable pursuant to
the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Opposition, pp. 2:3–4, 2:23–25, 4:5–6,
7:3, 7:23–24, 8:27, 20:9.)
No reply or other responses has been filed.
B.
Whether there is a Federal Cause of
Action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
1. Legal
Standard
“Subject to
subsections (a)(3) and (e), a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a
supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under
this title [15 USCS §§ 2301 et seq.], or under a written warranty, implied
warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and
equitable relief—
(A)
“in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the
District of Columbia; or
(B) “in an appropriate district court of the United
States, subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection.”
(15 U.S.C. § 2310, subd.
(d)(1)(A)–(B).)
2. Discussion
There is no dispute that the Subject Vehicle was purchased
through a third party (Carvana) from that third party’s dealership in Georgia.
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities, p. 1:1–3; Appendix of Documents, Ex. C,
GUT 00001, GUT 00009; Appendix of Documents, Ex. D, p. 29:17–21; Statement of
Genuine Disputes (which only disputes that Georgia remedies apply,
rather than disputing the car was purchased from a dealership in Georgia).)
Further, as the Court has taken judicial notice of
Defendant’s filing with the California Secretary of State, there is no dispute
that Defendant is organized in Delaware (and not in California).
Finally, as neither Party has represented to the Court that
there is a relevant, actionable Georgia law that implicates express or implicit
warranty protections regarding the Subject Vehicle, there is no dispute before
the Court regarding any Georgia laws.
These three details are important because they frame this
case by clarifying what is not actionable as a matter of law.
First, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is not
actionable here because the Subject Vehicle was not purchased in California. (Cummins,
Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 483, 493 (“We conclude that the
[Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act] does not apply unless the vehicle was
purchased in California.”)
Second, the California Commercial Code is not actionable here
because the transaction (i.e., the purchase of the vehicle) neither bears a
reasonable relation to this state nor falls under one of the statutorily-listed
categories for jurisdiction. (Com. Code, § 1301, subds. (b) (“In the absence of
an agreement effective under subdivision (a), and except as provided in
subdivision (c), this code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to this state.”) and (c) (listing sections of the Commercial Code that
deal, respectively, with the rights of unsecured creditors, bank deposits and
collections, letters of credit, bulk sales, investment securities, perfection
and priority of secured transactions, leases of personal property, and transfer
of funds).)
Third, none of the Parties have made the Court aware of any
Georgia laws that are actionable here.
Without any state-based causes of action to rely on, the sole
issue at hand becomes clear: whether as a matter of law Plaintiffs can plead an
actionable claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act without any actionable,
state-based cause of action.
There appears to be a conflict in reasoning between the
Courts of Appeal on this point.
In one case, a Court of Appeal held that “the trial court
correctly concluded that failure to state a warranty claim under state law
necessarily constituted a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss” and
affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal by sustaining the car
manufacturer’s demurrer without leave to amend the complaint. (Daugherty v.
Am. Honda Motor Co. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 827, 832–33.)
However, another case
held that the trial court acted in error when it concluded that California law
supplanted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, noting that “Magnuson-Moss
supplements California law of warranty and establishes a cause of action under
the federal act for breach of written warranty.” (Orichian v. BMW of N. Am. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1332.)
Here, the relevant facts are closer to those in Daugherty than
to Orichian. In Daugherty, there were no state law warranty
claims at issue; in Orichian, even though there was no viable claim
under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the Magnuson-Moss claim could
still be based on the California Commercial Code (even though the plaintiff in
that case did not plead a separate cause of action under the California
Commercial Code). (Daugherty, supra, at 833; Orichian, supra,
at 1325, 1330–34.)
Although the Court is troubled by the apparent conflict in
reasoning between these two appellate cases, it appears that Daugherty
is more directly on-point. (See, Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.)
Without an underlying state cause of action, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs are unable to state a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act. Defendant meets its burden of proof in showing that there is no triable
issue of material fact as to the sixth cause of action, and Plaintiffs have not
met their subsequent burden of proof in showing that there is such a triable
issue of material fact.
Defendant has not made any arguments regarding the seventh
cause of action for negligent repair.
(See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication, filed
11/9/22.) Therefore, the Court denies summary
adjudication as to that cause of action. However, as the seventh cause of
action does not include any allegations regarding fraud, oppression, or malice,
the Court grants summary adjudication in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiffs’
prayer for punitive damages.
The Court GRANTS in part Defendant FCA US LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication. The Court GRANTS summary adjudication in
favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs regarding the sixth cause of action
(the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim) and the prayer for punitive damages
listed in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The Court DENIES the Motion regarding summary
judgment.
The Court need not, and hence does not, reach arguments
regarding the applicability of state claims based on the Subject Vehicle being
a used car, the applicability of the choice of law provision in the purchase
agreement, or whether the Court should follow the Jensen line of cases
instead of the Rodriguez line of cases.
V. Conclusion
Defendant FCA US LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment/ Summary
Adjudication is GRANTED in part. Summary adjudication is GRANTED in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiffs regarding the sixth cause of action (the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim) and the prayer for punitive damages listed in
Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Summary judgment is DENIED.