Judge Michael P. Linfield, Case 22STCV08377 2022-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael P. Linfield, Case: 22STCV08377, Date: 2022-08-05 Tentative Ruling

SUBJECT: Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay State Court Proceedings

The Court severs the provision of the arbitration agreement requiring Plaintiff to pay half of the arbitration filing fees. With that one change, Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. This action is STAYED until arbitration procedures under the Arbitration Agreement conclude.

On March 8, 2022, Plaintiff Mohammed “Mo” Sajady filed a complaint against Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center alleging the following causes of action:

1. Age Discrimination in Violation of the Fair Employment & Housing Act (Government Code § 12940 et seq.)

2. Failure to Take All Reasonable Steps to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment (Government Code § 12940(K).)

On June 3, 2022, Cedars-Sinai moved the Court for an order “to compel arbitration and to dismiss this action without prejudice or, in the alternative, to stay the court proceedings, including discovery, until completion of binding arbitration before American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).” (Motion, p. 2:4-7.)

On July 25, 2022, Plaintiff Mohammed “Mo” Sajady submitted objections to the evidence submitted by Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in support of its Motion to Compel Arbitration. The following constitute the Court’s rulings on Sajady’s evidentiary objections.

Objection
1		OVERRULED
2	SUSTAINED
3		OVERRULED
4		OVERRULED

On July 29, 2022, Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center submitted objections to the evidence submitted by Plaintiff Mohammed “Mo” Sajady in support of his opposition to Cedars-Sinai’s motion to compel arbitration. The following constitute the Court rulings on Cedars-Sinai’s evidentiary objections.

Objection
1		OVERRULED
2	SUSTAINED

On June 3, 2022, Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following Court records in support of its Motion to Compel Arbitration.

1. Notice of Entry of Order in Patel v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Case No. BC4338712, before the Honorable Mark V. Mooney of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, granting Cedars-Sinai’s Petition To Compel Arbitration, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

2. Minute Order in Greene v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, et al, Case No. BC458857, before the Honorable Terry A. Green of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, granting Cedars- Sinai’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request For Stay of Proceedings, attached hereto as Exhibit B.

3. Minute Order in Reininger v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Case No. 30-2013-00633250-CU-WT-CJC, granting Cedars-Sinai’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action, attached hereto as Exhibit C.

4. Minute Order in Edgelow v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Case No. BC543760, before the Honorable Michael P. Linfield of the Los Angeles Superior Court, granting Cedars-Sinai’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and To Dismiss Or Stay Action, attached hereto as Exhibit D.

5. Minute Order in Jerry Thomas, Jr. v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Case No. BC651058, before Honorable Mark V. Mooney of the Los Angeles Superior Court, granting Cedars-Sinai’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and To Stay Proceedings, attached hereto as Exhibit E.

6. Minute Order in Tracey Amireh v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, et al, Case No. BC658741, before Honorable Michael Johnson of the Los Angeles Superior Court, granting Cedars-Sinai’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and To Stay Proceedings, attached hereto as Exhibit F.

7. Minute Order in James Booker Jr. v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, et al., Case No. 19STCV23831, before Honorable Elaine Lu of the Los Angeles Superior Court, granting Cedars- Sinai’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and To Stay Proceedings, attached hereto as Exhibit G.

8. Minute Order in Laura Ross v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, etc., et al., Case No. 21STCV22944, before Honorable Kevin C. Brazile of the Los Angeles Superior Court, granting Cedars-Sinai’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and To Stay Proceedings, attached hereto as Exhibit H.

Plaintiff Mohammed Sajady objects to Cedars-Sinai’s requests for judicial notice for the following reason: “The orders issued by other courts concerning defendant’s motions to compel arbitration in unrelated actions are not relevant to the instant motion. (See Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 901, (fn. 3); Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 885 “A written trial court ruling in another case has not precedential value.”)” (Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendants Request for Judicial Notice, p. 1:27—2:3.)

The Court SUSTAINS Sajady’s objection. The Court DENIES Cedars-Sinai’s requests for judicial notice.

On July 29, 2022, Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following Court record in support of its Motion to Compel Arbitration.

1. Minute Order in Dakaira Anderson v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Case No. 20STCV22661, before the Honorable Laura A. Seigle of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, granting Cedars-Sinai’s Petition To Compel Arbitration, attached hereto as Exhibit I.

The Court DENIES Cedars-Sinai’s request for judicial notice. “A written trial court ruling in another case has no precedential value.” (Budrow, 171 Cal.App.4th at 885; Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761; In re Molz (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 836, 845; Santa Ana Medical Hospital Center v. Belshé (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.)

“The court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. This subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to the professional negligence of a health care provider made pursuant to Section 1295.” (CCP § 1281.2.)

A proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. (Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479.) Such enforcement may be sought by a party to the arbitration agreement. (CCP § 1280(e)(1).) Under both the Federal Arbitration Act and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. (Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) The party moving to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. (CCP § 1281.2.)

The petition to compel arbitration functions as a motion and is to be heard in the manner of a motion, i.e., the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court's discretion. (CCP §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413, 414.) The petition to compel must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218, 219.)

To decide a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine whether the claims are covered within the agreement’s scope. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocer Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)

The Court may decline to enforce an arbitration agreement if the party opposing arbitration can establish that the agreement is unconscionable. For an arbitration agreement to be unenforceable as unconscionable, both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. (Ibid.) “In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Ibid.)

"As the cases above illustrate, the core concern of the unconscionability doctrine is the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. These include terms that impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy; terms (usually of an adhesion or boilerplate nature) that attempt to alter in an impermissible manner fundamental duties otherwise imposed by the law, fine-print terms, or provisions that seek to negate the reasonable expectations of the non-drafting party, or unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh terms having to do with price or other central aspects of the transaction." (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1145 (cleaned up).)

Cedars-Sinai asserts that Sajady “executed Cedars-Sinai’s standalone Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims (“Arbitration Agreement”)” and moves the Court to compel Sajady to submit his claims to arbitration. (Notice of Motion, p. 2:4-7; Hickey Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A, p. 2.) Sajady argues that the instant motion “fails to provide specific – indeed, mandatory – firsthand information showing that in fact Plaintiff executed the arbitration provision or agreed to its terms” because the writing Cedars-Sinai relies upon for evidence of its claims has not been authenticated. (Opposition, p. 2:25—3:5.) Sajady notes that “any writing must be authenticated before the writing, or secondary evidence of its content, may be received in evidence.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) “Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.) “Thus, while all writings must be authenticated before they are received into evidence (§ 1401), the proponent's burden of producing evidence to show authenticity (§ 1400) is met when sufficient evidence has been produced to sustain a finding that the document is what it purports to be.” (People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1435.)

Sajady argues that Cedars-Sinai fails to authenticate both the signature purported to be that of Sajady, and the signature of Defendants’ representative on the arbitration agreement. (Opposition, p. 3:6-15, 4:17-24; Hickey Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A, p. 2.) Sajady suggests that this lack of authentication signals a lack of mutuality from the alleged agreement and argue that Cedars-Sinai fails its burden of showing that the signature was “the act of” Plaintiff and Defendant. (Opposition, p. 4:17-27.) In reply, Cedars-Sinai cites Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158 for the three-step burden shifting process under which signature authentication concerns in arbitration agreements are reviewed. “The moving party can meet its initial burden by attaching to the motion or petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the opposing party's signature. . . . For this step, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication. If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.” (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 [cleaned up].)

Sajady does not deny that the signature appearing on the arbitration agreement is his signature. Therefore, under Gamboa, “nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.” (Id.)

The Court finds that there is a signed arbitration agreement that covers this dispute.

“The term [contract of adhesion] signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 243.)

The Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement is a contract of adhesion as it presents as standardized contract imposed and drafted by Cedars-Sinai, the party with superior bargaining strength, that offered Sajady a single choice: sign the agreement and accept employment or reject both. “[F]ew employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 115.)

· Claims not resolved by the Conflict Resolution Procedure that demand $25,000.00 or more will be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration.

· The Arbitrator’s fee will be paid by Cedars-Sinai, but the filing fee for the arbitration service will be paid equally by the employee and Cedars-Sinai, and Cedars-Sinai will reimburse the employee for that cost should the employee prevail in the arbitration.

· Parties will engage in discovery according to and governed by California Code of Civil Procedure § 1283.5, expressly incorporated into the agreement.

· Arbitration proceedings will be held in Los Angeles, California, under the then effective Employment Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA); provided that if there is any conflict between such rules and the requirements of California or federal law, such legal requirements will govern the arbitration.

· The Arbitrator will issue a written decision including essential findings and conclusion upon which the award is based. The Arbitrator may award any form or remedy available in Court, and al arbitrations covered by the agreement “shall be adjudicated in accordance with applicable California law for state claims and applicable federal law for federal claims. (Hickey Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A, pp. 2, 3.)

As Plaintiff noted in his opposition, the statute referenced by Defendant in its motion, CCP § 1283.5, does not exist. This appears to have been a typo; Cedars-Sinai states that it intended to refer to CCP § 1283.05. (Reply, p. 6:10-23.) Further the Court recognizes that the Arbitration Agreement intends to incorporate by reference the most recent American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules, even if they postdate the Arbitration Agreement.

The Court notes that the Arbitration Agreement provides for neutral arbitrators, more than minimal discovery, a written award that explains the rationales for its conclusions, and all types of relief otherwise available in a non-arbitration forum.

The Court finds that the reference in the arbitration to a $25,000 threshold to be ambiguous, and to raise the possibility of non-mutuality. Further, the Agreement does not make clear who or what determines whether a conflict meets this damage threshold. However, this is not critical in this case, because Plaintiff filed his action as a general civil case, requesting more than $25,000 in damages.

The Court finds one provision of the arbitration agreement – the provision requiring Plaintiff to pay half of the filing fee for the arbitration – to be unconscionable. “[H]igh arbitration fees can be unaffordable for nonindigent as well as indigent consumers, and nothing . . . precludes courts from using unconscionability doctrine on a case -by-case basis to protect nonindigent consumers against fees that unreasonably limit access to arbitration” (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 920.) It is not clear how much this fee is; Plaintiff has already paid the filing fee for this lawsuit. Other than the above, the Arbitration Agreement does not appear to impose costs on employees those employees would not face in court.

The Court will sever the provision of the arbitration agreement requiring Plaintiff to pay half of the arbitration filing fee. With that deletion, the Court does not find the arbitration agreement to be substantively unconscionable.