Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case Number: 22STCV01879, Date: 2023-08-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV01879, Date: 2023-08-30 Tentative Ruling

On January 14, 2022, Janet B. Sikiyan (“Sikiyan”) filed her Complaint against Haskell & Davis, CPA, David Haskell, Gregory Davis, and Shannon Deck on employment-related causes of action.

On April 27, 2022, by request of Sikiyan, the Clerk’s Office dismissed without prejudice the cause of action for unlawful withholding of wages from the Complaint.

On December 13, 2022, Haskell & Davis, CPA, David Haskell, Gregory Davis, and Shannon Deck, filed their Answer to the SAC.

On June 9, 2023, Haskell & Davis, CPA filed its Verified Cross-Complaint against Sikiyan.

On September 15, 2023, Sikiyan filed her Verified Answer to the Verified Cross-Complaint.

On January 16, 2024, Haskell & Davis, CPA filed its Motion for Summary Adjudication (“MSA”). In support of its MSA, Haskell & Davis, CPA concurrently filed: (1) Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Memorandum”); (2) Evidence in Support of MSA; (3) Declaration of Gregory J. Davis; (4) Declaration of Shannon L. Deck; and (5) Separate Statement.

On March 20, 2024, Sikiyan filed her Opposition to the MSA. In support of her Opposition, Sikiyan concurrently filed: (1) Declaration of Janet B. Sikiyan; (2) Separate Statement; (3) Request for Judicial Notice; (4) Objections to Declaration of Gregory J. Davis; and (5) Objections to Declaration of Shannon L. Deck.

On March 29, 2024, Haskell & Davis, CPA filed its Reply in support of the MSA. Haskell & Davis, CPA concurrently filed its Proposed Order.

Sikiyan filed evidentiary objections to Haskell & Davis, CPA’s evidence. The following are the Court’s rulings on these objections.

Objection
1		OVERRULED
2		OVERRULED
3		OVERRULED
4		OVERRULED
5		OVERRULED
6		OVERRULED
7		OVERRULED
8		OVERRULED
9		OVERRULED
10		OVERRULED
11		OVERRULED
12		OVERRULED
13		OVERRULED
14		OVERRULED
15		OVERRULED
16		OVERRULED
17		OVERRULED
18		OVERRULED
19		OVERRULED
20		OVERRULED
21		OVERRULED
22		OVERRULED
23		OVERRULED
24		OVERRULED
25		OVERRULED
26		OVERRULED
27		OVERRULED
28		OVERRULED
29		OVERRULED
30		OVERRULED
31		OVERRULED
32		OVERRULED
33		OVERRULED

Objection
1		OVERRULED
2		OVERRULED
3		OVERRULED
4		OVERRULED
5		OVERRULED
6		OVERRULED
7		OVERRULED
8		OVERRULED
9		OVERRULED
10		OVERRULED
11		OVERRULED
12		OVERRULED
13		OVERRULED
14		OVERRULED
15		OVERRULED
16		OVERRULED
17		OVERRULED
18		OVERRULED
19		OVERRULED
20		OVERRULED
21		OVERRULED
22		OVERRULED
23		OVERRULED
24		OVERRULED
25		OVERRULED
26		OVERRULED
27		OVERRULED
28		OVERRULED
29		OVERRULED
30		OVERRULED
31		OVERRULED

As indicated above, the Court is overruling every one of Plaintiff’s 64 objections to these two declarations. Many of the objections are frivolous. “This is hardly good advocacy, and it unnecessarily overburdens the trial court.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 254, fn. 3.)

Sikiyan requests that the Court take judicial notice of a declaration previously submitted in this matter.

The Court DENIES as superfluous judicial notice of this item. Any party that wishes to draw the Court’s attention to an item filed in this action may simply cite directly to the document by execution and filing date. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(d).)

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. The motion may be made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (1)(a).)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, citation omitted.)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474, [applying the summary judgment standards in Aguilar to motions for summary adjudication].)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839, citation omitted.)

“The trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a fact finder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Binder, supra, at p. 840, citations omitted; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

“On a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320, citation omitted.)

Haskell & Davis, CPA moves for summary adjudication of the following two issues:

(1) whether Sikiyan was a partner at Haskell & Davis, CPA and thus owed fiduciary duties to the partnership; and

(2) whether Sikiyan was an employee at Haskell & Davis, CPA who did not owe fiduciary duties to the partnership.

Haskell & Davis, CPA argues: (1) that the Parties’ conduct reveals that Sikiyan was a partner at Haskell & Davis, CPA; (2) that Sikiyan was not an employee at Haskell & Davis, CPA; and (3) that multiple estoppel doctrines preclude inconsistent positions. (Memorandum, pp. 7:13, 10:1, 11:13.)

Sikiyan opposes the MSA, arguing: (1) that whether Sikiyan was an employee or a partner is question of fact for the jury; (2) that factual issues remain whether any partnership agreement was formed; (3) that Sikiyan was not given any sharing of profits or business management participation; and (4) that Haskell & Davis, CPA has admitted that Sikiyan owned 0% of the partnership. (Opposition, pp. 4:11, 5:12, 8:1, 8:25.)

In its Reply, Haskell & Davis, CPA argues: (1) that Sikiyan refuses to concede undisputed facts; (2) that Sikiyan makes an abusive number of objections; and (3) that Sikiyan does not address Haskell & Davis, CPA’s arguments. (Reply, pp. 1:1, 5:11–12, 8:1–2, 10:10.)

The “issues” raised by Haskell & Davis, CPA are actually two sides of the same issue: either Sikiyan was a partner at Haskell & Davis, CPA, or she was an employee at Haskell & Davis, CPA.

Haskell & Davis, CPA submits evidence that indicates Sikiyan was a partner. Among this evidence is: (1) declaratory evidence from Gregory Davis that Sikiyan is a partner and not an employee; (2) declaratory evidence from Shannon Deck that Sikiyan was a partner and not an employee; (3) various documents (including a business card, an email signature, webpages, tax documents, etc.) that indicates Sikiyan was a partner; and (4) text messages from Sikiyan that indicate she considered herself to be a partner. (Decl. Davis, ¶ 13; Decl. Deck, ¶ 11; Evidence, Exhs. 2, 4–7, 11–13, 17–19.)

Sikiyan submits contrary evidence that she was not a partner. Among this evidence is: (1) declaratory evidence from Sikiyan that she did not share in the profits of the partnership and had no control of the partnership; and (2) the IRS forms, which includes a declaration under penalty of perjury that Sikiyan owned 0% of the partnership. (Decl. Sikiyan, ¶¶ 5–8; Evidence, Exh. 11, Schedule K-1 [actual page 196 of 605] and Exh. 17, Schedule K-1 [actual page 356 of 605].)

The Court agrees with Sikiyan that the issues raised by Haskell & Davis, CPA involve questions of fact that must be determined by the jury. Although Haskell & Davis, CPA has met its initial burden on these issues, Sikiyan has met her subsequent burden to demonstrate that there are triable issues of material fact regarding whether Sikiyan was or was not a partner.