Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case 21STCV37868 2023-04-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 21STCV37868, Date: 2023-04-19 Tentative Ruling

SUBJECT: Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

The Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED in part.

Summary adjudication is DENIED to Paul Sungil Choi, Eunice Hee Oh, and Degnan SP, Inc.’s cause of action for violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances section 2.68.320.

Summary adjudication is GRANTED to Paul Sungil Choi, Eunice Hee Oh, and Degnan SP, Inc.’s causes of action for breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

This case involves various allegations and causes of action surrounding the use of property. For the sake of clarity, the Court refrains from using the terms Plaintiff, Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Cross-Defendant. Rather, the Court shall use the terms “Movants” and Non-Movants.”

This case, listed as case number 21STCV37868, is a the lead case in a consolidated action that is comprised of four Complaints, one Cross-Complaint, and seven Answers. The lead case was originally filed by Hubert Bordenave on October 13, 2021 against Soon N. Yoon, Paul Sungil Choi, Eunice Hee Oh, and Degnan SP, Inc. Lori Bordenave is a party in two of the actions. The Court has already found all four cases to be related. Soon N. Yoon has been dismissed with prejudice from Hubert Bordenave’s Complaint, and Soon N. Yoon’s Cross-Complaint (filed April 25, 2022) has been dismissed without prejudice.

On January 13, 2023, Hubert Bordenave and Lori Bordenave (“Movants”) filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication. Movants concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Raffi Kassabian; (2) Declaration of Hubert Bordenave; (3) Declaration of Lori Bordenave; (4) Separate Statement; and (5) Proposed Order.

On January 30, 2023, Movants re-filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication (“MSJ”), along with all the concurrent filings. The Court disregards the January 13, 2023 filings and considers the January 30, 2023 filings.

On March 14, 2023, by request of Hubert Bordenave, the Clerk’s Office dismissed without prejudice Paul Sungil Choi, Eunice Hee Oh, and Degnan SP, Inc. from the first cause of action in Hubert Bordenave’s Complaint.

On March 24, 2023, Movants filed their Motion to Bifurcate the Action (“Motion to Bifurcate”). They concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Raffi Kassabian; and (2) Proposed Order.

On April 5, 2023, Paul Sungil Choi, Eunice Hee Oh, and Degnan SP, Inc. (“Non-Movants”) filed their Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opposition to MSJ”). Non-Movants concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Wil J. Rios; (2) Declaration of Paul Sungil Choi; (3) Response to Separate Statement; (4) Evidentiary Objections; and (5) Proposed Order.

On April 6, 2023, Non-Movants filed their Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate the Action (“Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate”).

On April 12, 2023, Movants filed their Reply to the Motion to Bifurcate the Action (“Reply to Motion to Bifurcate”).

On April 14, 2023, Movants filed their Reply to the MSJ. Movants concurrently late filed: (1) Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Paul Sungil Choi; (2) Declaration of Raffi Kassabian; and (3) Proof of Service.

Non-Movants filed evidentiary objections to Movants’ declarations. The following are the Court’s rulings to these evidentiary objections.

Objection
1	SUSTAINED
2	SUSTAINED
3		OVERRULED
4		OVERRULED
5		OVERRULED
6		OVERRULED
7		OVERRULED
8		OVERRULED
9		OVERRULED
10		OVERRULED
11		OVERRULED

Movants filed evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Paul Sungil Choi. The following are the Court’s rulings to these evidentiary objections.

Objection
1		OVERRULED
2		OVERRULED
3	SUSTAINED
4		OVERRULED
5		OVERRULED
6	SUSTAINED
7	SUSTAINED
8		OVERRULED
9		OVERRULED
10		OVERRULED
11		OVERRULED

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Id.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)

Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)

Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

This consolidated case contains numerous pleadings. Among them are (1) a complaint originally filed in 21STCV38453 (Choi, et al. v. Bordenave, et al.) with causes of action for declaratory relief, violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances section 2.68.320, and breach of contract; and (2) a complaint originally filed in 22STCV02995 (Choi, et al. v. Bordenave, et al.) with causes of action for breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations.

Movants ask the Court to grant them summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication on the second cause of action in 21STCV38453 (i.e., the cause of action for violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances section 2.68.320) and on all causes of action in 22STCV02995.

“It is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months, or both, for any person, during an emergency, to:

A. “Willfully obstruct, hinder, or delay any member of the County emergency organization in the enforcement of any lawful rule or regulation issued pursuant to this chapter, or in the performance of any responsibility or duty authorized or imposed by virtue of this chapter;

B. “Do any act forbidden by any lawful rule or regulation issued pursuant to this chapter, if such act is of such a nature as to give or be likely to give assistance to the enemy or to imperil the lives or property of inhabitants of the County, or to prevent, hinder, or delay the defense or protection thereof; and

C. “Wear, carry, or display, without authority, any means of identification specified by the emergency agency of the State, the County, a County District, or any city in the County.

“Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, it shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months, or both, for any person to violate any curfew or other emergency order or regulation established by any lawful rule, regulation, order, or directive issued pursuant to this chapter. It shall be an affirmative defense to a violation of a curfew order that, at the time of such violation, a person was: (1) traveling to or from work or school, (2) experiencing homelessness and without access to a viable shelter, or (3) seeking medical treatment.”

The Revised Guidelines to Aid in the Implementation of the Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium During the COVID-19 Pandemic (“Eviction Moratorium”), dated July 20, 2021, states in relevant part:

“Nonpayment of Rent: A Landlord shall not serve a notice to evict on or otherwise attempt to evict a Tenant subject to the Moratorium:

A. Who fails to pay any amount of rent or other costs or fees, including but not limited to late charges and interest, if the Tenant demonstrates an inability to pay such rent or other costs or fees due to financial impacts related to COVID-19, the state of emergency regarding COVID-19, or following government-recommended COVID-19 precautions, so long as the Tenant has provided the Landlord with notice of an inability to pay within seven (7) calendar days of the date the rent or other costs or fees were due, unless extenuating circumstances exist that prevented the Tenant from providing timely notice, including but not limited to the Tenant’s illness or the illness of a family member for whom the Tenant is providing care. Tenants are encouraged, but are not required, to provide this notice in writing.

B. Moratorium Period. Commercial Tenants who are unable to pay rent incurred during the Moratorium Period are protected from eviction under this Moratorium so long as the reason for nonpayment is Financial Impacts Related to COVID-19. . . .” (Eviction Moratorium, ¶¶ 6.1, subds. A.–B.)

“Commercial Tenants: A Landlord who has attempted to evict a Tenant for nonpayment of rent and who receives notice from the Tenant that the Tenant is unable to pay rent or other costs or fees, and extenuating circumstances prevented the Tenant from providing timely notice, must immediately cease all efforts to evict the Tenant, including but not limited to dismissing a summons and complaint that has been filed to evict the Tenant. The Tenant shall not be considered a prevailing party and shall not be entitled to recover costs or legal fees as a result of any such voluntary dismissal.” (Eviction Moratorium, ¶ 6.8., subd. B.)

“For any Tenancy which is subject to the County’s rent stabilization or mobilehome [sic] rent stabilization ordinances (Los Angeles County Code Chapters 8.52 and 8.57), a Landlord shall not attempt to increase the amount of rent while the Moratorium remains in effect, and any notices of rent increase served during the Moratorium shall be void and of no force or effect. The time period stated in any notice of rent increase served before the Moratorium is effectively tolled until the end of the Moratorium. The Department may approve pass-through charges requested in an application filed pursuant to Los Angeles County Code chapters 8.52.070 and 8.57.070, provided that no pass-through charges shall be allowed during the Moratorium. Landlords may not charge interest or late fees on unpaid rent or other amounts otherwise owed, during the Moratorium Period and are prohibited from retroactively imposing or collecting any such amounts following the termination or expiration of the Moratorium.” (Eviction Moratorium, ¶ 9.)

“Landlords, and those acting on their behalf, are prohibited from harassing, or intimidating, or retaliating against Tenants for acts or omissions by Tenants permitted under the Moratorium, and such acts by Landlord or Landlord’s agent will be deemed to be violations of the Retaliatory Eviction and Harassment provisions as set forth in County Code Sections 8.52.130 and 8.57.100 and as expanded by this Moratorium.” (Eviction Moratorium, ¶ 10.)

“Violations of the Moratorium and appropriate remedies may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a private right of action between a Tenant and Landlord. Tenants may raise the existence of the Moratorium, and any rights and remedies created thereunder, as an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action. Nothing in these Guidelines are intended to limit the County’s authority to enforce its executive orders, laws, and regulations.” (Eviction Moratorium, ¶ 11.)

“A Landlord, who is determined by the Department to have violated the terms of Paragraphs V, VI, VII, or VIII of the Moratorium, shall be subject to administrative fines pursuant to Sections 8.52.160 and 8.57.130 of the County Code. The maximum administrative fine for violations of Paragraph VIII is temporarily increased during this Moratorium, from $1,000 to $5,000 per violation, per each day the violation continues. If the aggrieved Tenant is disabled or age 65 or older, an additional fine of up to $5,000 per day may be applied. Any Tenant, or any other person or entity acting on behalf of the Tenant representing the Tenant's interests, including the County, may enforce the provisions of Paragraphs V, VI, VII, or VIII of the Moratorium by means of a civil action seeking civil remedies. Landlords shall be subject to civil penalties as outlined above.” (Eviction Moratorium, ¶ 12.)

Movants argue that the cause of action for violation of the Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances section 2.68.320 fails because: (1) the Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium does not apply, since Non-Movants can pay their rent and they did not provide timely notice of nonpayment; and (2) the cause of action is moot since the eviction moratorium has ended. (MSJ, pp. 10:13–17, 11:21.)

Non-Movants disagree, arguing: (1) there are triable issues of material fact regarding this cause of action; (2) Movants’ attempt to raise Non-Movants’ rent was disproportionate and unreasonable; (3) Non-Movants’ admission does not necessarily mean Non-Movants were able to pay rent at the time in question; (4) Non-Movants provided timely notice of their inability to pay rent; (5) the cause of action is based on violations of the eviction moratorium during the time the moratorium was in effect; and (6) alleged violations of the eviction moratorium may have ongoing effects. (Opposition to MSJ, pp. 8:10–12, 9:3, 9:17–19, 10:26–27, 11:24–25, 12:8–10.)

The Court notes that Movants make additional, new arguments in their Reply that are not responsive to arguments made in the MSJ or the Opposition to MSJ. These arguments are: (1) that section 2.68.320 of the Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances does not provide for a right of action; and (2) that the Eviction Moratorium does not provide an affirmative cause of action. (Reply to MSJ, pp. 8:22, 9:3.) There are four other arguments regarding this cause of action that are made in the Reply which are reiterations of prior arguments made in the MSJ. (Id. at pp. 9:8, 9:14–17, 10:13–15, 10:20–21.)

“Points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before. To withhold a point until the closing brief deprives the respondent of the opportunity to answer it or requires the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.” (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn.3. See also, Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010; Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enters. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8; Alcazar v. LAUSD (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 86, fn. 5.)

Movants’ new arguments may or may not be correct. However, as no good cause was shown for failure to present the new arguments earlier, the Court does not consider them at this time. Movants may bring up these arguments at trial. The previously-asserted arguments that are reiterated in the Reply to MSJ are considered.

Movants are correct that the Eviction Moratorium has now ended. Although the Eviction Moratorium was extended since the MSJ was filed on January 30, 2023, the Eviction Moratorium officially ended on March 31, 2023. (See www.dcba.lacounty.gov/noevictions.)

However, that does not mean that any violations that occurred during the existence of the Eviction Moratorium are no longer actionable. Unless limited by another section of the Eviction Moratorium, the cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action, and the cause of action must be brought within the limitations period applicable after accrual of the cause of action. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.)

Neither Party has discussed the statute of limitations for either the Eviction Moratorium or the Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances Section 2.68.320. The Court finds that the Statute of Limitations is determined by Code of Civil Procedure section 343.

“An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 343.)

The cause of action for violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances Section 2.68.320 was filed on October 18, 2021. That is less than four years since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and thus less than four years since the cause of action accrued. It was also filed prior to the end of the Eviction Moratorium. Therefore, although the Eviction Moratorium has elapsed, the cause of action for a violation of the Eviction Moratorium while the Eviction Moratorium was in effect is not moot.

Movants argue that timeliness of the notice is an issue because any act at issue threatened eviction by September 31, 2021 while Non-Movants served Movants with their “Notice to Landlord of Inability to Pay Rent Due to Covid-19” on October 8, 2021. (MSJ, p. 11:10–16.)

Non-Movants argue that the notice was not untimely because it was still within the timeframe provided for by the Eviction Moratorium. (Opposition to MSJ, p. 11:11–16.) Non-Movants do not dispute the assertion that Non-Movants did not give notice to Movants prior to Movants serving Non-Movants with a request for rent increase or eviction.

The Court has carefully reviewed the evidence submitted by both Movants and Non-Movants in connection with the MSJ. The evidence presented is sparse: no written eviction notice prior to October 2021 has been submitted, and none of the declarations address what was written or stated in any such eviction notice that allegedly threatened eviction by September 31, 2021. The mere allegation is that Movants pushed Non-Movants for a rent increase prior to October 2021. The only relevant evidence in the record is: (1) that Non-Movants consistently paid their rent prior to October 2021 (Decl. Lori Bordenave, ¶ 16.); (2) that Non-Movants only stopped paying rent in October 2021 (id.); (3) that Non-Movants filed their “Notice to Landlord of Inability to Pay Rent due to COVID-19” on October 8, 2021 (Decl. Kassabian, Exh. C.); and (4) that the notice lists the reason for inability to pay rent as “Lay-off, loss of hours, loss of revenue, or other income reduction resulting from business closure or other economic or employer impacts of COVID-19” (id.).

Further, neither party has cited to the Court which provisions of the Eviction Moratorium are applicable.

Summarizing the evidence, Non-Movants paid their rent through September 2021 and Non-Movants stopped paying their rent as of October 2021. To the extent that Movants threatened a rent increase on Non-Movants in the period shortly before October 2021, such a rent increase was void and of no force or effect pursuant to Eviction Moratorium paragraph 9, and no notice was required for invocation of this protection. To the extent that Non-Movants sought protection for nonpayment of rent as commercial tenants as of October 2021, Non-Movants served Movants with notice of inability to pay rent on October 8, 2021, with a reason based on COVID-19. This was sufficient to invoke the Eviction Moratorium protections pursuant to Eviction Moratorium paragraphs 6.1, subdivision B., and 6.8, subdivision B.

Movants argue that the protections for the Eviction Moratorium do not apply because Non-Movants were able to pay their rent. (MSJ, p. 11:3–9.) Movants cite multiple requests for admission where Non-Movants admitted that they received sufficient income from their operation of the property to cover their rent month to month as it relates to the lease. (Decl. Kassabian, Exhs. A (RFA No. 28 for each Non-Movant).) Because the Eviction Moratorium does require a demonstrated “inability to pay such rent or other costs or fees”, Movants meet their initial burden of proof regarding this argument. (Eviction Moratorium, ¶ 6.1, subd. A.)

Non-Movants argue that just because they admitted that they made enough money to cover the rent every month prior to October 2021 does not necessarily mean that they were able to do so at the time in question. (Opposition to MSJ, p. 10:5–9.) Non-Movants submit as evidence their corporate Statement of Income, which shows a significant drop in monthly income when comparing the first half of 2021 with the rest of 2021 and all of 2022. (Decl. Choi, Exh. G.) Non-Movants sufficiently meet their subsequent burden to show that their ability (or inability, as the case may be) to pay rent starting in October 2021 is a triable issue of material fact.

The Court DENIES summary adjudication as to the cause of action for violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances Section 2.68.320.

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)¿

If a breach of contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) “In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Constr. Protective Servs., Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198–199.)¿

Movants argue that the cause of action for breach of contract fails because: (1) Movants did not interfere with the quiet enjoyment of the premises by fencing the parking lot; and (2) Non-Movants’ discovery responses cannot establish a claim for breach of contract. (MSJ, pp. 7:4–6, 8:11–12.) Movants specifically point to Non-Movants’ admission that the parking lot is not part of the Parties’ lease. (Decl. Kassabian, Exh. A (RFA No. 34 for each Non-Movant).) Movants meet their initial burden by providing evidence that there is no breach of contract for fencing the parking lot because the parking lot was not part of the contract.

Non-Movants argue that the parking lot was part of the premises of the subject property, and thus there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the parking lot was part of the lease. (Opposition to MSJ, p. 5:11–16.)

In support of their argument, Non-Movants cite paragraph two of the lease and paragraphs seven and eight of the Declaration of Paul Sungil Choi. (Response to Separate Statement, ¶ 12.) But this evidence does not support Non-Movants’ assertion. The Declaration of Paul Sungil Choi merely states that Movants fenced the parking lot and that the fencing of the parking lot affected Non-Movants’ business. It does not assert that the parking lot is part of the lease.

“2. PREMISES: Landlord hereby leases to Tenant and Tenant hereby leases from Landlord, on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, that certain real property and the building and other improvements located thereon situated in the City of Los Angeles, County of ______, State of Calif [sic], commonly known as Hubert’s Liquor and described as ______ (said real property is hereinafter called the ‘Premises’).”

The parking lot is not mentioned in that section of the lease or elsewhere. Non-Movants argue that it is a question of fact whether the parking lot is part of the premises that they are renting and thus a part of the lease. However, this issue has been conclusively decided by Non-Movants admission to a Request for Admission.

Request for Admission No. 34 states verbatim: “Admit the PARKING LOT is not part of the terms of the LEASE AGREEMENT.” This was admitted, and Non-Movants never moved to withdraw the admission or amend it.

“Any matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission in the pending action, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that admission under Section 2033.300.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410, subd. (a).) Thus, Non-Movants do not meet their subsequent burden to show that a triable issue of fact exists regarding a breach of contract.

The Court GRANTS summary adjudication against Non-Movants on their cause of action for breach of contract.

The elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage include “(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” (Crown Imports, LLC v. Super. Ct. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404 [cleaned up].)¿¿¿

Further, “the alleged interference must have been wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. For an act to be sufficiently independently wrongful, it must be unlawful, that is, it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” (Id. [cleaned up].) ¿¿

Movants argue that the cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage fails because: (1) Non-Movants do not establish that Movants committed a wrongful act; and (2) Non-Movants do not identify any actionable relationship. (MSJ, p. 9:8–10.) Movants assertion that their fencing of their parking lot is not a wrongful act is sufficient for Movants to meet their initial burden.

Non-Movants claim that the wrongful act is the fencing of the parking lot because “based on the lease agreement between the parties, [Non-Movants] have a legal right to use the parking lot.” (Opposition to MSJ, p. 9:10–11.) As indicated above in §I(C)(2), the Court has determined that the parking lot is not part of the lease agreement. There is no evidence or authority for the propositions that Non-Movants have a right to use the parking lot or that Movants do not have the right to fence the parking lot.

As there is no evidence that any interference by fencing the parking lot was a wrongful act, Non-Movants have not met their subsequent burden to show there is a triable issue of material fact regarding this cause of action.

The Court GRANTS summary adjudication in favor of Movants and against Non-Movants on Non-Movants’ cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.

“The elements of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage are (1) the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s knowledge (actual or construed) that the relationship would be disrupted if the defendant failed to act with reasonable care; (4) the defendant’s failure to act with reasonable care; (5) actual disruption of the relationship; and (6) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.” (Redfearn v. Trader Joe’s Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989, 1005.)

“For negligent interference, a defendant's conduct is blameworthy only if it was independently wrongful apart from the interference itself.” (Lange v. TIG Ins. Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187, citations omitted.)

The same analysis applies here as it did with the previously-discussed cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. (See supra, §1(c)(3).) Because there is no evidence that any interference by fencing the parking lot was a wrongful act, Non-Movants have not met their subsequent burden to show there is a triable issue of material fact regarding a cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

The Court GRANTS summary adjudication in favor of Movants and against Non-Movants on Non-Movants’ cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED in part.

Summary adjudication is DENIED to Paul Sungil Choi, Eunice Hee Oh, and Degnan SP, Inc.’s cause of action for violation of Los Angeles County Code of Ordinances section 2.68.320.

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order . . . that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 598.)

“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (b).)

“The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant’s profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud in accordance with Section 3294. . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (d).)

Movants request that the Court bifurcate the unlawful detainer portion of the case and set it for an early trial date. (Motion to Bifurcate, p. 8:6–7.) Movants argue: (1) that bifurcation will benefit judicial economy and expedition; and (2) that bifurcate would promote the ends of justice. (Id. at p. 7:1, 7:18.)

Non-Movants oppose the Motion to Bifurcate. (Motion to Bifurcate, p. 10:22–23.) Non-Movants argue: (1) that denial of bifurcation will result in conservation of judicial resources because the causes of action involve the same or similar issues with the same evidence; and (2) that Movants will not be prejudiced by hearing the issues or claims together. (Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate, pp. 7:3–4, 9:19.)

Movants argue in their Reply: (1) that a small overlap of the evidence does not weigh against bifurcation; (2) that bifurcation is conducive to judicial economy; and (3) that bifurcation is necessary to avoid prejudice and delay. (Reply to Motion to Bifurcate, pp. 3:18–19, 5:11, 6:21.)

The Court agrees with Non-Movants’ arguments. The denial of bifurcation will conserve judicial resources. Having two trials will take more resources in this situation than one trial. Moreover, the hearing on this motion is scheduled for April 19, 2023, while the trial in this matter is scheduled for May 1, 2023. Even if the Court were to agree to bifurcate, it would be impossible to hold the UD trial prior to the currently-scheduled trial date of May 1, 2023.